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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF THE MARKET
by
Deniss Kaskurs
Florida International University, 2021
Miami, Florida
Professor Ronald Cox, Major Professor
At the end of the 20th century, the European Union (EU) had decided to expand
into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by extending accession invitations to ten CEE
states. During the accession process, each nation had a bargaining committee which was
established to negotiate with EU representatives about the entrance requirements.
Formally, negotiations revolve around political and economic bargaining between
politicians of the incoming member states and the EU representatives. Informally,
however, private commercial entities heavily influence the bargaining process, both from
the EU and from the member state side. This scholarly work refers to these entities as
transnational interest blocs due to the dominance of large-scale transnational corporations,
their corporate and business lobbying networks, and the wide geographical spectrum that
they cover. In most of the issue areas that were bargained by the EU and the CEE states,
transnational corporations were successful in advancing their policy agendas. Their success
depended on a mix of factors that included whether transnational interest blocs had
business allies in Eastern Europe and whether they were unified in their policy preferences.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The European Union has developed into the largest regional union in the world.
From the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, the union gradually
expanded over the years, creating many oversight agencies in different spheres, and
establishing treaties that would lead to an integrated single market. Today, the once small
community is called the European Union (EU) and it currently has 28 members. 1 Apart
from having an integrated single market, it also has several political bodies which has made
the EU a supranational government.
To be part of the European Union (EU), member states must comply with several
political and economic requirements. All member states must have a stable democratic
regime with their citizens having all the basic human rights. Economically, each member
state has to make sure that their economy follows the EU’s definition of a competitive
market economy.2 Apart from the type of economy, since each member state mostly trades
with other EU member states, EU regulations specify a unified product quality standard. If
the production standard is initially not up to par with the EU requirements, it will not t be
allowed to join the Union. If the standard is not maintained when the member state is
already within the union, the product is not allowed to be exported to other EU member
states. Finally, apart from trade requirements, each member states’ economic indicators
need to confirm with the Maastricht Treaty requirements if the member state wants to join
the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) which has the Euro as the common
currency.3 To satisfy the Maastricht Treaty criteria, member states have to keep the
inflation rate fairly low and to peg the national currency to the Euro exchange rate for two
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consecutive years before a member can adopt the Euro. In terms of national government
finances, the yearly government deficit-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio must not
surpass the 3% threshold. Also, government debt-to-GDP cannot be above 60% in the year
prior to joining the EMU. For some member states, these requirements have proven to be
rather difficult to achieve without large long-term economic, political, and social
sacrifices.4
At the end of the 20th century the EU had decided to expand its union into Central
and Eastern Europe. Countries such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland were good
candidates due to their geographical proximity to Germany and France. Other candidate
nations such as the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Hungary had not quite met the economic
and political requirements to become member states in the 20th century, but with some
adjustments these nations joined the EU on May 1st, 2004.5
During the accession process, each nation had a bargaining committee which was
established to negotiate with EU representatives about the entrance requirements and what
each negotiating party would have to give up or gain if a new member state would enter
the Union. Formally, negotiations revolve around political and economic bargaining
between politicians of the incoming member states and the EU representatives. Informally,
however, private commercial entities heavily influence the bargaining process, both from
the EU and from the member state side.
In this scholarly work, we will refer to these entities as transnational interest blocs
due to the dominance of large-scale transnational corporations, the presence of relatively
powerful domestic corporations and businesses, their ties to influential corporate and
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business lobbying networks, and the wide geographical spectrum that they cover. This
work attempts to answer the following question: How did transnational interest blocs affect
the bargaining process during the Eastward expansion in 2004? Were any of the
concessions on either side made in response to the interests and preferences of the
transnational interest blocs? If so, what were the terms of the concessions and how were
they negotiated?
This work limits itself to the Baltic States and Poland. The Baltic States have been
chosen because they have been considered small market economies whereas Poland is
often contrasted as a large market economy. If transnational interest blocs are able to
significantly influence policy in all of these states, despite their diverse market structures,
that would suggest that the power of these groups transcends the specific circumstances of
individual states. If this can be demonstrated, the findings could potentially be applicable
to other countries within the EU, especially those that aspire to EU member status and
choose to go through the accession process. In addition, such findings could contribute to
the utilization of similar methodology to trace business influence in other parts of the
world, especially where states are undergoing a similar process of economic policy
transition. Furthermore, by analyzing states with different types of market structure, we
can also look at how sectoral differences among business interests result in different
economic and political policy preferences. The Baltic States do not have a big
manufacturing sector and mostly rely on their service sectors as well as acting as a transit
hub between Western Europe and Russia. Poland, on the other hand, specializes in light
manufacturing and heavy automotive machinery production, respectively. These
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differences in economic specialization may yield many insights that could explain why
certain policies were enacted in some countries and omitted in others.
Literature Review
The following section will summarize the different theoretical schools of thought
that analyze the main motivation for expanding the EU eastward. Each school of thought
emphasizes different actors, institutions, or structures in analyzing and in explaining the
Eastern European accession in the EU which has made the existing scholarly research so
comprehensive and yet not without shortcomings.
Rationalist approaches explain the accession of Eastern European states in the E.U.
by arguing that states act as rational actors in weighing the costs and benefits of E.U.
membership. The aspiring member states accept the restrictive and costly conditions of
accession because the relative benefits of membership outweigh the costs. Moravcsik and
Vachudova take into consideration the costs of enlargement for aspiring member states in
the form of embedding the EU law into the national system, the EU interference and
double-standards in core policy areas, and the tendency for aspiring member state
governments to devote more resources to economic goals rather than social policy. The
authors assert that these costs will be outweighed by the long-term benefits of membership,
such as access to major markets and to foreign direct investment, the stabilization of
democratic rule and the enhancement of their administrative capacities. 6
Proponents of the constructivist approach argue that the decision on eastward
expansion does not confirm rationalist expectations, since for many member states, the
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costs of enlargement are higher than the benefits. The enlargement seems to be a less
advantageous solution than alternative strategies such as association agreements. 7
Constructivists point to the importance of norms and collective identities that enable the
EU to accommodate the preferences of the Central and Eastern European states (CEEs). 8
The belief in and adherence to liberal human rights (i.e. individual freedoms, civil liberties)
and

political rights are the fundamental beliefs and practices that constitute the

community.9 Despite clear material interests shown by existing EU member states or
corporate interest groups, constructivists contend that norms or principles have been
equally important in explaining the policy outcomes, and have generally led to a stronger
accommodation of CEEs’ interests than a purely rationalist account would acknowledge. 10
While constructivist literature yields important insights into the nature of EU expansion,
the focus on the accommodation of CEEs’ interests as defined by norms or principles often
minimizes the economic and social costs for aspiring member states.
Apart from rationalist and constructivist approaches, established integration
theories have attempted to explain the Eastward EU expansion. This school of thought
assumes that governments had supported further EU expansion to strengthen their position
in relation to domestic interest groups. This perspective focuses on the domestic balance
of power between governments and business, and posits that increasing levels of
international economic interdependence results in new domestic coalitions that can shift
government policy toward support for integration.11 With CEE member states primarily
focusing on manufacturing and agricultural sectors that regularly demand economic
assistance from their governments, CEE states often cannot provide such financial aid.
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With the help of the EU Structural Funds, CEE states receive funds to improve critical
manufacturing infrastructure and to pursue research and development projects Such
resources help minimize economic and territorial disparities among the EU members. 12 By
integrating into the EU, CEE states would be able to satisfy domestic business groups and
ultimately strengthen governments’ position in relation to domestic groups in the domestic
political arena.13
Power-based and interest-based approaches in international relations share the
rationalist assumptions of egoistic interests and materialism. The neorealist analysis of EU
eastward expansion starts from the assumption that the international system is an anarchical
self-help system in which CEE states must be primarily concerned with their security if
they want to survive and protect their autonomy. CEE states have to worry about the
relative gains of other states and seek to defend their position in the international power
structure. Therefore, CEE states are sensitive to changes in the distribution of power. Since
the Soviet Union and subsequently the socialist bloc collapsed in 1991, some of the CEE
states became independent and new in the international arena. Out of fear of the newly
emerged Russian Federation and other post-Soviet republics that are prone to authoritarian
rulers who pursue expansionist policies, many CEE states decided to join the EU as a way
to align themselves in order to balance the perceived threat from the other former Soviet
republics. The Realist alliance theory states that international organizations such as the EU
provide economic resources that are an indispensable component of the national power
base, and the state pursues foreign economic policies in order to maintain and strengthen
its autonomy, security and position in the international power structure. The weaker states
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favor EU expansion if enlargement is a necessary and efficient means to balance superior
power or perceived threats. From this perspective, accession allows the CEE countries to
improve their power position by aligning with the EU to counter the threat of rival states
or power blocs.14
Contrary to the neorealist approach, the neoliberal approach sees EU eastward
expansion in terms of economic value. Due to increasing international interdependence,
military power is losing its effectiveness as a means to achieve state objectives. Therefore,
security is not the only, and not even the main, benefit that states seek by forming and
expanding international organizations. International organizations are created because they
help states manage interdependence and increase their gains from international
cooperation. Within this group of scholars, many individuals agree that trade integration
with the CCE region will benefit the EU economies in the aggregate. It opens a new market
for Western European exporters that can take advantage of their proximity to the CEE
countries. Trade with the EU accounts for approximately 40-65% of the total trade of most
CEE countries while trade with the CEE region does not amount to more than 5% of the
total trade of EU members. Even though this creates a highly asymmetrical
interdependence in favor of the CEE, the preponderant interest of all of them is in intra-EU
trade. Germany is clearly the most important beneficiary of economic integration with the
East. Its trade with CEE comes to 9% of its total external trade and around 45% of total
EU trade with this region. With CEE accession, the Eastern part of the EU would become
the net beneficiaries of the common market. EU transfers to these countries will outweigh
by far their contributions to the EU budget.15
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Countering the neoliberal approach, Kees Van Der Pijl was one of the pioneers of
a neo-Marxian approach in explaining the history of transnational corporate power within
the EU. Van Der Pijl has analyzed American influence on Western European policy
making during the 20th century and beyond. His book, The Making of the Atlantic Ruling
Class, is a study of trans-Atlantic relations that critically examines the power of the
American and European banking-industrial communities. At the end of World War 2,
multinational corporations in the United States led a movement towards Atlantic
integration built on the cooperation and rule of an Atlantic business class. After World War
2, the US government feared the closure of the Western European market to U.S. trade and
foreign direct investment. In response, U.S.-based multinational corporations worked with
the U.S. state and their allies in Western Europe to promote the rehabilitation of Europe
through a liberal-capitalist system, with Americans preferring a post-war open door for
trade and investment. The Marshall Plan became the embodiment of this post-war US
offensive as supported by the internationalist factions of the U.S. corporate establishment.
The plan brought together economic leaders from the U.S. and Western Europe who
advanced policies toward Western European markets that were more favorable to foreign
direct investment and trade. For example, US liberal politicians and multinational
corporations worked with their counterparts in Western Europe to weaken European
socialist parties and leftist labor federations in an effort to create a class structure that was
more favorable to their agenda. The new post-war German leaders helped the US weaken
the collective power of the German working class so that capitalist accumulation could
proceed on more favorable terms for large-scale investors. 16
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Later, with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, US President John F. Kennedy
continued the transatlantic movement of capital by creating a new partnership between US
and the European Economic Community, which was the early forerunner of the modernday EU. Today, the EU still has a trans-Atlantic partnership with the US, as the EU
channels a lot of Structural Funds into CEE member states to advance the American and
German manufacturing and infrastructural goals. CEE member states offer good
manufacturing and technology service hubs at decreased labor costs and on a basis that
suits both Western European and American business interest groups. Undoubtedly the rise
of a powerful international community of bankers and corporations was one of the most
significant developments of the 20th century. Kees Van Der Pijl’s work reveals the close
relationship between economic and political interests: most of the important strategic and
political decisions, especially since 1941 have had an economic base. 17
Finally, another critical school of thought analyzes European expansion using the
neo-Gramscian analysis of international hegemony by a transnational capitalist class. This
type of hegemony is based on a dominant mode of production which penetrates all
countries and links into other subordinate modes of productions. This hegemony is
exercised through a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure.
Production is meant in an encompassing sense including the production of physical goods
and of knowledge and social relations. States form an institutionalized arena of class
struggles and compromises. Essential for the stability of class rule that underlies state
power is the creation of a historic bloc. This bloc is seen as the entity in which a leading
class builds organic alliances with subordinated classes within a specific national context.
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Its institutions and ideologies will extend to subordinate groups. This concept can be
internationalized. An international historic bloc refers to the relatively stable alliances of
ruling classes that support the existing international order. 18
As a critical theory, the Neo-Gramscian School does not seek to provide an
alternative explanation of the existing hegemonic order but rather asks how this order came
about and whose interests are served by it. Several scholars have used this approach to
analyze European integration in the context of global structural changes. 19 This scholarly
camp shows that a qualitatively new, transnational neoliberal constellation has emerged
over the last twenty years. European integration since the 1980s has aimed at reducing its
dependence and backwardness and focusing on restoring Europe’s global competitiveness.
The elimination of national constraints on trade and competition, the transnationalization
of production, and the cross-border centralization and concentration of economic power
have led to an increasingly transnationally integrated European space. 20
At the level of social relations, the process has engendered a truly transnational
historic bloc which seeks to create the conditions for the hegemony of transnational capital
within CEE. A major forum of the bloc’s leading class is the European Round Table of
Industrialists (ERT).21 Through lobbying activity at national and supranational levels and
strategic reports on the burning issue of European integration, the ERT has developed
privileged influence on European policymaking. During the 2004 accession process, the
ERT used its lobbying power to diminish local agricultural and raw material processing
sectors in the CEE, thus creating more favorable conditions for local export-oriented
companies that often allied themselves with the transnational historical bloc. Labor union
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power has also been under threat because they have been further subordinated by the
neoliberal bloc.22 Through the institutions of “competitive corporatism”, trade unions
participate in neoliberal restructuring by accepting wage restraint, reform of the welfare
states and the increasing the flexibility of labor markets. 23
The shift in the mode of production and the emergence of a new, transnational
historical bloc has led to the institutionalization of a new form of relations between
European and national institutions. In 2004, the EU eastward expansion has aimed at
enhancing competitiveness at all levels of European societies. Through Europeanizing
certain CEE state functions such as monetary policy, and through significantly reshaping
the framework in which nation-states operate, the EU has developed into an interface that
enhances regime competition between different national systems of governance. Most of
the burden of the adaptation process to this new competitive environment rests upon the
CEE states and national institutions. CEE states have transformed from Keynesian welfare
states into national competition states, whose main function is to mobilize society in the
aim of competitiveness.24
Bohle & Grekovits have analyzed the Eastward enlargement using the transnational
capital framework with regards to the project of Eastward enlargement. Unlike previous
schools of thought which focus on the more contemporary period of challenges of Eastward
expansion, these authors trace the influence of the transnational corporate class to the
1990s. Initially, transnational corporations organized sub-contracting relations with
Eastern European firms rather than investing directly because it allowed for an easy exit
option in case things went wrong. Transnational corporations have increasingly used
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Eastern European production facilities and their comparatively cheap and skilled labor.
Eastern expansion provided an opportunity for transnational capital to reorganize their
production chains, and to increase their competitiveness in the European and global
markets.25
Critique
Rationalist and neorealist approaches seek to explain EU expansion by positing
aggregate gains for states undertaking the accession process. Yet these approaches, by
treating states as “black boxes”, are not able to analyze the interplay of domestic and
international actors that have competing agendas that help determine the politics of
integration and accession. Similarly, integration approaches view state actors as key drivers
of the process in that they are perceived as responding to “market” incentives in supporting
integration. In this way, the “market” is dehistoricized, and viewed as a technical arena in
which the “external” state intervenes.26 In other words, the power of business interests
within the market and within the state is minimized in favor of viewing integration as a
political process by which changes within the market are managed by state actors.
Approaches that privilege sectors of transnational capital in explaining the politics
of EU accession, the neo-Gramscian approaches, are closer to what will be advanced in
this dissertation. However, these approaches tend to attribute the politics of integration to
the preferences of transnational capital, rather than disaggregating business interests
between international and national fractions or sectors of capital. In order to correct for this
deficiency, I use the term transnational interest blocs to capture the interplay between
different sectors and/or fractions of business interests as they compete to influence the
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political economy of CEE accession. Transnational interest blocs refer to the power of
business actors to use their ownership of economic assets to influence the policymaking
process that establishes the rules for integration. These transnational interest blocs will be
constituted differently depending on the structural, institutional, sectoral, and historical
context in which they operate. Therefore, this theoretical framework has the flexibility to
account for the emergence of different types of transnational interest blocs across different
CEE states. As I will show in the next section, process tracing will be the method I will use
to try to ascertain the degree of influence exerted by transnational interest blocs on the
process, content and policies adopted by CEE states during their accession to EU
membership.
Methodology
In the social sciences, researchers use, and often combine, cross-case comparisons
and within-case observations. For within-case analysis, several options are available:
congruence method, process tracing and typological theory. In order to determine the
influence of transnational interest blocs on the EU accession bargaining process, this
scholarly work is going to utilize process tracing methodology. Process tracing is a
procedure for identifying steps in causal process leading to the outcome of a given
dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context. Using process
tracing, this work is going to assess a theory by identifying the causal chains that link the
independent and dependent variables. The goal is to uncover the relations between possible
causes and observed outcomes.27
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For us to be able to make some statements about the direction of the cause and
effect relationships, we are going to rely on the characteristics of the decision makers and
of the decision environment. Process tracing method provides some access to activities that
occur between the onset of the stimulus (independent variable) and the eventual response
(dependent variable). As a whole, process tracing methods are likely to offer a more
comprehensive means of evaluating and understanding the steps that are taken between the
independent and dependent variables. There are a variety of methods that can be grouped
into the process tracing category including eye movement racing, computer logs, written
protocols, and verbal protocols.28 While the former two are mostly used in information
science and psychology, this scholarly work will primarily focus on analyzing written
protocols. This technique will be essential when examining how government
representatives of aspiring EU member states made their decisions to pursue one policy or
another during the bargaining process. Similarly, this technique can be used to evaluate
policy decisions made on behalf of the EU government. The verbal statements can then be
coded, and hypotheses tested regarding a model or theory of the decision process.
The techniques mentioned above are not mutually exclusive. A multi-method
approach in process tracing research not only provides greater support for the theory being
tested, but also serves as a source of validation for each of the individual methods. Process
tracing also provides an opportunity to combine positivist and interpretivist approaches in
the making of a case study, allowing us to explore both the causal “what” and the causal
“how”.29 In a positivist perspective, the main goal of process tracing is to establish and
evaluate the link or absence thereof between different factors. Through the use of histories,
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archival documents, interview transcripts and other sources, the investigator examines
whether the causal process of the history that she is using can be observed in the sequence
and values of the intervening variables. 30
In an interpretivist perspective, process tracing allows us to look for the ways in
which this link manifests itself and the context in which it happens. The focus is not only
on what happened, but also on how it happened. It becomes possible to use process tracing
to examine the reasons that actors give for their actions and behavior and to investigate the
relations between beliefs and behavior. Confronted with the problem of the variety and
complexity of human perceptions, preferences, and motivations, two types of solutions are
available.31 One option is to make assumptions about actors’ preferences and perfections.
We can rely on common-sense intuition or deductive reasoning and make a judgment call
on their plausible or reasonable character. The other option is to acknowledge that
preferences and perceptions are empirical questions that only a painstaking empirical
investigation can uncover. From this perspective, it is not enough to add theoretical
assumptions about the shape of the utility function, about the actor’s expectations or about
their attention to their environment. Process tracing based on intensive, open-ended
interviewing and document analysis helps to understand the meaning and the role of
established regularities and can help to suggest ways to uncover previously unknown
relations between factors.32
Since private commercial influence is mostly seen in lobbying for certain policies
and their timing, on the EU side, tracing the process of policy implementation will give the
best result. This work will use process tracing to analyze the effectiveness of transnational
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interest blocs in promoting their policy agenda during the bargaining process and the
process of policy making. Sequencing will be used to evaluate the degree to which
transnational interest blocs had significant impact on the policy outcomes during the
different policy making stages. With the help of sequencing this work will be able to trace
the connection between transnational interest blocs and different aspects of the accession
process.
The accession process is a complicated and consists of several stages which include
agenda setting, bargaining and policy implementation. Using process tracing, we will
utilize academic journals and books as well as official EU correspondence that trace the
chronological sequence of EU policies implemented in the bargaining process with the
aspiring member states. Apart from academic literature, a large amount of data will be
gathered through journals and online media that focus on international corporate and
financial affairs. Additionally, individual member state financial media outlets and
government correspondence will also be used to analyze how national business groups
affected the ascension bargaining process.
Chapter breakdown
The second chapter will focus on the structural history of transnational interest bloc
integration in the EU. It will look into how the nature of cooperation among European
commercial entities gradually changed from a pluralist society into a corporatist
policymaking structure. With the establishment of the Marshall Plan and rise of the
Washington Consensus in the United States as well as the deregulatory government in the
UK under Margaret Thatcher, private commercial entities started to become more

16

concentrated and more aggressive towards implementing an environment where their
interests would trump labor and other welfare policies. Heavy lobbying would allow
private groups to bypass national government and go directly to the European Union
council and later on even straight to the particular committees of interest, thus ignoring the
major EU authorities altogether.
Chapters 3-4 will focus on the two cases studies (The Baltic States and Poland). I
examine each case with the intent of tracing the extent to which transnational interest blocs
have influenced the decision making in terms of political economics during the 2004
accession period. So far it is assumed that transnational interest blocs had extensive
influence during the early stage of industrial and economic policy bargaining among the
EU and the aspiring CEE member states. The size of the CEE economies and their
institutional development is assumed to have been one of the main factors as to how the
level of transnational interest bloc influence differed in each case study.
The third chapter will analyze the three Baltic States and their accession to the EU
in 2004. Since they gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Baltic states
had to transition from a centrally planned economy to a liberal market economy. Being a
transition economy for the most part of the 1990s, the three Baltic States concentrated on
deregulating and privatizing their economies. Removing capital controls as well as pegging
their currencies to the Euro in order to successfully joint the EU, all of the Baltic States
were significantly constrained in their ability to influence their economic policies during
the accession process. As a result, representatives of the EU were able to impose their
policies much easier. Given the harsh transition process, the Baltic States did not have
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enough power to counter outside pressure and succumbed to foreign demands at the
expense of its own citizenry. Between 2006 and 2008 a lot of FDI was flowing to the Baltic
States’ construction and service sectors that would in the end overheat their economies and
force the Baltic nations to exercise austerity measures to combat the 2008 crisis.
The fourth chapter focuses on Poland’s accession process in 2004. Being
geographically closer to the Western European EU member states, Poland has had the
opportunity to establish stronger ties with the EU government than the Baltic States. Also
being a former socialist nation, Poland had to go through some economic transformation.
Even though it was not as harsh as the ones experienced by the Baltic States, Poland had
to severely restrict its economic authority in order to obtain EU membership. The Polish
government received a lot of funding from the EU as well as private foreign entities to
improve its infrastructure and the industrial sector. Preliminary observations show that
Poland has a noticeable presence of foreign corporate interests, but the domestic economy
and the welfare state has not suffered at its expense as much as in the Baltic States. This
scholarly work will attempt to discover the factors that made the scale, composition, and
effect of foreign corporate interests different in Poland as opposed to other prospective EU
member states.
The fifth chapter is going to summarize and compare the findings. Moreover, it will
provide a detailed analysis of the factors that led to the differences in the extent of
transnational interest bloc influence on the Eastern European member states.
Finally, the sixth chapter will serve as an assessment of the implications of the
accession negotiations, by documenting how these agreements enhanced the presence of
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corporate investors in the EEC after the agreements were finalized. This chapter will
provide examples of how EU corporations used their victories in the negotiation of the
agreements to establish a more consolidated investment and trade position in the Baltic
States and Poland and how this has affected their economies.
Chapter 2: Historical development of transnational interest blocs in Europe
After World War II, the U.S. and Western Europe experienced sustained economic
growth driven by the utilization of technology that allowed for the expansion of
manufacturing production. Large-scale deployment of capital and labor in the areas of
automobiles, machine tools, chemicals and steel defined this era of global capitalism
(1945-1980). A concentration of capitalist ownership, expansion of industrial employment,
utilization of assembly line methods of production and the growth of a manufacturing
working class were the primary features of this system. U.S. multinational corporations
initially dominated industrial production on a global scale, but within a couple of decades
after WWII, these firms were losing market share to corporations in West Germany and
Japan, which were able to integrate newer technology and avoid the “sunken costs” of prior
investment that had been undertaken by U.S. firms. Greater competition for markets that
had previously been dominated by U.S. firms led to declining profit rates as early as 1965
for most of the Fortune 500 (the dominant global corporations), a trend of profit rate decline
that would continue through 1982.33
There are various theories that scholars advance for this decline in the rate of profit,
including the product life cycle theory that posits the rise and decline of profit rates as a
manifestation of technological cycles of capitalist innovation. The technology that
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dominated this period of global capitalism was giving way to the next technology cycle
that would be dominated by the advance of information technology, computers, and other
high technology innovation in the electronics sector. According to this liberal theory of the
declining rate of profit, corporations that faced strong competition for dwindling market
share eventually solved their profit squeeze by incorporating the latest technological
innovations in production, but this process took time and was stretched out over several
decades.34 In contrast to this interpretation, Marxist scholars have emphasized an inherent
tendency in capitalism for profit rates to fall due to competitive pressures that require
capitalists to invest proportionately more of their capital in technology (dead labor) which
reduces their ability to exploit workers (living labor) in order to maximize their returns on
capital investment.35 Whichever theory you accept, capitalist owners of the richest Fortune
500 firms were facing a profit squeeze by 1965 that they tried to address in a variety of
ways, which included further concentration of ownership as capitalists tried to buy out
competitors and to expand into other fields and markets; expansion into untapped foreign
markets ahead of their competition; and finally, efforts to roll back the costs of production
by trying to reverse the trend toward high wage growth and greater government regulation.
By the early 1970s, corporations in the U.S. formed organizations such as the
Business Roundtable (1972) as a way to strategically orient their class interests around
potential solutions to the long-term decline in the rate of profit. At the same time, global
corporations began to cooperate around global organizations such as The Trilateral
Commission, established in 1973 with the goal of stabilizing global capitalist profits
through expanded access to trade and foreign direct investment. Divisions emerged
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between the more global and capital-intensive firms that were part of these business groups
and companies that were more labor-intensive and tied to domestic markets. The former
advocated greater internationalization of foreign direct investment and production while
the latter advocated protectionist measures. Large-scale firms that were relatively
dependent on national subsidies and national market position tended to be more resistant
to global rules that would increase trade and foreign direct investment. Despite these
tensions, capitalist interests united around a common goal of reducing the rate of wage
growth (if not reversing it entirely), rolling back the expansion of the capitalist regulatory
state that had accompanied the Bretton Woods period of “managed capitalism,” and
exerting pressure on capitalist governments to expand of business friendly government
subsidies to reduce the costs of corporate investments. 36
During the late 1960s and much of the early to mid-1970s, workers in the U.S. and
Western Europe used their strength in the manufacturing sector to mobilize for higher
wages and better working conditions at the same time that the dominant global corporations
were trying to lower their costs of production. Economically and politically, corporations,
especially in the U.S. by the late 1970s and in Western Europe by the 1980s, sought to
lower their costs of doing business by creating an international division of labor that would
allow corporations to reduce wages paid to their domestic workforce by relocating some
production to lower wage foreign locations. In the U.S., the Business Roundtable emerged
as the primary vehicle utilized by the most profitable and capital-intensive global firms to
encourage policymakers to facilitate a corporate restructuring designed to lower wages and
restore profitability to the leading sectors of the U.S. economy. In Western Europe, the
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European Roundtable of Industrialists (taking its name from its U.S. counterpart) formed
in 1983 with the objective of accomplishing many of the same goals. 37
During the 1980s, both American and West European corporations started to
restructure their production methods and intensified their political pressure on governments
to implement favorable economic policies.

To remedy the falling rate of profit,

corporations in the United States wanted to combat the labor unions that had enough
bargaining power to sustain high wage and full employment levels. In order to restore the
markets in which profits were falling, corporations wanted to abandon the post-war full
employment policies as they were seen as naturally unsustainable by market economies
without government and labor union support. The hallmark of the new neoliberal economic
policies was indeed the reversal of post-war macroeconomic stability that ensured
employment and social guarantees in favor of price stability and higher profit margins. In
Europe, the increasing power of the neoliberal policies was manifested in the
“Eurosclerosis” argument. Political elites believed that the falling economic growth was
due to government interventionist policies alongside excessive welfare states. However,
while in the United States, American corporations attributed falling profit rates to market
rigidity and labor union power, European corporations focused more on the fragmentation
of the European market and the technology gap in relation to the United States and Japan.
In order to improve this situation, many European corporations saw a unified European
market as a strong answer to the increasing foreign competition. 38
In 1982, European Community members attempted to tackle the capitalist crisis
their own way instead of pursuing a unified economic policy. Britain pursued neoliberal
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policies to a large extent under Margaret Thatcher. The Thatcherite program focused on
minimizing government’s role in the national economy, thus making the economy rely on
what was said to be “self-regulating markets.” In particular, the dominance of financial
capital has been restored by the process of financial deregulation and capital liberalization.
Internationally, Britain has shown its commitment to support free international trade by
opening its economy to large flows of FDI from around the world as well as encouraging
local investors to invest money into other countries. Germany, on the other hand, managed
to retain its social democratic model of capitalism during this period. While Germany
accepted free international trade in goods and services as well as a fairly limited role of the
government in the national economy, the German model relied on an overall social
consensus in which market forces can operate. 39
Germany enacted new rules that would undermine the post-war Keynesian
economic policies to combat inflation, but it did so to a much lesser extent than Britain. In
particular, it retained its commitment to the social welfare of its labor and corporations.
Additionally, unlike Britain, who liberalized not only free trade in goods and services but
also capital flows, Germany decided to solidify the close relationship between the industrial
and financial capital. Since the late 19th century German banks were hardly integrated into
the international circuits of money capital. Instead, German banks were linked to German
industry on whose development they became directly dependent. The symbiosis between
industry and banking got even stronger after World War II, when German industry was
financed by domestic banks to a large extent in exchange for being shareholders of the
financed industries. This agreement ensured that bank capital has a large stake in industrial
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production and has an interest in its long-term development. Not only does this
interdependence between German industry and banks account for the international success
of Germany’s economy since 1950 but it also helped Germany’s economy withstand the
pressures from globalization and the transnational spread of the neoliberal ideology.
Availability of sufficient financial resources for the German industries as well as banks’
ability to decide the operation of German industries effectively rendered the need for
foreign capital unnecessary, which subsequently insulated Germany from the impact of
foreign financial flows.40
Finally, France decided to address the looming crisis through a direct intervention
of the French government in the national economy. Since World War II, the French
government played a direct role in generating economic growth according to centrally
planned priorities. In 1981, the French socialist government initiated a nationalization
program through which the French government would assist French companies with
subsidies and protectionist policies, however, this program was short lived as the increasing
international pressure forced the French to pursue more neoliberal policies to stay
competitive. In particular, the French engaged in austerity policies to cut state support to
its businesses, thus forcing French corporations to emancipate themselves from the state
and to become a more autonomous force with an internationalist outlook. 41
The extent to which corporations were able to restructure production outside their
national borders depended heavily on the institutional and historical context that they
operated within. Capital-intensive, high-technology and financial firms advocated strong
liberalization initiatives that would support the efforts to corporations to segment
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production across borders to lower wages and reduce investment costs. The most important
indicator of the global integration of production is the rapid rise of foreign direct
investment (FDI). It is estimated that the global FDI flows increased from $567 Billion in
1982 to $1,716 billion in 1990 which outpaced the trade in goods and services three times
during the same period. United Nations distinguishes between different levels of
globalization of production. The first level is the “simple” integration where foreign entities
are limited to producing simple merchandise that is sent to the host country for final
assembly and sales. During the latter part of the 1980s, the global restructuring developed
into “complex” integration, where a corporation could outsource parts of its production
system to several foreign entities, thus incorporating them into complex networks that
allows corporations to globalize their supply chains. Each foreign entity then can specialize
in different production functions, which also allows them to specialize in more
sophisticated production functions. This complex integration predominates around the
world which allows the wealthiest corporations to only focus on a few functions such as
patent ownership, marketing and research and development undertaken in the “home”
country and/or domiciled in a tax haven. These “parent” corporations then hire contractors
to segment the production of a finished product or service across several countries. 42
Transnational Interest Blocs and Global Restructuring
Transnational interest blocs are the theoretical framework I will use to
conceptualize a closely embedded relationship between powerful global corporations,
government policymakers in developed and developing economies and investment partners
located in foreign markets. These interest blocs are best understood as a hierarchy that
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privileges the profit-making interests of the dominant global corporations which are able
to leverage their economic and political resources to build durable relationships with key
political actors and business partners across state boundaries. Among many transnational
interest blocs, the U.S. Business Roundtable, and the European Industrial Roundtable
(ERT) have been pivotal in influencing policy making in the US and the EU, respectively,
to achieve their economic and political objectives. Among a wide variety of goals, these
corporate lobbying networks established political strategies to remedy the falling rate of
profitability.43
While typical lobbying groups focus on domestic political institutions and markets,
transnational interest blocs go to other regions of the world to forge economic and political
relationships that are designed to further the internationalization of production. Across state
boundaries, transnational interest blocs incorporate a range of political and economic actors
whose networks contribute to the creation of global value chains that divide production
across state borders. While transnational interest blocs originate in the developed nations
where their power is at its highest level, their ability to expand their power into foreign
countries and markets depends on favorable political and economic ties that they are able
to establish, including the ability to forge collaborative relationships with foreign investors
and foreign governments in order to negotiate an expansion of foreign direct investment
and/or subcontracting of production on preferential terms. In the home countries,
transnational interest blocs usually control the majority of the market in each industry
where contestation is limited if not absent altogether. Power over market share and
profitability tends to differ across the entire value chain. Further from the core,
transnational interest blocs have to depend on political and economic alliances to fend off
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challenges from other societal groups, including trade unions, environmental organizations
and other political groups that may oppose their objectives.
Despite fluctuations in power across different states, transnational interest blocs
have most of the power within their own global value chains. The process through which
the dominant corporations have been able to obtain the biggest rate of return within their
global supply chains is best explained through a pyramid structure. On top of the global
value chains there are only a few dominant corporations within each sector of production.
These corporations use their market and political power to influence domestic as well as
foreign governments to adopt policies favoring capital accumulation, and the ability to
exploit foreign labor across the world by allying with local capitalists in foreign nations.
These relationships are formed in order to minimize production costs for the dominant
corporation by dispersing production across a range of contractors and subcontractors,
whose competition with each other forces costs downward within the supply chain.
Dominant corporations realize a high percentage of their profits by owning patents or
trademark rights that allow corporations to leverage these ownership rights as “rent” in the
production process. Thus, the current system of capital accumulation derives most of its
value in branding, marketing, and distribution, which is disproportionately dominated by
transnational capitalists at the top of the global supply chain pyramid. At the same time,
dominant transnational firms in the retail industry benefit from this system by being able
to acquire low-priced goods that are produced within an increasingly globalized production
system.44
Alongside the maximization of return through patents, the dominant firms have also
used the global financial system to make additional profits and increase their market power.
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In the past, corporations invested a significant portion of their profits into capital
equipment. By the latter part of the 20th century, non-financial corporations started to
increase the share of profits going into financial assets and into stock buybacks to increase
the short-term share value of their companies. In addition, nonfinancial corporations started
to utilize financial markets to engage in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, where the
most dominant companies in each sector take over their competitors. By buying out their
competition, big corporations increase their market share and gain access to new patents
that can be used to leverage an even bigger rate of return across global value chains. This
is most notable in the high technology sector, where the top 10% of corporations measured
by patents have been increasing their ownership of offshore corporate assets since 2000.
Companies such as Apple and Microsoft have acted as investment banks, purchasing the
majority of offshore corporate bonds that are used by other corporations to finance
investment or speculation. At the same time, corporations that want to avoid paying taxes
on their profits, use “tax havens” to shelter their money from government interference.
While these companies are increasing their profits through global financialization they also
decreased their investment rates in capital production. Instead, this kind of investment is
forced upon the middle and lower tier of the global value chain. Such imposition of
responsibility to the lower tiers is done through market power, manifested by market
shares, but also by top corporations having political power through which they utilize
foreign political actors to assert their economic preferences. 45
Exercise of political power by the dominant corporations has been manifested by
influencing governments to secure investment agreements that would protect intellectual
property rights (IPRs). Since the latter part of the 20th century, the FDI flows have
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increased dramatically from the West to African and Asian nations. Since such FDI flows
are believed by many scholars to benefit the recipient nations, corporations alongside their
domestic governments have used this premise to secure more favorable conditions for their
investments. This has often led recipient governments to adopt neoliberal policies,
including government austerity, tax incentives, investment guarantees and friendly
macroeconomic policies in an effort to attract foreign investment. Such investment
facilitates the creation of global supply chains where dominant corporations use foreign
government support to manage low- cost production in lower tiers of the global value
chains.
Starting in 1980s transnational interest blocs used their influence in U.S. and EU
governments to promote a framework for the adoption of Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994. An American corporation, Pfizer, championed the
support of TRIPS within WTO. With good connections to lobbying networks in the United
States and the European Union, Pfizer was able to insert TRIPS within many regional
global trade agreements. The interests of transnational interest blocs can be seen in the
content analysis of more than 400 regional agreements that were made between 1990 and
2010. Transnational interest blocs led by high tech and pharmaceutical sectors, have
worked to develop the framework for an Intellectual Property Rights regime through the
insertion of WTO-plus provisions. The “WTO-plus” clauses refer to the insertion of
stronger provisions for protection of intellectual property in regional investment
agreements and bilateral treaties. 46
Since many developing countries were heavily relying on FDI and the above
regional trade agreements, these WTO-plus clauses restricted developing nations’ ability
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to challenge TRIPS provisions. While developing nations could dispute such provisions
within the WTO, transnational interest blocs worked with their domestic governments to
implement investor-dispute settlement measures that facilitate corporations’ ability to sue
foreign governments for changing the terms or conditions of FDI agreements. These
investment protection mechanisms are designed to prevent “discrimination” against
foreign firms from differential treatment in trade and investment law compared to domestic
competitors and for failing to extend or to honor the terms of the patent and copyright laws
as specified in the investment agreements. Such a shift from agreements focusing on trade
to agreements that focus on investment indicate how the new globalization trend was
geared to facilitate the creation and support of new global value chains. Many scholars
have stated that such global value chains help foreign economies grow and foreign labor
to become wealthier.47
In reality, workers connected to the global value chains are located within large
scale reserve army of labor that keeps wages and organized representation low. Inability to
organize and collectively represent themselves disables workers from receiving higher
wages for their increasing productivity. Transnational interest blocs partner with foreign
governments that repress their labor by making sure that smaller scale producers control
their marginal costs so that more value can be delivered to the top of the value chain.
Market composition in foreign countries is such that many firms are competing to become
contractors whose assembled product will be integrated into global value chain where it
will be passed along the other intermediaries until it reaches final assembly and
distribution. As profits from this global value chain are taken from domestic economies
and the finished products are marked up by the corporations that own IPRs, there is a big
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difference between the value produced by workers and the wages they receive. This
increasing difference between productivity and compensation is a core characteristic of the
new globalization. Usually, wages should increase with productivity as a reward for the
increased value that is produced within the same period of time. Even if workers in the
lower tiers of global value chains receive wage increases the gap between wages and
productivity still remains big. The presence of such wage gaps, alongside the stagnation of
wages in many countries, allows us to conclude that workers have been increasingly
exploited within the productivity-wage relationship. 48
In terms of the economies of developing states, neoliberal policy advocates claim
that FDI has beneficial effects in terms of domestic supply networks that create economic
growth. However, such beneficial spillover effects are less evident in a system where
products are being produced in a global value chain that often bypasses much of the
domestic economies of developing countries. Since much production happens in export
processing zones, they cannot be locally taxed and hence they do not contribute to the
development of domestic economies. Inputs within this system often come from abroad
and the finished product is sent to other parts of the global value chains as opposed to
contributing to local production.
Finally, transnational interest blocs are not a unified network of corporate actors.
While such blocs consist of many members from different sectors, the cohesion and
conflict of interest among such members depends on the level of global competitiveness
and sectoral preferences which are usually manifested in different views towards trade and
investment policies. The major divisions are between firms that are highly integrated and
competitive globally, who prefer reduction of trade and investment barriers, and those
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sectors that are connected to agricultural, textile, and less competitive manufacturing
sectors, who generally require government subsidies and trade protectionism to stay active
in their sectors.49
Corporations that manage assets that are more fluid and permeable, are able to
move those assets with fewer constraints relative to firms that own more tangible, longterm, and sunken assets that represent fixed investments. Dominant transnational firms that
are financializing their assets through FDI have more flexibility with the current free trade
and investment agreements among countries. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s
computer and electronics sectors were one of the first sectors to adopt global value chain
strategy that encompassed segmentation of production across the world. In the United
States, companies such as Apple, IBM and Hewlett Packard outsourced their production to
large contractors in Southeast Asia. Similarly, in the EU, technology, and communications
companies such as Ericcson, Philips and Nokia outsourced low value production abroad
while focusing on ownership and protection of intellectual property, branding and
marketing activities that delivered most of the profits. Parent firms established value chain
links with large-scale contract manufacturers in their home countries and across the world,
particularly in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore where agreements were made with
original equipment manufacturers to execute production and assembly of products within
the regional supply networks.50
The automobile sector also outsourced initial component production and assembly
abroad, however unlike the high technology and communications sectors, did not
subcontract the final assembly of products. Instead, the automobile sector executed the
final product assembly within their high-cost plants in their home countries or within
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nearby regional market locations. The exercise of such assembly networks partially
depends on foreign subcontractors but also on the ability to utilize labor effectively, as
opposed to just being concerned with IPS. As a result, the automobile sector along with
similar manufacturing sectors forms a transnational interest bloc that lobbies governments
to promote agendas within their home countries and within the countries and regions that
they invest.51
Transnational Interest Blocs in the EU
EU governance is fairly complicated, therefore interest groups that have been active
in Brussels since the 1950s have developed specific lobbying strategies in relation to
different EU institutions. Several elements contribute to increasing the lobbying power of
private interest groups such as the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) and
Business Europe.52 These interest groups are well aware that supplying continuous
“expert” knowledge and framing it for very specific areas of policies maximizes the impact
of their lobbying. Since the EU Commission and Parliament are not fully self-sufficient in
each policy area due to being understaffed or simply lacking all of the necessary
information, these institutions require the missing links from organizations or groups that
possess the desired information. Eventually the EU institutions and private lobbying groups
become interdependent, thus enabling private lobbying groups to exert pressure in the form
of influence during the policy making process. In return for the ability to influence the EU
agenda setting and policy making process, the EU institutions want certain types of
information in order to function properly. Three types of information can be identified as
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the most important resource when it comes to studying the exchanges between business
interest and the EU institutions.
The first type can be classified as expert knowledge. This type of information
concerns the expertise and technical know-how required from the private sector to develop
effective EU legislation in a policy area. The second type of information is Information
about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI) which concerns the needs and interests
of a sector that is widespread across the Single Market. Finally, the Information about the
Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI) concerns itself with needs and interest of a sector
in the domestic market. The encompassing types of information require many individual
interests and parties to be involved in forming one representative interest. The involved
parties can be individual firms, national employers, or employee associations, etc. ERT,
Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE) and Business Europe represent an
Encompassing Interest because they specialize in gathering the needs and interests of their
respective members. Within the ERT and AMUE, the IEEI is more prominent, because it
aggregates business interest at the European sectoral level which is what ERT members
represent to a large extent. On the contrary, Business Europe is made out of national
employer confederations that aggregate interests at the national sectoral level before it is
passed onto the Business Europe headquarters in Brussels. 53
With so many different lobbying groups present in Brussels as well as the complex
multilevel EU governance, each lobbying group must determine the organizational form of
their lobbying activities. Large lobbying groups such as the ERT and AMUE have more
resources to invest in individual lobbying, and therefore have representative offices in
Brussels to develop direct lobbying strategies. The ERT is Europe’s only transnational,
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cross sectoral pressure group that primarily represents big businesses from most important
industrial sectors. On average, there are five to seven members from companies within
each of the four basic sectors: agro-business; chemicals; oil and electronics; with oil being
the most represented. Starting in early 2000s, ERT sectoral membership has transcended
the manufacturing sector by including the big financial corporations some of which have
interlocking executives. One of the bigger ERT members is Peter Sutherland who joined
ERT as British Petroleum chairman but who also happened to be a chairman of Goldman
Sachs International, the European branch of Goldman Sachs. Such interlocking
dictatorships allow industrial corporations to utilize the resources of financial firms to
make substantial profits in the financial sectors. Many industrial corporations have foreign
exchange departments where they trade currencies in the global money market to avoid
currency fluctuations, thus making them finance capitalists. 54
With ERT having such top socioeconomic membership across several sectors, it
can focus its lobbying efforts on policies that would not only affect the top of the global
value chain operations conducted in the headquarters country, but also policies that would
affect the entire global value chains, including the lower segments located in foreign
markets. For example, when the EU initiated the discussion of its expansion into CEE in
1993, ERT started constructing lobbying efforts that would guarantee its members access
to cheaper labor markets. As a result, ERT focused its efforts on suggesting that the EU
Commission demand labor law liberalization and preferential treatment of foreign
investors at the expense of domestic businesses and social welfare as part of the accession
conditions.55
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On the other hand, smaller lobbying groups such as the Business Europe rely more
on collective action from their member employer confederations at the national level before
developing a broader policy proposal that affects members across countries. Absence of
national employer confederations in each member state would disable individual
manufacturing firms to engage in dialogue at the EU level while the ability to be part of
national trade confederations such as the Latvian Employers’ Confederation in Latvia
allows Latvian firms to get their interest to the EU institutions through Business Europe
main office in Brussels.
While Business Europe, founded as UNICE in 19581, has been closely affiliated
with the EU Commission and Parliament, the Industry and Manufacturing Commissioner
Davignon, was not fond of this lobbying group because he believed it did not provide the
required quality and quantity of information that was needed for the EU institutions to
function properly. It is believed that the more layers are involved in providing any type of
information, the slower and less efficient such information will be supplied. Since Business
Europe is comprised of many national employer associations, the sought-after information
is first processed on the national level and then passed onto the EU level where Business
Europe headquarters presents it to the EU institutions.

Each national employers’

confederation is comprised of various sectors. Most of its member companies have highcost margins and small-scale economies, thus disabling them from globalizing their
production and instead focusing on domestic markets as well as on exports to close foreign
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One of the largest lobbying groups in the EU, Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of
Europe (UNICE), changed its name to Business Europe in 2005. The new name will be used throughout
this work.
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markets. Usually, smaller automobile, telecommunications, and raw materials producers
such as metal and timber processing industries form such confederations. Due to high costs
of production and lower output levels than international corporations, Business Europe
members produce goods and services that have lower value when it comes to the global
value chain framework. Because Business Europe members’ production and global value
chain position is much lower than those of ERT members, Business Europe policy
preferences sometimes can be different or even in conflict with those of ERT. For example,
while the ERT views EU eastward expansion into CEE as an opportunity to integrate
cheaper labor markets into their global value production chains, Business Europe members
view these markets as full of new consumers that could benefit from the goods and services
produced by Business Europe members. As a result, Business Europe would be in favor of
strengthening the CEE labor conditions because it would generate bigger income for local
residents who could potentially use their income to buy goods produced by Business
Europe members.56
Lobbying groups that have fewer layers such as the ERT, can provide the soughtafter expertise much faster, which made Commissioner Davignon much more favorable
towards ERT as the biggest business partner of the European Commission as opposed to
Business Europe. With only one layer of decision making among its members that have
business plans encompassing not only the entire EU but also other regions of the world,
ERT can efficiently provide IEEI. As will be shown below, ERT could provide enough
IEEI regarding the state of European industries in the face of globalization, that the EU
Commission was persuaded to create the Internal Market to ensure a better environment
for profit generation. The EU Commission is considered to be the most supranational
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institution in the EU decision making process. It is geared towards promoting common
European interests, as well as promoting its own position. It attempts to persuade EU
member states to accept policies that go beyond intergovernmental consensus based on the
lowest common denominator. To promote EU-wide policies, the EU Commission has the
sole right of legislative initiative. As an agenda setter, the EU Commission has the formal
right to initiate legislation and is thus responsible for the drafting of legislative proposals
The drafting of proposals takes place in the first phase of the policymaking process and
requires a substantial amount of sector-based expert knowledge and IEEI, especially new
legislative areas.
When it came to benchmarking competitiveness of European manufacturing
industries, ERT was first to propose changes to the way trade among the EU member states
was conducted. Not only were trade barriers and strict labor laws advocated to be dismissed
but also the creation of an Internal EU market was proposed. After some amendments were
concluded, the EU Commission finally approved the EU Single Market initiative. To
further the ERT’s quest of improving competition, AMUE was created to advocate for a
single EU currency that would lower transaction and M&A costs across the EU. As will be
shown below, several financial sector representatives comprised AMUE and provided the
EU Commission with IEEI concerning the benefits of a unified currency as a weapon
against the looming globalization.57
In the agenda setting and policy development phase, the EU Commission is not
interested in appeasing particular IDEI or domestic interests. At this early stage of the
legislative process, the domestic private interests and the particular interests of most
member states, often with the exception of the dominant large-market states, have not yet
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been identified, therefore the articulation of domestic interests, especially in developing
states, cannot be yet identified at this stage. The articulation of IDEI or domestic interests
most often comes into play in the EU Parliament. The EU Parliament serves as a forum for
discussions of political importance during the EU legislative process. In order to
understand the EU Parliament’s role in the legislative process, the constituency orientation
of the Members of the EU Parliament (MEPs) has to be analyzed. All MEPs are elected at
the national level and therefore retain important links with their electorate. To increase
their chances of reelection, MEPs need information about their national electorate. MEPs
therefore want information pertaining to domestic interests, especially the most powerful
commercial interests. As discussed in more detail in the next section, since Business
Europe is comprised of national employer confederations that provide IDEI to the main
Business Europe office and subsequently to the EU institutions, the EU Parliament is
heavily dependent on how members of national employer confederations perceive their
elected officials. It is through this dynamic, Business Europe is able to influence EU
Parliament with their policy ideas.

The European Roundtable of Industrialists
One of the major transnational interest blocs that developed in Europe in 1980s was
the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT). Consisting of West European and
Scandinavian manufacturing firms, this interest bloc was concerned about preserving their
competitiveness in Europe and around the world. With the emerging presence of Japanese
and American merchandise in European markets, ERT members were worried about being
pushed out of their home market. ERT attributed this lack of competitiveness to high labor
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costs, the need to tailor their products to every national market in the EU, and high
transaction costs as a result of currency exchange. The ERT, however, believed that the
previously mentioned issues were so complicated, ERT’s economic power was not enough
to overcome these obstacles. In order to remedy these obstacles, ERT sought help from
the EU. Upon looking at the EU’s Social and Economic affairs Committee, the ERT
management was disappointed as to how little was being done to unify the EU-wide
market and help local business stay competitive on the global market. 58
According to the ERT, the EU did not have a platform for European firms to voice
their concerns to the EU. ERT management added that most EU officials apart from Mr.
Davignon, the EU Commissioner in charge of industrial affairs at that time, ignored their
concerns regarding European business competitiveness. Viscount Davignon was one of
the few members of the EU Commission at that time who supported ERT’s ideas to have
a unified forum for European capitalists to voice their concerns in the face of the capitalist
crisis. When Davignon joined the EU Commission as the Industry Commissioner, he
disliked Brussel’s poor attitude towards European business where too much emphasis was
put on technical and jurisdictional aspects and very little on how to deal with industry
issues as well as not allowing industrial leaders to solve their issues themselves, without
government involvement. After successfully working with European CEOs of different
sectors, Davignon wanted to create a permanent group that would represent large-scale
European industry and also would work with the EU Commission to solve industry wide
concerns. Davignon preferred ERT over Business Europe because the saw Business
Europe as a traditional lobby group representing particular domestic business groups and
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sectors while the orientation of the ERT was more favorable to the establishment of a
unified market structure.59
Together with the French Commissioner Ortoli, Davignon took part in ERTs
inaugural meeting in April 1983 in Paris which gathered 17 CEOs from different European
sectors. During the 1980s, ERT wrote several position papers to the EU, indicating that
changes need to be made to make the European market more unified from the globalization
forces. In 1983, the ERT published a memorandum to Mr. Davignon, titled “Foundations
for the Future of European Industry” where the ERT called for specific measures to be
taken to improve their commercial activity. Among the many policy suggestions, the ERT
called for elimination of taxes on capital gains and improved subsidy schemes that would
direct more money towards more profitable companies while letting the fate of smaller
companies be determined by market forces. 60 These measures were strongly advocated by
European companies that had small economies of scale. They could produce and sell small
quantities of their products or services and still be breaking eve or making a profit. Before
1990s, ERT was governed by such companies and thus pursued neo-mercantilist policies.
Such neo-mercantilism focused on guarding the EU market from the forces of
globalization.
The ERT, however, was not only composed of companies with small economies of
scale. A big part of the ERT membership was composed of companies that needed to
engage in large economies of scale to stay in business. While neo-mercantilist policies
helped local European companies stabilize their economic position within Europe, other
European companies that relied on global markets, suffered because of such policies. In
1992, the EU suffered a commercial crisis where large- scale companies were facing
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decreases in profit margins that they attributed to high labor costs and government
regulation. During the perceived commercial crisis in 1992, the ERT came out with a report
titled “Rebuilding Confidence. An Action Plan For Europe” where they once again put
their focus on restoring competitiveness, but in relationship to the global markets, not just
the EU market.61 In the early 1990s globalization forces caught up with Europe and
Japanese products were flooding European and American markets. In order to stay afloat
in business, ERT stated that it needed to embrace the global market as opposed to hiding
from it. It proposed reducing labor costs by lowering wages. Apart from lowering wages,
EU governance should also decrease the personal income tax so that the decrease in the
gross monthly income would be compensated by an accompanying decrease in taxes, thus
leading to the same level of disposable income per month. This way, ERT claimed,
business would be able to restore their profits as well as being able to employ more people
and as a result decrease the unemployment rate in Europe.
Aside from decreasing labor costs, ERT advocated for market deregulation.
According to the ERT, European bureaucracy was excessive and had cumbersome
employment rules and regulations. They claimed that a “standstill” is needed in order for
them to add value to the economy. The argued that the EU should “cut the level of waste
which eats away at the economy. When talking about waste, ERT was referring to public
resources going to unproductive parts of the society and that they should be redirected
towards economic sectors that bring value for money.62
Apart from the Single Market initiative, ERT also supported the European
Monetary Union (EMU) project. EMU members would have the Euro as their national
currency. Having one common currency across the region eliminates transaction issues
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such as exchange rates but takes away a member state’s ability to conduct their own
monetary policy as all the Euro related questions are dealt by the European Central Bank.
In order to achieve the goal of having one currency, ERT established the Association for
the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE) in 1987. The AMUE was founded by five
corporations: Fiat, Philips Rhone-Poulenc, Solvay and Total. Wisse Dekker, the CEO of
Phillips and one of the first advocates for the European Single Market was the AMUE’s
first chairman. Out of the thirty board members, 7 members were executives at top
European corporations such as Andre Leysen of Gevaert and Karl Baumann of Siemens.
Just like with the ERT, Commissioner Davignon played an even more important role at
AMUE by being one of its founding board members. A significant part of the AMUE board
and membership were also ERT members while the remainder consisted of European
financial and banking sector representatives. While ERT was focused on improving
European industrial competitiveness on the international arena, AMUE was created with a
single goal in mind – to establish a unified currency across the EU. While AMUE was
established by some of the ERT members, the association claimed that its goal did not
overlap with the ERT and their publications. AMUE members stated that they divided tasks
between ERT and AMUE. While ERT was focusing on labor, competition, and innovation
policies, AMUE would be working on monetary and fiscal policies, which in their opinion,
would allow the two groups to reach their goals more efficiently. 63
During the first ten years, AMUE was organizing meetings with leading
bureaucrats in Brussels as well as business owners from countries that were more skeptical
about the notion of having one currency. These meetings were very technical in nature to
show the mechanics as to why not only one currency is possible in a union that consists of
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states with their own currencies, but also how one currency could help national businesses
improve their profits not only regionally, but also internationally. AMUE SecretaryGeneral de Maigret stated that introduction of a unified currency, the Euro, across the EU
will bring monetary stability and long term certainty, which will increase productive
investment, generate economies of scale and eliminate uncertainty over production costs,
which will in turn increase competitiveness, improve economic growth and employment.
While elimination of costs associated with exchanging currencies may ease the operations
of many European business as well as EU citizens who require foreign currency on a
regular basis, the introduction of Euro amplified the power of large financial interest groups
across the EU.64
When a single regional currency is introduced, the governing body needs to
designate an institution that will distribute and oversee the functionality of the new
currency. In case of the Euro, the EU designed the European Monetary Institute (EMI) in
Germany to assume responsibility over the Euro in the EU between 1994 and 1998. This
reflected the economic and political power of Germany, along with leading corporations in
Germany, to exert power within the rules governing the operation of the single currency.
The EU decided to model the EMI from Germany’s Ordnungsekonomie, which is a type
of capitalist model where domestic banks are highly integrated into financing and
governing the operations of domestic businesses. The success of such a capitalist model in
shielding Germany from the threats of globalizations since World War II persuaded the EU
officials to establish the Euro governing body where it is now. To efficiently distribute the
single currency across the region, EMI and later the ECB, relied heavily on domestic banks
of each member state. Domestic banks are in charge of steady distribution of Euro in their
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respective countries but are also in charge of interest rates that heavily affect the number
of Euros in each nation. As a result of the nature of single currency implementation and
supervision, financial interest groups have a lot of influence on Euro distribution in
member states.65
Apart from domestic banks in each member state, the EMI itself employs a lot of
representatives of German, French and Swiss financial interest groups for their expertise.
With this positioning in the EMU, financial interest groups in Germany and France could
channel their agenda through the EMI onto the EU. The ability to influence the interest
rates or exchange rate between member states currencies and the Euro can affect monetary
and economic standings not only of individual EU citizens but also the national economies.
More importantly, to adopt the Euro, all member states have to defer their ability to conduct
monetary policy to the ECB. When one central institution, which is heavily influenced by
financial interest groups, has been given the control over national monetary policies, then
effectively the monetary well-being of member states’ economies can be influenced by
private financial entities. Such presence of private financial interest groups within the
central Euro governing body amplifies the powerful ties of transnational interest blocs not
only within the EU governing institutions but also across the EU member states’ banking
sectors.66
In 1994, the EU Commission was convinced enough that having one currency
would benefit the union immensely, that it decided to establish a Committee on Economic
and Monetary affairs. According to the commission, this committee would be
independently analyzing the steps on how to adopt a single currency. It is crucial to note
that by being “independent”, the EU commission meant that it would primarily consist of
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private actors and not EU politicians or EU member governments’ representatives.
Initially, the committee consisted of 12 members out of which 3 were AMUE chairmen.
The EU commission used the AMUE representatives to appear in public discussion on
monetary affairs to share their expertise on having a single currency. Even though private
influence on monetary affairs was suspected from the public, AMUE involvement in EU
affairs was less scrutinized because it was not industry specific but rather it was advertised
as for the improvement of the EU internal market itself which was said to benefit everyone
in the EU.67
In 1995, AMUE saw its goal reached. After reviewing some of the AMUE reports
on the benefits of having one currency, the EU Commission announced that a single
currency called the Euro would be born in 1999. While AMUE’s primary tasked was
successfully achieved, instead of ceasing to exist, the association’ scope of affairs
continued to grow. After the launch of the Euro, AMUE designed a benchmarking program
that would allow businesses and the ECB to measure the efficiency of the use of Euro
within national boundaries. Emphasis was put on having a smooth changeover of national
currencies to the use of the Euro by the local residents. AMUE influence did not stop within
the EU. While the implementation of the Euro was done to help restructure the European
industry and capital markets, AMUE wanted to see the Eurozone have a significant
economic and political presence in international arena. 68
Together with the ERT’s shift towards a more globalized approach in terms of trade
policies, AMUE also wanted the EU to represent the Eurozone as one entity in the global
economic forums such as the G-7 meetings. With Japan and USA being the major
international rivals, AMUE organized a global meeting in Germany in 1998 with smaller
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interconnected meetings taking place in Washington, Tokyo and London consisting of
regional businessmen and banks with one goal: to put the Euro as a prominent regional
currency in the global foreign exchange markets. With this move, AMUE wanted to be on
par with the US dollar and Japanese Yen as major tradable currencies in world. Despite a
lot of bureaucratic and technical obstacles, AMUE managed to achieve its goal and today
Euro is seen as a major regional currency by a lot of businesses and is treated as such in
the international financial markets.69
While the Euro is argued by its supporters to bring lasting economic and financial
stability that contributes to economic growth, there has been a lot of criticism regarding
what EU member states have to do to adopt the single currency, as well as the lack of
monetary flexibility when countries face an economic crisis. Euro adoption requirements
ask potential EMU members to keep national debt, inflation, and interest rates low which
is fairly hard to do for many EU member states. The most common method to achieve the
required threshold is through the implementation of austerity measures that focus on
cutting public employment and welfare rates. Furthermore, implementation of the Euro is
seen by many as an impediment to democracy. When member states adopt the Euro, they
give away their ability to develop independent monetary policy. Instead, the European
Central Bank (ECB) orchestrates monetary policies of EMU members. The ECB consists
mainly of technocrats who focus on achieving economic success as indicated by economic
measurements, which privilege low inflation and tight monetary policies. There is less
concern about the socioeconomic consequences of such policies for citizens within the
EMU. Ordering potential EMU members to cut public expenditure to meet entry
requirements and to continue deciding on policies that could have drastic social
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consequences for the EMU citizens diminishes the democratic power national governments
have over their population. Instead, an external institution is given power to dictate
monetary policies for national economies. 70
At the same time, the EMU gave a boost to the wave of mergers and acquisitions
that were part of the global restructuring of production. In particular, the banking and
insurance sectors have benefitted from the single currency as they led the wave of mergers
and acquisitions. Acquisition of other banks and insurance companies in other EU member
states allows big financial companies to cut operational costs, increase their economies of
scale and reap higher profit margins because of an even more concentrated market power
and presence in other countries, thus deepening their ties to foreign markets. One of the
most prominent examples is the takeover of the Belgian bank BBL by the Dutch company
ING Group, and the merger of two largest insurance companies, Zurich, and BAT, in
Western Europe. Tens of thousands of jobs and around 150 thousand branches across the
EU were closed, thus increasing the concentration of the most powerful banks in the
region.71
The impact of the EMU was not limited to the European financial sector. US
corporations had also welcomed the introduction of the Euro. US based electronics and
arms producing company Allid Signal used the single currency to produce its products in
other nations which increased their economies of scale but also crowded out smaller
domestic companies. Similarly, Reebok International, the US based sportswear producer
had 14 distribution points across the EU in 1995. After the Euro was introduced in 1999,
Reebok closed all distribution centers except for one central point in the Netherlands. The
single currency allowed Reebok to eliminate foreign exchange costs and the company took
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this opportunity to decrease the local supply points and instead started engaging in long
distance supply of goods which generated higher costs that were passed on to the
consumers.72
Companies that previously organized their production on a country-by-country basis
increasingly operate on a European level. The Euro boosted this process by removing the
last barrier of currency fluctuations. It will make the instant comparison of prices and
productivity within the whole Eurozone possible, thus increasing the trend of relocations
to the most competitive areas. The obvious consequence was the intensified competition
between countries and regions to attract investment by lowering taxes and making labor
markets more flexible to meet foreign investor demands.
Business Europe
While ERT has been quite powerful and successful in achieving their goals, these
interest groups are not the only ones actively influencing EU policy making in Brussels.
Another prominent lobbying group is Business Europe, which had been known as the
Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE). Established in
1958, Business Europe aims to influence EU policy making that affects European
manufacturing sectors that do not have large enough economies of scale to engage into
global value chain production but are instead relaying on exports within the EU Single
Market. Similarly, to AMUE and ERT, Business Europe produces industry reports and
position papers that it delivers to the EU Commission and EU parliament with hopes to
convince policy makers to change policies in their favor. 73
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Unlike the ERT who are representing the biggest and most powerful sections of
transnational capital, Business Europe works as a decentralized group that accepts
members from different manufacturing sectors across Europe. While their headquarters are
in Brussels, Business Europe has 25 national federations that act as middlemen between
national members and the Business Europe leadership. Each national confederation brings
together most national production enterprises banks, trading companies, as well as research
and educational establishments. While such confederations are explicit in their activities,
their individual sector representation is not revealed to the public for various reasons.
While the Business Europe chairmen mostly influence the EU governing bodies, Business
Europe national federations attempt to win the favor of politicians who are part of the
national committees that represent their respective country in the EU Council of Ministers
and in the EU parliament.74
In order to advance the agenda of its members, Business Europe has created several
working groups, each specializing in different aspects related to manufacturing. One of the
bigger working groups concerns itself with the Internal Market. Business Europe members
agreed that globalization has brought increasing pressure on EU manufacturers and to push
back against American and Japanese firms, a more efficient intra-EU trade scheme needed
to be implemented. In 1998, a Business Europe report called “Benchmarking Competition:
From Analysis to Action” targeted technical harmonization and standards that applied to
traded good within the EU. Business Europe criticized the 1957 Treaty of Rome export
harmonization initiative as being too cumbersome for EU members to implement. As a
result, the EU Commission came out with a report in 1985, titled “Completing the Internal
Market” where it was stated that the legislative harmonization is limited to adoption of
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general essential safety requirements, but specific technical harmonization is voluntary.
EU directives no longer asked detailed specifications of a technical nature but gave an
outline of the characteristics a safe product must have. These characteristics are called
“essential requirements” because they include all that is necessary for the protection of the
public interest while detailed technical requirements were left out. With such amendments
Business Europe thought the regulatory framework would be optimized by easing the
pressure from national and EU level regulators, thus making harmonization of intra- EU
traded goods much faster.75
In addition to steering the EU Single market into adopting a more generalized and
faster harmonization standards, Business Europe has also played an important role in
minimizing workers’ involvement in company level decision making process. In 1970, the
EU Commission put forward the European Company Statute where it was stated that EU
companies had to engage with workers on any policy that would affect production. If this
statute passed, it would require three-quarters of all workers in each company to agree to
any policy changes related to production. While Business Europe acknowledged that
employee involvement in company activities is important, it also believed that such wide
employee involvement causes more delays because differences in cultures could lead to an
operational standstill when it comes to companies that engaged in cross-border mergers
and acquisitions. According to Business Europe, the diversity of existing systems in the
EU member states and the specific nature of employee involvement systems ruled out the
possibility of harmonization in this field. Therefore, the effort should be concentrated on
finding a consensual approach and Business Europe welcomed a method where priority
was given to negotiations between management and workers, without minimum
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requirements, with a view to freely reach agreements on flexible solutions geared towards
the need of the each company and its corporate culture. To achieve that, Business Europe
offered an implementation of an optional legal form of this type of employee involvement.
Business Europe stated that companies would only opt for this form of incorporation if the
proposed statute were sufficiently attractive and corresponded to their needs and if it was
a flexible instrument which did not impose additional constraints on company
management.76
In 1998, Business Europe put forward a position with regards to company
independence from public authorities when it came to employee training and hiring
processes. Business Europe posited that individual companies have the sole authority over
the internal changes in company processes and that public authorities should avoid
interfering in the private sector matters. While demanding less government oversight,
Business Europe was rather reluctant to promote complete independence from public aid.
Business Europe stated that it wanted governments to devote less if any financial aid to
companies but at the same time requested government assistance when it came to worker
employment and training. While Business Europe agreed that companies needed to train
their employees, the federation emphasized that it should be the governments’
responsibility to assist companies in raising the employability of individual citizens by
providing good primary education and fostering motivation to work. Business Europe went
even further to argue for protecting companies against government penalties in case
companies laid off workers based on less than stellar performance. 77
Business Europe stated that it was opposed to financial penalties given to
companies that laid off employees without first having provided appropriate training

52

measures. Instead, Business Europe suggested that governments apply positive incentives
such as providing tools to carefully examine and improve workers’ skills before deciding
on whether to hire or lay them off. Business Europe put forward a report detailing its views
on the relations between companies and governments as part of the global European
Charter of Skills. This report was timed accurately because it matched the EU
Commission’s decision-making process on the Eastward expansion scheduled for 2004.
This report was meant to achieve autonomy from EU labor and industrial regulations for
both existing EU member companies that wanted to expand into CEE and for CEE
companies who wanted to take advantage of the EU single market but were forced to adapt
to EU regulations. Business Europe was proactive in attempting to safeguard their current
members’ interests but also promoting themselves as a club of “good Samaritans” for
potential CEE members.78
In addition to the decentralized structure of Business Europe, what distinguishes it
from ERT is that Business Europe caters its procedures to its lowest denominator. It means
that it will calibrate its pace according the ability of their weakest members to ensure that
the Business Europe membership is not damaging to the overall wellbeing of national
industries. While this may seem to slow down the work of Business Europe, years of
practice and negotiation among member parties have allowed the organization to get
several hundred policy suggestions implemented in Brussels. However, the complexity of
policy proposals developed by Business Europe, and the degree of exclusion from public
scrutiny, make it look like a complicated and secretive organization to outsiders and the
media.79
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With ERT catering larger corporations and Business Europe focusing more on
small, medium, and large manufacturing companies, both share similar outreach strategies.
ERT deals with a lot of transnational companies while Business Europe works with
regional companies but at the same time collaborating with manufacturing interest groups
around the world to create global alliances between transnational and domestic firms.
Similarly, to ERT and AMUE, Business Europe concerns itself with benchmarking
competitiveness. The difference between Business Europe and ERT is that Business
Europe tries to assess competitiveness of its membership within the EU and compare it
with European companies that are not in the EU, thus limiting the concern of
competitiveness to the European region. Where Business Europe stands out compared to
ERT is its greater concern with the costs of environmental and health policies. Since
Business Europe

works with manufacturing companies that cannot outsource their

production due to small economies of scale, tighter cost margins and reliance on regional
exports, Business Europe believes the EU needs to relax the industrial pollution standards
and cut down on the subsidies given to public projects, which are often perceived by
Business Europe as subsidizing smaller scale producers who then use the subsidies to
compete with firms represented by the organization. . Therefore, inability to gain financial
assistance from the government would force smaller businesses to go bankrupt, thus
leaving more market share and potential for profits for Business Europe members. This
would allow the strongest manufacturers to fully enjoy the benefits of the Single Market
while the EU and member state governments could minimize if not eliminate any deficit
spending that they may have. 80
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In terms of the expansion into the Eastern Europe, similarly to ERT, Business
Europe was very proactive in pushing this process to start as soon as possible. Since Eastern
Europe does not have sophisticated electrical and chemical industry and was forced to shut
down its own manufacturing plants as part of the accession conditions, Business Europe
saw Eastern Europe as a big export market for the existing EU manufacturers that were
part of Business Europe. It set up a special committee on enlargement. Since Business
Europe has a decentralized structure with countries having their own individual
confederations, it started to send experts to each accession candidate country to help local
confederations and business interest groups to adjust to the EU accession as efficiently as
possible. At the same, by assisting the new member states in meeting the new regulations,
Business Europe enables itself to understand where some of the potential issues with
regulation compliance may come from. Such information is then given to the EU governing
bodies to adjust the pace of the accession. While on the surface this may seem as a
benevolent gesture to help the accession member states smoothly join the EU, at the end
of the day Business Europe puts its own interest first. By learning potential pitfalls,
Business Europe can gauge how beneficial each member state is going to be to its overall
success as an organization.81
While both the ERT and Business Europe have had many instances where they had
successfully influenced a policy in the favor, one stands out. After the Maastricht Treaty
was ratified in 1991 and the EMU project was in full swing, the EU decided to revise the
Maastricht Treaty in mid 1990s. Reasons for such actions were connected with the
expansion to the Central and Eastern Europe as well as various labor and environmental
policy changes that would make the EU more connected to its citizens. Both, the ERT and
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Business Europe worked hard to influence such revisions to maximize their wellbeing or
at least minimize the possible damage done to their business. Both groups used the
Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) in 1996-1997 to exercise their power over EU policy
making. Between the two groups, ERT was more influential since it had more access and
had a more intimate relationship with the EU Commission. ERT set up a special ICG
working group whose goal was to approach EU member state representatives as well as to
show ERT reports to the ICG Reflection Committee that the EU had set up to revise the
Maastricht Treaty. According to the ICG working group’s chairman, its goal was to push
the EU to “move forward” with the provisions that benefited corporations in the original
Maastricht Treaty.82
Along with pushing for provisions that would make the Single Market better
conform to their interests, both the ERT and Business Europe pushed for institutional
reform within the EU. Both lobbying groups wanted the EU Commission to have a
qualified majority voting system in place for a more efficient decision-making process.
Business Europe also pushed for a more simplified bureaucracy within the EU parliament
to ensure faster policy implementation. With these changes, EU member states had more
influence on EU decision making and since both the ERT and Business Europe had strong
relationships with national governments, EU member states government representatives
would act as middlemen for the lobbying groups’ agendas. 83
The institutional reform was a mere steppingstone towards achieving more
encompassing treaty revisions. Part of the Maastricht Treaty revisions were the labor and
environment policies. The EU reflection committee wanted to introduce the Social Charter
in the treaty that would guarantee policies on job creation, social security, and workers’
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rights as part of the European Convention on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms.
Since Business Europe deals with industrial leaders of smaller size comparing to the ERT
members, such charter posed a lot of threat to Business Europe members in terms of
profitability and competitiveness. For the ERT members, on the other hand, such a charter
provision did not cause any concern because if it passed, it would not cause significant
increases in labor costs. ERT leadership had insight that many members of the EU
Commission knew that this charter would not create new meaningful and well protected
jobs but rather many minimum wage jobs which fundamentally would help ERT members
to cut labor costs. Eventually Business Europe also understood that this charter did not
pose any threat and therefore ended up supporting its implementation as it ultimately
helped them achieve their goal of improving their competitiveness. 84
What caused more concern to both lobbying groups, especially to Business Europe,
was the implementation of stricter environmental policies in each charter of the revised
treaty. If such policies were implemented in only a few charters, it would not pose treat to
the commercial groups, but the strength of such policies lies in its spread in every area of
commercial activities. Putting such regulations in every single step of commercial activity
caused a lot of concern for these lobbying groups. Despite heavy lobbying, neither ERT
nor Business Europe were able to remove these provisions from the revised treaty. 85
What made this conference a successful endeavor for the lobbying groups was the
fact that ERT used the Social Charter on job creation to link it to international
competitiveness. The EU Commission may not fully understand the limited impact of the
charter on workers but ERT fully realized how to navigate this charter to minimize labor
costs while appearing to improve workers’ wellbeing. With the appearance of improving
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workers’ wellbeing, ERT has the platform to request more donations to workers’ training
programs while also asking for corporate tax reduction. With this agreement, both lobbying
groups solidified their premise in the revised Treaty which ultimately helps them achieve
competitiveness in Europe and beyond. 86
Apart from attempting to influence policy revision within the ICG, both lobbying
groups were continuing to push for the accelerated expansion to Eastern Europe. ERT
continued to see CEE as the European region that will bring high skilled labor and new
technology to foster the growth of their business while Business Europe saw CEE as the
new consumer markets where Business Europe members could sell their inventory that is
no longer consumed in Western and Nordic Europe. In order for this to happen, both the
ERT and Business Europe were advocating for the incoming CEE member states’
governments to relinquish some control over their monetary policies in order to be able to
adopt EU standards more efficiently. While these demands were not fully satisfied during
the ICG, these points were put on the Agenda 2000 report that was completed by the EU
Commission and Parliament as part of the accession talks for the first wave of the potential
CEE member states.87
Conclusion
The terms of the 2004 Eastward expansion were devised by the European
Commission with the help of ERT and Business Europe between 1993 and 2004 when the
Baltic States and Poland joined the EU. The process of CEE integration required CEE
countries to implement market liberalization and privatization reforms that would
accommodate the interests of Western European transnational interest blocs.
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When the aspiring CEE member states met the above conditions, Western European
countries enacted protectionist policies in steel, chemicals, and agricultural sectors to
safeguard their economies from CEE imports. In 1993, the ERT worked with the EU
Commission to establish a framework of favorable policies for its members. Such policies
entailed preferential treatment of ERT members by CEE governments when it came to
privatization and FDI regulations. Additionally, ERT demanded low taxation on its profits
and relaxation of local labor laws so that wage and work conditions bargaining would be
determined on individual company level. ERT argued that such policies were important to
guarantee access to CEE market by prospective investors.
The terms of the integration of CEE countries into the EU can be partially explained
by foreign political and business elites. Internal public and private actors within the CEE
also contributed to the accession of CEE under the specific conditions. The accession
process did not have the same due process for each aspiring CEE member state. The
internal environments of each CEE state determined the pace and content of the pre
accession reforms. CEE countries such as Poland that had larger market economies
attracted foreign investors by offering state subsidies, tax breaks, and partnerships with
domestic investors, government officials, and executives of private companies. Eventually,
Poland changed its political and economic policies to meet the accession preconditions.
They had to shift their subsidy packages from tariff protection over to incentive packages
for the members of various transnational interest blocs. This has caused downward pressure
in Poland which started to compete with other CEE states to attract the most foreign
investor attention. Tax reductions have been the most prominent incentive among the CEE
member states. Tax measures were complimented with investment incentives and a
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deregulation of the labor market, which made it easier for employers to terminate labor
contracts. Finally, Poland opted to retrench the welfare state by reducing pensions, health
care and education related expenditure and benefits.
While Poland had exerted the most direct competitive downward pressure on
wages, labor and social protection, transnational interest blocs as well as proponents of
neoliberal policies have praised the Baltic States, whose governments have liberalized their
markets with even fewer restrictions, more cuts in government spending and even lower
tax rates than in other CEE member states. The Baltic States were the most radical when it
came to restructuring their economies, especially in finance, which view the deregulation
of financial markets in the Baltic States as a good model for the other CEE member states.
Such liberalization of markets in the Baltic States have forced labor unions to become
marginalized while lowering trade union representation to one of the lowest in the region.
Of all the CEE in the EU, the Baltic States and Poland have been welcoming foreign
investors. Poland used its subsidies to attract higher end capital embedded in global value
chains while the Baltic States have focused on low cost capital accumulation by
implementing policies that emphasize production in low cost component parts and services.
In Estonia, this has meant a production profile of information technology services and lowcost production of machinery parts and transport vehicles. Latvia has opted to emphasize
financial services as well as production of medicaments and various agricultural products.
Finally, Lithuania has focused on producing components parts for machinery as well as on
offering various information technology services to both West European and American
corporations.
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For Business Europe, the extension of the EU towards the East was a
mouthwatering prospect from an industrial and consumer perspective. Business Europe
correspondents stated that “The EU’s internal market will be enlarged by more than 100
million consumers with rising incomes.”88 To catch up with the economies of the EU-15,
the CEE countries need huge investment in infrastructure and production equipment. The
EU-15 anticipates a trade surplus with the CEE countries for several decades. Since
Business Europe members occupy lower production tiers within global value chains and
have higher cost margins, Business Europe primarily sees CEE nations as a way to boost
Business Europe member revenues as opposed to markets to which operations can be
outsources. In 1997, Business Europe postulated that the EU Commission should have the
full authority to negotiate regional agreements on goods, services and intellectual property
on behalf of the CEE member states otherwise the unanimity required for such agreements
will automatically be extended to the new members which would make the flow of
economic benefits to Business Europe members loose its momentum.
Transnational interest blocs have worked successfully to restructure the European
economic landscape through the acceleration of global value chains. ERT members in
financial services, telecommunication services, IT services as well as machinery and
transport corporations have used the Baltic States to extract low cost production of services
and components. The price has been the growing gaps between an upper class and
managerial class in the Baltic States that benefit from these relationships and a working
class that has lost wages, social benefits, and job security. In the bigger markets of Poland,
governments have relied on a range of subsidies to attract more productive investments,
but such subsidies are implemented at the expense of the social welfare and precarity of
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the working class. Meanwhile, the managerial/ professional class has benefited from these
policies by working to position themselves as junior partners within transnational interest
bloc value chains. The overall effect of the CEE restructuring has been to elevate the
political and economic power of transnational interest blocs in most of the leading sectors
of European capital accumulation, while weakening the power of CEE governments and
the working class in those nations.
Chapter 3: 2004 Accession process in the Baltics

Despite acting mostly in the shadows of governmental institutions, transnational
interest blocs such as the ERT and Business Europe had been significant proponents of EU
expansion and integration for several decades before the 2004 Enlargement. Specific
configurations of business-government relations at the EU level as well as at the domestic
level of EU member states have largely determined the outcome of the integrative
processes across Europe. More specifically, ERT and Business Europe have persistently
regarded the deepening and widening of integrative processes in Europe as the major means
of increased corporate competitiveness in the global economy. While national governments
of accession states were concerned with losing authority over national policies,
transnational interest blocs, with the help of their representatives at the state and EU levels,
managed to lobby and persuade accession states to welcome the ideas of a common market
and increased liberalization.
In 1985, the ERT published a position paper called “Europe 1990” promoting a
unified internal market that would enhance the competitiveness of European corporations
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in the face of growing international pressure from the US and Japan. As a result, the EU
Commission wrote the Cockfield White Paper that outlined the Single Market 1992
program. The ERT played a vital role in promoting the Single Market program to domestic
business organizations and political officials in EU member states and in accession states.
Of the most important agenda items, eastward enlargement was on par with the creation of
the single market in the 1980s and the single currency in the 1990s among the most
important objectives. Access to the CEE economies has been a goal of Business Europe
and ERT since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. The region’s cheap labor and a 150
million consumer marker were the major attractions. 89
Both the ERT and Business Europe were very supportive when 10 aspiring EU
member countries of Eastern Europe expressed the desire to join the EU during the 1993
Copenhagen Council meeting. In 1997, the ERT established a dedicated Enlargement
Working group. The objective of the group was to work on further improvements of the
investment climate and to help candidate countries prepare for EU membership. The ERT
presented its perspective in a message to heads of state and government prior to the
Luxembourg EU Summit in December 1997, stating that enlargement should happen as
quickly as possible. ERT claimed that the candidate countries “must strengthen and
restructure their economies to meet the competitive pressures of a single market.” 90
Transnational interest blocs planned to play their own role in the accession process by
cooperating directly with the EU commission and with the accession states through the
establishment of Business Enlargement Councils (BECs) and by incorporating junior
partners in each of the Baltic countries. BECs served as the connecting link between the
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ERT and CEE junior partners. Together these actors and linkages among them formed a
transnational interest bloc. The goals of interest bloc members were to improve the
investment climate for existing ERT members, and to prepare CEE interests blocs to tackle
the pressure of the EU Single Market. 91
Over time, the BECs had become highly reputed consultative bodies not only to the
business community in the accession countries, but also to the CEE governments,
especially regarding issues related to competitiveness. In order to grasp the full benefits of
the enlargement, it was not enough to build economic ties with CEE junior partners through
BECs. In order to expand the transnational interest bloc, ERT established political
coalitions with governments of each accession countries and incorporated them as another
link within their transnational interest bloc. 92
The ability to communicate the needs of the transnational interest bloc to national
governments was paramount to the advancement of its goals. Since ERT and CEE business
associations’ goals were to increase competitiveness and attract more FDI, large
macroeconomic restructuring was required to facilitate such goals. ERT invited members
of CEE governments to be part of the BEC meetings in order to foster a dialogue between
the national governments, local business associations and ERT representatives about
competitiveness and FDI related issues.
ERT purposefully built political and economic coalitions within each accession
country because in this case increased competitiveness and FDI flows benefited not only
the ERT affiliates in the accession countries, but also local business interest groups and
governments. Since ERT members occupied the top of their respective global supply
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chains, they focused on policy agendas that would benefit their operations within those
supply chains. The most profitable corporations in the ERT derived their profits from
ownership of intellectual property rights, control of research and development marketing,
and extraction of value within global supply chains. Some of the main ERT members that
comprised the transnational interest bloc were the Swedish automobile producer, Volvo,
and the Norwegian real estate conglomerate, Linstow-Varner, who wanted to expand their
influence in Latvia.93 In Lithuania, the most powerful corporate groups were the Western
European and Nordic renewable energy companies, National Nuclear Corporations (NNC);
Belgatom; SwedPower International, who wanted to become the main energy suppliers
within the country.94 Finally, in Estonia, the German energy conglomerate, NRG Energy,
wanted to take over Estonian power supply infrastructure to add to its big energy supply
empire that spans across Europe. These sectors outsource labor-intensive operations to
countries with cheap labor while retaining more skill- intensive operations at the source of
the supply chain. In order to expand the global supply chains, corporations at the top work
with government coalitions and foreign companies to procure weak labor and tax laws that
would make it cost effective to establish new supply chain links. Similarly, policies that
would make capital movement from the headquarters to the new supply chain countries
easier are also among the top priorities.
Many companies in the accession countries are interested in joining the
transnational interest bloc. Local companies that see the benefit in working with foreign
companies to gain more revenue or recognition in the international arena, would gladly
help foreign companies establish economic partnerships in the new markets, as well as
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political allies to influence local governments to adopt policies favorable to transnational
investment. The most prominent junior partners throughout the three Baltic States came
from the finance sector. Latvian financial companies, Latvian Business Bank and First
Bank Of Latvia, wanted to help ERT execute its agenda because they could improve their
business by working for the incoming foreign corporations. 95 Similarly, Lithuanian
construction company, Vetruna LLC, wanted to help the transnational interest bloc enter
the Lithuanian markets.96 The prospect of having a more reliable and modern source of
renewable energy that can be distributed to Lithuanian citizens, was lucrative enough for
Lithuanian partners to cooperate with the bigger corporations. In Estonia, since the biggest
battle was concentrated on energy and raw material extraction, the most prominent junior
Estonian partners came from the energy and metallurgy sectors. The Estonian construction
company, Kunda Nordic Cement, aided the advancement on Estonia’s natural resources
market because bigger corporations could guarantee more output and hence more revenue
for the Estonian junior partner. 97
Given that most of the accession countries had a lower level of economic
development and exposure to larger markets, the appeal of having an increased flow of FDI
was attractive to CEE business and government actors. This situation, consequently, made
it easier for ERT to establish such coalitions in each accession country in order to advance
their own agenda.
Similarly, to ERT, Business Europe played an important role in the eastward
enlargement. Since Business Europe members were not as large in terms of wealth and
global presence, their policy focus was different from ERT, thus making Business Europe
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the leading component of another transnational interest bloc. Unlike ERT’s global
corporate members, Business Europe represented regional small and medium-size
manufacturing enterprises. Most of the Business Europe members operate in the heavy
industries such as automobile manufacturing and natural resource extraction and
processing that rely on local sales and exports as their main sources of revenue. Business
Europe members tend to rely on “in house” activities to produce the final product. Due to
their smaller scale of operation, Business Europe members do not have big enough cost
margins to engage into bigger scale production and to outsource parts of its production to
other countries. As a result, Business Europe and ERT often did not agree on the same
policies and each would attempt to influence the EU and CEE governments to pursue their
respective interest bloc’s policies. Compared to ERTs focus on competitiveness and
improved investment climate, Business Europe’s main goal was to prepare its future CEE
members to be able to consult their respective governments and the EU Commission within
the tripartite social dialogue with relation to trade and worker-employer policies. 98
Business Europe thus put more emphasis on capacity building of member
organizations. Business Europe sent representatives of its member federations to speak on
different issues in the accession countries. With the help of its Business Organizations as
Single Market Integration Players Program (BOSMIP), Business Europe was strengthening
connections between its members in the acceding countries. The goal of BOSMIP, was to
strengthen horizontal business federations in acceding countries through partnership with
EU member federations involving transfer of know-how and experience. By sharing
lobbying expertise, Business Europe enabled their junior partners in the Baltic States to
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influence their governments to open business opportunities not only for local entities, but
also for Western European partners. While BOSMIP organizers advertised this as a good
will training session, behind the scenes, BOSMIP was using its junior partners to channel
its own agenda of creating an easier path to channel their investment capital that would
yield additional profits in addition to promoting export- generated income. 99
Furthermore, to help with the accession process, Business Europe set up a task
force on enlargement. Experts were assigned to each candidate country. They tried to help
the local federations or the business representatives in these countries to adapt to the EU
accession requirements. Business Europe asked national governments to consult businesses
more closely on all aspects of enlargement related to economic activities. It actively
participated in all commission initiatives involving the EU and candidate country business
communities. Business Europe established the Industrial Forum on Enlargement, aimed at
exchanging information and experience on all industrial aspects of the pre-accession
strategy, and at giving concrete recommendations to national authorities and to the EU
Commission.100
On the EU side, the EU Commission and the EU Parliament were the major
governmental bodies responsible for the 2004 accession. Both EU bodies developed and
oversaw the signing of the Association Agreements between 1991 and 1996 through which
the 10 CEE acceding states expressed the desire to join the EU and have accepted the
demands to restructure their political, economic and social spheres to meet the Copenhagen
criteria. In order to monitor the accession process of each candidate country, the EU
Commission together with the EU Parliament adopted a resolution on April 18, 1991 to
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establish Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPC) as one of the principal institutions to
oversee the 2004 accession process. A delegation of 12 members is appointed to a JPC by
the European Parliament to meet with each candidate country’s accession committee once
a year. At the end of each meeting, rather than adopting a formal communique, each JPC
can adopt declarations and recommendations to send to the Association Council for
consideration by the EU Commission and EU parliament, as well as by the candidate
country concerned. To be able to formulate EU’s position on each candidate country’s
accession strategy, the EU Commission appointed rapporteurs for each candidate country
who operated on behalf of each candidate country’s JPC. The rapporteurs on each
candidate country had the responsibility to report to each JPC on the political, economic,
and social developments in the applicant countries concerned. By visiting each candidate
country and forming contacts not only with politicians but also with the business
community, university professors, representatives of minorities and citizens, they try to get
an accurate assessment of these developments. Rapporteurs’ reports have to be included
by each JPC, as well as the EU Commission and EU Parliament, as part of the EU’s analysis
of the progress towards accession in each country. 101
Within the above EU institutional hierarchy, ERT and Business Europe can
communicate their interests to the rapporteurs and consequently to the JPC. Official
rapporteur visits to each accession country started with a process of consulting business
actors, including the ERT. The ERT then invited rapporteurs to the BEC meetings to
discuss competitiveness and investment related issues. At the same time, Business Europe
allowed rapporteurs to be part of the BOSMIP program to meet with the current members
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as well as with representatives of CEE federations, to discuss labor and trade related issues
through meetings and UTFE position papers.
The influence of ERT and Business Europe has been prominent during the Baltic
States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) accession between 1998 and 2004. Both
transnational interest blocs utilized BECs and training programs as transmission belts to
spread their agenda to the Baltic business interest groups and governments. With high
dependence on improved FDI flows and trade relationships with members of both
transnational interest groups, Baltic interest groups and governments were forced to
concede to most of the transnational interest group agenda. During the accession
negotiations with the EU Commission, Baltic governments included the preferences of
transnational interest groups in their respective National Accession Programs. If some of
the policy preferences were not planned to be implemented or delayed, the EU Commission
would not grant the exceptions to the policy implementation and would reinforce the
transnational interest group preferences during the accession meetings between the CEE
representatives and the EU Commission. Overall, the two transnational interest groups, the
ERT and Business Europe, were successful in advancing and enforcing their agenda in
Latvia and Lithuania during the accession process while Estonian actors were able to repeal
some of the foreign influence due to a stronger connection between the Estonian business
groups and the Estonian government.
Republic of Latvia
The Latvian government expressed its desire to join the EU at the 1993 Copenhagen
Council where it signed the first Association Agreement. This agreement framed the
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Copenhagen criteria as part of the accession conditions. The Copenhagen criteria focused
on issues pertaining to democratic governance and free market economics by laying down
24 common EU law chapters that Latvia had to fulfill in order to join the EU. Latvia set up
its National Program for Integration into the EU where it devised steps for the fulfillment
of the accession criteria. While a big portion of the accession criteria dealt with the
improvement of governing institutions and administrative capabilities, medium- and longterm economic development occupied the second largest domain of the criteria. The most
important premise of economic growth was low unemployment and GDP growth rate of 45% as well as liberalization of capital flows and privatization of state- owned enterprises
for the attraction of FDI.102
Since Latvia only recently became an independent country, its own government did
not have enough tools and expertise on how to change economic and social policies. As a
result, the Latvian government started to integrate more actors into the process of fulfilling
the accession negotiations in order to cover all angles of expertise. Of the many non-state
actors that were involved in the accession negotiations and EU legislation adoption, the
business community representatives played by far the largest role. During the accession,
EU business organizations started to form different transnational interest blocs that would
expand into Latvia and include Latvian junior partners. ERT and Business Europe started
to implement BECs and training programs that would provide the connection between
existing transnational interest group members and potential Latvian counterparts in order
to advance their own policy agenda and its implementation. Within these linkages, ERT
and Business Europe were the more powerful partners that exercised their influence
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through their wealth and market share within the EU. While Latvian partners offered
relatively little benefit to the transnational interest blocs, alliance with them during the
accession was crucial for the faster implementation of ERT and Business Europe’s agenda.
The ERT set up the Council of Foreign Investors in Latvia (FICIL) in 1999. FICIL
was created to improve the business environment in Latvia through active dialogues with
the Latvian government. FICIL does so by meeting with the Latvian government twice a
year in High Council Meetings. On one side, the High Council is represented by business
executives from each FICIL member, and on the other side it is represented by the Latvian
government representatives. These meetings are intended to facilitate high-level policy
discussion between foreign investors and the Latvian government to set up structured
exchange of expertise and opinions among the major investors and the national policy
makers. Resolutions from such discussions are then included in an official Communique. 103
During the accession negotiations between 1999 and 2002, the Latvian government
met with FICIL several times. The most pivotal High Council meetings were conducted in
2002 and 2003. The fifth High Council meeting held in March 2002, was attended by the
Latvian Prime Minister Andris Berzins, the Ministers of Finance, and Economy, and the
head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Latvia. The business community
was represented by Coca-Cola, Volvo, Statoil and Ernst &Young to discuss tax policy and
administration. The Council Chairman, Vice President of ABB Anders Novinger, pushed
the Latvian government to reduce the real estate tax from the 1.5% level that was required
by the EU, to 1% because it was thought to be necessary to encourage more inflow of FDI
to Latvia after joining the EU. Furthermore, the Council Chairman argued that the already
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reduced corporate tax (from 25% to 15% to meet the accession criteria) should be decreased
to 12.5% as it was done in Ireland. Andris Berzins who chaired the meeting on behalf of
the Latvian government, pointed out that the corporate tax burden in Latvia is one of the
lowest in Europe and convinced the business community that it will find a way to cut the
real estate and corporate taxes even further to enhance the investment climate in the
future.104
The demand to decrease the corporate and real estate taxes were incorporated in the
Government’s Action Plan for Improvement of the Business Environment in Latvia. By
June 2002, Latvia adopted the tax cuts into its National Convergence Program as part of
the accession negotiations for the 5th EU – Latvia Association Committee meeting in
Brussels on 12 June 2002. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Indulis Berzins represented
Latvia while the EU JPC was chaired by Mr. Camos Grau. After some discussion, it was
agreed that Latvia could decrease the above taxes to the rate that was below the EU average,
which Latvia claimed to be instrumental in attracting FDI and in coping with the pressure
of the EU single market. Furthermore, Latvia was forced to decrease the value added tax
that it collected from royalties, timber sales and international passenger traffic. 105
The Latvian government met with FICIL during the Sixth High Council meeting in
March 2003 to finalize the position on the Competition Policy, Financial Control and
Environment legislations. For ERT representatives, Volvo, and Linstow-Varner, it was
important to curb local state support for the business sector. Particular focus was put on the
state financial aid to the local manufacturers because it helped national champions to stay
competitive within the EU Single market. ERT representatives posited that large amounts
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of state aid kept inefficient firms in the market which impeded the efficiency of the overall
market. As a result, the Latvian government became convinced that decreased state aid
would not only improve market efficiency and investment flows but would also decrease
national expenditures. This, however, could not be done in one year and despite ERT, the
EU gave Latvia until 2009 to restructure the state aid to its business sector. In terms of
Financial Control and Environment policies, ERT argued that the incoming FDI should not
be subject to any tax but also investors should not be required to contribute to the social
security fund of their employees.106
On the taxation policy side, which ERT was concerned about the most, the EU
Commission allowed Latvia to postpone the required value added tax on excise duty. Since
some of the ERT members operate in the tobacco and alcohol sectors, such a conclusion
on the tax policy was very welcomed by the ERT. Together with Latvian partners who
acted as distributers of foreign tobacco and spirits in Latvian, ERT was able to persuade
the Latvian negotiation team to ask for a derogation on the minimum tax excise duty.
During the FICIL High Meetings, ERT representatives together with Latvian partners
discussed how a higher excise tax would harm tobacco and liquor sales in Latvia. Not only
would Latvian nationals be discouraged from purchasing such products, but it would also
harm the import of such goods which would harm the excise tax base as well as operations
of local companies. While per unit tax would be increased, the taxable amount would have
been decreased, thus leading to an overall decrease in tax revenue. 107 After the FICIL
meetings, the Latvian negotiation team would explain the same logic to the JPC during
their meetings. JPC members would analyze the proposed position and express it to the EU
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Commission. After reading the JPC report, the EU Commission stated that Latvia was
allowed to postpone the application of the overall minimum excise duty on the retail selling
price for cigarettes of the price category most in demand until 31 December 2009, provided
that during the period between 2003 and 2009, Latvia gradually adjusts its excise duty rates
towards the overall minimum excise duty in the EU. As long as this derogation is
maintained, existing EU member states can import the same quantitative limits for
cigarettes and liquor into their territories from Latvia without further excise duty
payment.108
On June 18, 2003 the Latvian accession representatives met with the JPC in Riga
to discuss the above policies. Despite the difficult negotiations a solution was achieved that
would serve ERT and government officials who were not siding with ERT members, and
supporters of ERT transnational interest bloc. The agreed accession terms allowed Latvia
to negotiate transition periods for the competition and financial control policies so that it
would not have a sudden social and economic impact on Latvian society. While ERT
supporters did not receive their preferred policy agenda in the short term, it will reap the
benefits from the long-term changes in policy. At the same time, local Latvian businesses
benefited from the derogation but would ultimately lose in the long term when the
transition period is over.109
The Sixth High Council meeting and the 2003 Latvia- JPC meeting were the last
accession negotiation meetings before the EU Commission concluded that Latvia was
eligible to join the EU in May 2004. In the short period of time between 2001 and 2003,
ERT managed to influence policy making on Latvia’s side in terms of the competition, tax,
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and capital flow laws because they directly affected the operations of ERT members. As
much as Latvia was reluctant and incapable of obtaining the requirements, it managed to
do so with hopes that long-term financial and economic benefits outweigh the costs of such
negotiations.
While ERT had direct influence on the Latvian government during the accession
negotiations, Business Europe elected to lobby the JPC that was assigned to work with
Latvia. In 2000, Business Europe’s Task Force on Enlargement (UTFE) published a
position paper titled Accession Negotiations Under Swedish Presidency 2001 where it fully
supported EU’s Eastward expansion as well as expressed the excitement of potential
economic benefits it would bring to the EU Single Market. As such, UTFE focused on
making sure that the negotiating policy fields, especially those concerning competition,
capital flow and labor would be enacted without any delays. Unlike ERT’s focus on
investment that would make its Latvian junior partners part of the global supply chain,
Business Europe focused on investments that increased the market presence of its members
as regional importers into Latvia and using Latvian junior partners as distributers and not
their servants within a global supply chain. Given that Latvia had asked for derogations in
several policy areas related to business, UTFE had to step in to sway the JPC not to give
permission to delay policy adjustment in areas that are most vital to Business Europe.
UTFE

categorized

Latvia’s

requests

into

acceptable,

negotiable,

and

unacceptable, depending on how each policy affected the speed of the Single Market’s
expansion. Requests evaluated as acceptable are measures that Business Europe believes
can be included in the accession treaty without negotiations on substance, while negotiable
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requests may be discussed with an intention to limit the scope and time of the request and
ultimately make the request fall into the “acceptable” category. Finally, requests deemed
to be unacceptable should not be considered by the JPC entirely. 110
Despite negotiations with the JPC, Business Europe could not reach an agreement
among its members regarding a proposed

delay of state aid abolishment. In the end

Business Europe deferred to ERT’s influence regarding the pursuit of the policy of
abolishing domestic enterprise state aid from the very beginning. What made ERT’s
influence much more powerful than Business Europe’s during this accession period is the
fact that ERT had established a linkage through an institution while Business Europe only
had utilized training programs to help their prospective members to get ready to join EU.
Apart from the training program, Business Europe had no physical and structural presence
in Latvia until 2005, when LDDK officially joined Business Europe.
UTFE states that “any measure making it possible for a Member State not to apply
the Internal Market rules entails a negative impact, as this would hamper the free flow of
goods, capital, services and/or persons. Any measure that allows a Member State not to
apply Community competition policy will distort competition just in the same way that any
measure that opens the way for a different trade regime with third countries threatens the
unified nature of the common commercial policy.”111 Since Business Europe’s
membership was composed mostly of smaller and medium size enterprises that relied on
external trade to earn more profit, the enlargement of the Single Market was crucial for the
success for its existing members. As a result, Business Europe wanted to take away all of
the trade and competition barriers that could potentially hinder trade flows for its existing
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members. Upon learning that Latvia wanted to delay trade barrier abolishment to protect
its industry, Business Europe quickly opposed such policies citing the status of the EU
Single Market and its common commercial policy that prohibits trade barriers between
newly acceded states and already existing states. Furthermore, Latvia’s request to have a
free trade regime with Lithuania while having trade barriers with other EU members made
Business Europe think that Latvia was discriminating against current Business Europe
members in terms of requesting preferential trade partners and potential profit sources
outside of EU competition policy.112
During the accession negotiations, Latvia requested several transition measures
applied to several policy areas, most notably in the financial sphere. For example, in terms
of free movement of capital, Latvia requested restrictions to acquisition of real estate by
existing EU member states’ nationals and companies. The request was deemed as
unacceptable because any restrictions to the purchase of real estate for commercial
purposes would create problems for the free flow of capital. Similarly, in the external
relations sphere, Latvia requested to maintain free trade in agricultural products with
Lithuania and Estonia in the event that these countries do not accede to the EU at the same
time as Latvia. This request was also seen as unacceptable because according to Business
Europe, such a measure would clearly pose a problem to the unified nature of the Common
Commercial Policy. Business Europe believed that this clause would give Latvia an unfair
free trade advantage in relation to the other EU member states, thus making the existing
Business Europe members disadvantaged compared to the Latvian business owners. 113
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While Business Europe was very strict with requests regarding capital flow,
commercial policy, and trade in goods, it was more lenient with requests that pertained to
the flow of services. In one instance, Latvia requested a larger transition period regarding
the Deposit Guarantee Scheme, the EU equivalent of America’s Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and Investor Compensation Scheme. This request was negotiable because
even though credit institutions that do not follow the deposit guarantee scheme would have
a competitive advantage compared with those that do, it was unclear if such a request would
have a major impact on competition or not. Similarly, the absence of the Investor
Compensation Scheme would impede the flow of capital, but the overall impact is not
certain and will depend on the scope and time of the regulation. 114
While Business Europe covered many accession negotiation policy areas, requests
related to the financial sector and to business competition comprised the bulk of their
lobbying papers. Since Business Europe’s membership was comprised of small and
medium size enterprises that relied on exporting to other countries, it was important to have
strong competition laws and access to financial resources in Latvia so that members with
higher cost margins did not have to encounter much resistance from entering foreign
markets.
Business Europe directly lobbied the JPC assigned to negotiate with Latvia. During
the accession, Business Europe did not have a physical institution and direct representation
in Latvia. Instead it relied on the training program to establish the link between the
prospective Latvian members and Business Europe. As a result, Business Europe could not
influence the Latvian government directly during the accession negotiations and it had to
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focus on establishing strong connections to the JPC, which it could reach through its
representatives in Brussels and various conferences related to the accession.
Business Europe’s influence may be seen during the Intergovernmental
conferences where accession states met with the EU Commission and Parliament members
to discuss the accession negotiations. The JPC assigned to negotiate with Latvia presented
its conclusions to the EU Commission which used them to put forward EU’s official
statement at the European Council in 2003 about the agreements on the accession
conditions.
When looking at the 2003 EU Council held in Athens, it was concluded that within
the free movement of capital clause, Business Europe’s influence can indeed be seen as the
clause states that “In no instance may a national of a Member State be treated less favorably
in respect of the acquisition of agricultural land and forests than at the date of signature of
the Accession Treaty or be treated in a more restrictive way than a national of a third
country.”115 Business Europe wanted to have the ability to acquire land in Latvia in case
its members wanted to set up their own distribution centers as links in their export lines.
Business Europe sent its 2001 position paper regarding Latvia’s accession negotiations and
claimed that all policies regarding commercial activity should not discriminate against
current EU members. As a result, Business Europe used its commercial expertise to
persuade the Joint Parliamentary Committee that restriction of land purchase to foreigners
would impede the EU Single Market efficiency. Using this rationale, the JPC sent this
recommendation to the EU Commission. Consequently, the EU Commission adopted this
as its official ruling regarding the purchase and sale of Latvia’s agricultural land. This
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clause strictly contradicts Latvia’s request to prohibit the purchasing of commercial
property by foreigners for seven years from the date of accession.
Business Europe was not willing to negotiate away its commitment to free
movement of capital that directly affected the profits of its members. At the same time,
requests within the “freedom to provide services” clause, that were deemed “negotiable”
were granted with some changes. For instance, the request to have at least a five- year
transitional period for Latvian Bank Deposit Guarantee, and Foreign Investor
Compensation Schemes to be implemented, was changed so that it suited Business
Europe’s requirements. Business Europe was concerned about the investor compensation
scheme that would guarantee some investment returns on their projects.
In the 2003 EU Council meeting it was agreed that required minimum level of bank
deposit guarantee and investor compensation schemes will not be applied in Latvia until
31 December 2007. Business Europe was not satisfied with such a conclusion as it thought
that such a derogation would inhibit the commercial activities of the transnational interest
bloc’s members. If there are no guarantees that the investors can get their investment profit
delivered to them via an official compensation scheme, then Business Europe members are
not encouraged to move their capital to Latvia. As a result, Business Europe explained in
its position paper that inability to guarantee a minimum compensation to Latvian and
foreign investors would strongly inhibit Latvia’s economic development in the short term.
After reading the position paper, the JPC consulted with the EU Commission where the
EU representatives agreed that inhibition of Latvia’s economic development would go
against the common economic goal of the accession itself. As a result, the EU Commission
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required Latvia to ensure that Latvia’s deposit guarantee and investor compensation
schemes provide for coverage of not less than ten thousand euros until 31 December 2005
and not less than fifteen thousand euros from 1 January 2006 until 31 December 2007. This
gradual fulfillment of the deposit guarantee and investor compensation schemes made it
bearable for Business Europe. Members of the automotive sector as well as pharmaceutical
sector members were concerned that in case of establishment of their own offices in Latvia,
there would not be any guarantee of compensation in case their offices make profits. 116
With Business Europe members providing business to Latvian companies, Latvian partners
were interested in making sure that the new legislation enabled Business Europe to invest
in Latvia which would consequently bring business opportunities to its Latvian partners,
thus allowing this derogation to be granted.
When looking at Latvia’s experience during the EU accession negotiations, it can
be seen from the previous examples that both the ERT and Business Europe have had
significant influence in setting important foundational aspects of the policy agenda. The
ERT and Business Europe established the Foreign Investor Council In Latvia and the
Business Europe Task Force for Expansion, respectively, as intermediate links between
dominant corporations in the EU and their supporters and partners in Latvia. Through
physical presence of FICIL and large market share of its members in Latvia, ERT managed
to successfully influence the Latvian government and several Latvian partners to decrease
the real estate and corporate taxes. At the same time, Business Europe used the UTFE to
advocate for policy preferences that would help their existing members profit from trade
and investments with Latvia. Instead of focusing on investment and tax related policy areas,
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UTFE concentrated on business competition and financial institution regulation policies.
Both transnational interest blocs disagreed on several policy areas because their members
occupied different spots in global supply chains. ERT’s top-of-the-supply chain
corporations needed tax breaks and land for their greenfield investment while Business
Europe’s small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprise relied on trade in goods, and
hence it focused on abolishment of trade barriers and adverse competition laws in Latvia.
While such lobbying power cannot be directly teased out, the final accession
negotiation agreement was presented at the 2003 Athens EU Council meeting, where it was
seen that most of the Business Europe and ERT’s requests were immediately completed
while some were delayed in the short-term to gain an even better outcome in the long-term.
Representatives of the Latvian government were forced to succumb to the pressure of
different transnational interest blocs due to differences in economic and political power.
Some Latvian firms that were junior partners in different transnational interest blocs relied
on improved financial flows into Latvia to boast their well-being in the long term at the
expense of smaller Latvian businesses that lost their support and did not have adequate
support from Business Europe during the negotiations. Latvian firms that conducted
business as distributers of foreign goods and services, as well as facilitators of foreign
business’ branches, helped ERT influence the Latvian government during the FICIL High
Council meetings. Additional assistance to ERT not only increased the chances of getting
the transnational interest bloc’s preferences onto the agenda, but also it gave the Latvian
firms the opportunity to show their commitment to the transnational interest bloc.
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Republic of Lithuania
During the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the European Council decided to
commence bilateral intergovernmental conferences in 2000 for negotiations with Lithuania
on the conditions for its entry into the EU and the ensuing Treaty adjustments. Accession
negotiations began on 28 March 2000.117 The negotiations first went through a number of
“easy” chapters including science and research, statistics, education, and training. At the
opening of the negotiations, Vygaudas Usackas, the Lithuania Foreign Affairs Minister and
the chief negotiator for Lithuania, expressed the hope that Lithuania could make excellent
progress in the negotiations throughout the upcoming years and aspire to be in a position
to assume EU membership by January 2004. 118
Apart from the Lithuanian negotiation team, various Lithuanian domestic interest
groups were involved in the negotiations since the negotiated chapters were linked to their
businesses. Many of these groups such as the Lithuanian Chamber of Agriculture (LCA),
wanted to push back against transnational interest blocs under ERT and Business
Europe.119 The Lithuanian interest groups’ preferred keeping their dominance in the
domestic market and keeping business resources such as land, labor and equipment to
themselves as opposed to letting them being used by foreign entities. In several, policy
areas such as agriculture, medical equipment production and VAT changes on
transportation services, Lithuanian domestic interest groups managed to defend their
interests by postponing the implementation of EU policies that would allow transnational
interest blocs to assert their agenda on Lithuanian markets.

84

On the other hand, different transnational interest blocs under the command of ERT
and Business Europe, wanted to expand their European market presence through Lithuania.
The transnational interest block under ERT wanted to expand its global supply chains as
well as to enter different Lithuanian markets to expand profit generating opportunities. To
achieve this agenda, ERT attracted junior partners from Lithuania to assist it behind enemy
lines.

Lithuanian junior partners involved Lithuanian businesses that profited from

transnational interest bloc presence in Lithuania. One of the areas where ERT needed
partners is in helping to influence the Lithuanian government to take down foreign direct
investment-related barriers and to loosen regulations regarding purchases of Lithuanian
land and subsequent construction of new buildings for business purposes.
The other transnational interest bloc dominated by Business Europe also had its
own agenda towards various Lithuanian markets. Focusing more on policy areas that affect
export and import-related operations as well as market entrance barriers, Business Europe
employed not only Lithuanian members of Business Europe, but also independent junior
partners who would benefit from Business Europe’s members’ investments in Lithuania or
their imported goods from abroad.
Apart from accessing Lithuanian markets and having junior partners in the
export/import related sectors, Business Europe also attracted junior partners from the
Lithuanian financial sector. With Business Europe members potentially entering various
Lithuanian markets, they would need local financing to expand their operations. While
foreign banks can offer financial resources to Business Europe members, banks in
Lithuania offered financing at lower interest rates. Additionally, for banks in Lithuania, the
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credibility of foreign businesses was much higher than Lithuanian businesses. Market
power and already existing capital were seen as guarantees that foreign entities could repay
the loans. Swedish banks such as SEB and Swedbank respectively, dominated the
Lithuanian banking sector and were attracted to Business Europe’s members potential
businesses in Lithuania.120 Being foreign financial institutions themselves, they were
interested in generating more profit from Lithuanian markets. As a result, they were eager
to work with Business Europe’s members and provide them with loans as well as with
assistance influencing the local government.
In the environmental realm, the transnational interest bloc dominated by ERT
wanted to establish a presence in the sustainable power generation industry as well as have
access to raw natural resources. When the negotiations touched upon the closure of the
nuclear power plant, Ignalina, ERT wanted to take the opportunity to insert its members
into the process of securely closing it and replacing it with sustainable energy generating
machinery. To that end, ERT’s members, National Nuclear Corporations (NNC);
Belgatom; SwedPower International, all of whom are environmental consulting and
engineering companies, were put in charge of closing the Ignalina power plant and
establishing their own windmills and hydroelectric power stations. The ERT lobbied the
EU to allow its members to oversee the environmental technicalities since subpar handling
of nuclear waste could lead to a major catastrophe. The British renewable energy company,
NNC, with its German subsidiary company, STEAG, was interested in becoming the major
supplier of renewable energy in Lithuania so that it could reap a share of its profits as well
as partial control over the energy generating machinery on the Lithuanian territory. 121
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In 2002, the negotiations touched chapters that were less legislative and more
redistributive such as industrial and commercial policy, small- and medium-size enterprise,
and agriculture. Even though most of the sectors of Lithuania’s economy have faced
challenges during the EU accession, it was the agricultural sector that was the most
challenging. In order to represent the interests of rural residents and companies, the
Lithuanian Chamber of Agriculture (LCA) attempted to influence the Lithuanian
Accession committee while the Agriculture chapter was negotiated. The LCA was
established in the interwar era under the independent Lithuanian government but was
inactive since it became part of the Soviet Union. LCA resumed its activities in 1991 when
Lithuania became independent from the Soviet Union. Initially, LCA represented only
farmers from different agricultural sectors. However, eventually it started representing
rural citizens’ interests as well. During the accession period it was estimated that about one
third of Lithuania’s population lived in rural areas and around 20% of the working
population was engaged in the agricultural population that contributed almost 10% to
Lithuania’s GDP.122 Given the significance of agricultural sectors and rural areas to
Lithuania, LCA and its members became concerned when Business Europe, through
UTFE, was against Lithuania’s position on prohibiting the sale of agricultural land to
foreigners and increasing agricultural subsidies to Lithuanian farmers.
The Lithuanian Chamber of Agriculture was invited by the Lithuanian Ministry of
Agriculture (LMA) to participate in the negotiations with the JPC that was assigned to
negotiate with Lithuania on behalf of the EU Commission. Instead of accepting LCA
representatives as “active observers” and “advisors”, the Lithuanian government demanded
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that the LCA representatives do the official negotiators’ function as well. When the time
came to negotiate the transitional arrangements and derogation of certain policy points,
LCA and the Lithuanian accession committee faced a lot of resistance from the Joint
Parliamentary Committee. When LCA asked to use local materials to be implemented
when modernizing structural requirements for the production and placing on the market of
minced meat and meat preparation, JPC stated that Lithuania won’t be able to apply local
materials until 31 December 2006. JPC was adamant in advocating that the first two years
after the accession, Lithuania needs to utilize materials that come from the existing EU 15
member states.123 When analyzing the origin of this requirement, we need to look at
UTFE’s 2001 position paper on Lithuania’s accession recommendations. UTFE deemed
this transitional measure to be unacceptable because any new member state that does not
allow foreign goods (material) to be imported and sold in the market poses a fundamental
problem to the Free Flow of Goods clause of the EU Single market. Limiting the import of
structural goods in order to protect the domestic industry was a form of trade protectionism
and hence disrupting the market economy. 124
Agribusiness interests with Business Europe favored decreasing governmental
assistance to Lithuanian farmers, whether from the Lithuanian government or from the EU.
Such aid was seen by Business Europe as obstructing foreign competition for the
Lithuanian market. As a result, Business Europe lobbied the EU to persuade the Lithuanian
accession committee to allow foreigners to purchase agricultural land. The ability to
purchase of agricultural land would help Business Europe’s members channel greenfield
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investment for new operations or simply to restrict local farmers from having more access
to land.
Within the agricultural policy chapter, Business Europe operated on its own without
any Lithuanian partners. The agricultural sector is very important to the Lithuanian society
and close to 10% of its population is involved in agriculture. Several logistics and
distribution businesses rely on Lithuanian farmers retaining their land and crops. 125 As a
result, none of Lithuanian businesses assisted Business Europe in overthrowing the
legislation regarding the purchase of agricultural land by foreigners.
Despite the pressure of UTFE and pressure from the Lithuanian government, the
JPC felt they were “kind-hearted” because they found a middle ground between the two
fractions.126 Throughout the course of negotiations, JPC and UTFE managed to persuade
the Lithuanian government to relax the strict agricultural policies regarding EU aid to
Lithuanian farmers and purchase of agricultural land by foreigners. At the same time, JPC
also did not give in to UTFE’s efforts to eliminate EU aid towards Lithuania entirely and
to force Lithuania to give full access to foreigners to buy Lithuanian agricultural land. The
most important concessions were an increase in the rate of subsidization to agricultural
producers from 25% to 45% as opposed to Lithuania’s desired 60% and to UTFE’s 10%. 127
This decision was reached by the JPC because rural Lithuanian residents and farmers
claimed that they would not

vote for the EU accession if the subsidies were not

increased.128
JPC believed that Lithuania’s decision not to join the EU after all of the negotiations
had been completed would have defeated JPC’s effort to make accession happen. As a
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result, JPC needed to appease Lithuania in order to gain long-term benefits of Lithuania’s
accession. In terms of agricultural land sale to foreigners, after pressure from the rural
residents and members of the LCA, the Lithuanian negotiators managed to secure a sevenyear transition period only after which the land can be purchased by foreign entities. 129 The
UTFE was displeased with such results. However, the danger of failing to pass Lithuania’s
referendum to join the EU would have been much more devastating than these concessions.
While UTFE’s goals of strongly minimizing EU aid to Lithuanian farmers and of having
full access to agricultural land in Lithuania were not achieved in the short term, UTFE
believed that the possibility of acquisition of Lithuania’s agricultural land and changes to
EU aid in the future are worth the short-term inconvenience. 130
Apart from the agricultural sector, a lot of negotiating happened in the financial and
manufacturing realms. Similarly, to Latvia, Lithuania requested exclusion of certain credit
institutions from the scope of banking directives. According to the new EU financial
legislation, the Lithuanian financial institutions had to increase their minimum deposit
insurance scheme from $25,000 to $75,000 and had to establish

new investor

compensation guarantee schemes which were absent before the accession. 131 The new
legislation was a big challenge for Lithuanian financial institutions and the government
alike. As a result, the Lithuanian accession committee requested an extension for the
implementation of such policies.
Unlike in Latvia’s situation, where UTFE deemed such a request unacceptable
because its banks had a big enough share of the domestic market, the Lithuanian
government was able to receive the derogation for its financial institutions. The reason
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UTFE and JPC did not object to such a request is because the market share of the domestic
financial institutions in question was not big enough to impact competition in the EU Single
Market. Since Business Europe’s members consisted of regional SMEs that relied on new
markets for export, having the ability to request financial support from Lithuanian financial
institutions could be perceived as crucial to the success of Business Europe’s members’
operations in Lithuania. If Lithuanian domestic banks were to be granted exceptions to the
EU Single market regulations, it would not affect the foreign capitalists’ ability to expand
into Lithuania. The majority of Lithuania’s financial market is controlled by Swedish and
Danish banks. Whether the EU financial regulations applied to them was under the
discretion of their headquarters in Sweden and Denmark, respectively. In this case, not only
were the Scandinavian banks eager to provide financial support to Business Europe’s
members, but it also did not need any exceptions to the EU regulations, since it had enough
capital to withstand any adverse EU regulations. 132
In the end, the derogation lasted several years after Lithuania joined the EU. The
derogation allowed the Lithuanian domestic banks to steadily amass the required reserve
capital to meet the EU Single Market. Per EU regulations, Lithuanian banks had to have
enough reserve capital to cover up to 100,000 Euros for private and commercial deposit.
In case of the Investor Compensation Scheme, Lithuanian banks had to agree to host the
investment profit and be ready to pay 60% of the total within one month of the initial
request. The remainder would need to be paid out within the second month. 133
Extension of mandatory Investor Compensation Scheme implied that Business
Europe members may not be compensated in case their investments failed or the invested
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funds get misused. What made Business Europe agree to the derogation is the fact that the
derogation applied to Lithuanian domestic banks only and not to Swedish and Danish banks
who had the majority of the market share. If the compensation scheme were applied to
Lithuanian banks, Business Europe’s members could go to the foreign banks and safely
invest through them with guarantees. 134
Finally, within the “Energy” and the “Environment” chapters, the question of the
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant’s decommission was the focus of the negotiations. Since
Chernobyl’s nuclear disaster in April 1988, environmental and human safety from nuclear
material has been paramount in the EU. Lithuania’s Ignalina has the same structure and
type of the nuclear core as the one found in Chernobyl. Consequently, the EU was
concerned with such a plant operating within the EU borders and requested that it be
decommissioned as part of the negotiation process. While Lithuanian authorities knew that
Ignalina’s structure had major flaws, they did not want to close the power plant because it
supplied 70%-80% of Lithuania’s electricity. As a result, the Lithuania’s Negotiation
Delegation argued that Ignalina should be modernized to meet EU safety requirements. It
was estimated that modernization would require around two billion Euros and should be
financed by the EU Structural Funds and Lithuania’s funds for regional development. 135
After several meetings with the EU representatives and members of the Atomic
Energy Association, in 2002, it was jointly decided to decommission the power plant by
2009. Despite the attempts of the Administration of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant and the
authorities of local municipalities to keep the plant active for economic reasons, domestic
and foreign commercial interest groups persuaded the EU to close the plant and opt for
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cleaner energy sources.136 The British National Nuclear Corporation (NNC); the Belgian
energy company Belgatom; and the Swedish renewable energy company SwedPower
International group played active roles in making sure that not only the power plant got
decommissioned, but that part of Lithuania’s electricity was supplied with the help of their
wind turbines. The above environmental engineering companies specialized in different
parts of wind turbines. Hence, all of them were needed to complete the construction of
several wind turbines that would supply Lithuania with electricity. 137
What made the influence of such companies possible in this case is the fact that all
of them are part of Business Europe. Since Lithuania was going to be a new EU member
state with a lot of flat land that could be utilized for electricity generation from wind, it was
appealing for clean energy extraction manufacturers to make sure the local plant was
closed. In order to entice Lithuania to decommission the plant, France and Germany agreed
to offer a financial package to assist in the decommissioning costs. Together with the
Lithuania’s rural development fund, the EU Structural Fund created the International
Decommissioning Support Fund that gave out specific grants to the Lithuanian authorities
in order to assist with the process. 138
While the financial aspect of such negotiations was covered by the international
community, the closing of the nuclear plant is a long process and the Lithuanian
government estimated that it would need a transition period of ten years (from 2002 until
2012) to close the plant. At the end of the negotiations, the maximum transition period was
five years (from the date of accession until the end of 2009), which was the final provision
established by the EU Commission. When looking at Business Europe’s position paper
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regarding CEE accession negotiations, it was stated that policies regarding Energy and the
Environment chapters, must not have a derogation of more than five years and ultimately
should not have any effect on trade and competition in the Internal Market. Furthermore,
disposal of any hazardous waste into the environment should be prohibited as it can affect
competition of companies who deal with environmental policies. 139
At the end of the negotiations, Lithuania managed to satisfy most of the EU
accession chapters with some scheduled to be completed by 2009. It was clear that Business
Europe was not only influential in terms of policy setting during these negotiations, but it
also managed to put some of its member companies in charge of policy execution such as
in the case of Ignalina NPP decommission. Business Europe was able to be more influential
in negotiation chapters where the level of technicality exceeded the technological knowhow of the EU. Therefore, Business Europe’s knowledge of these sectors enabled it to
successfully exert influence on the EU.

In chapters

such as agriculture and land

acquisition, Business Europe was not as successful because Lithuanian domestic interest
groups such as the LCA managed to influence the Lithuanian and EU representatives not
to give in to the demands of foreign investors at the expense of local rural residents’ needs.
Due to the number of rural residents affected by EU agricultural policies, LCA threatened
Lithuanian representatives of not voting for EU accession which consequently would create
larger costs than the benefits of giving the agricultural land to the foreigners as part of the
EU accessions negotiations.
So far, transnational interest group influence patterns in Latvia and Lithuania differ.
While in Latvia, ERT managed to influence taxation patterns for corporations and Business
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Europe succeeded in minimizing the transition periods for capital flow and competition
laws. In Latvia Business Europe managed to influence only the more technical chapters
but had little influence in the technical chapter due to the protest from domestic interest
groups. LCA utilized its constituent power and technical expertise to overcome the
immense regulatory obstacles put up by the EU and transnational interest blocs. Even
though Lithuanian interest groups did not have the market share and the financial resources
to fight against EU and transnational interest blocs influence, they used their seemingly
small assets effectively to balance the pressure that came from conventionally bigger and
more powerful actors.
Republic of Estonia
Republic of Estonia (Estonia) expressed the desire to join the EU in 1995 when it
signed the Association Agreement. After several EU delegation visits to Estonia with the
purpose of assessing the country’s feasibility to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the EU
Council decided to commence EU accession negotiations starting in April 1998. 140 The
Estonian government formed the Accession Negotiation Delegation to represent Estonia’s
interests during the accession negotiations that lasted between 1999 and 2002. The
Delegation was headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and consisted of ten government
officials while the EU commission relied on the Association Committee that negotiated the
accession criteria during the Association Council meetings. The Estonian Accession
Negotiation Delegation also formed the official Consultative Council that would assist the
Delegation in forming national positions in the more technical accession chapters. The
Consultative Council was chaired by Toomas Luman, the chairman of Nordecon AS, and
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consisted primarily of members of the business community as well as the executives of the
employers’ confederation. This group was tasked with assisting the Estonian government
in making the best statements that would represent the interest of Estonia within the
negotiation process.141
During the accession negotiations between Estonia and the EU, the ERT and
Business Europe were also interested in outcomes of policy areas that would affect their
agendas. Particularly, the transnational interest bloc dominated by the ERT was interested
in expanding its investment base for opening new business or expanding existing ones in
Estonia. In order to expand in Estonia, the transnational interest bloc under ERT’s
command wanted to acquire some land for its greenfield investments.
ERT members who wanted to expand their business in Estonia, wanted to purchase
land to build their production or distribution branches for the local market. Since the land
is cheaper and real estate taxes are lower in Estonia than in Western Europe or in
Scandinavia, it was essential for ERT to assure that Estonia kept its land purchase policies
fairly liberal. The ability to purchase land in Estonia would allow ERT members not only
to assert their market power in Estonia but it also would allow to retain more revenue as
profits due to lower business costs. However, ERT’s attempt to keep land purchasing easy
for its members was not as fruitful as initially hoped for. Estonian businesses realized the
disadvantages of liberal land purchasing policies which made them face the increasing
influence of the transnational interest bloc.
After ERT released its statement about Estonia’s land purchasing laws, the deputy
chancellor of the Foreign Ministry stated that the 1995 – 1999 reference years don’t reflect

96

Estonia’s possibilities and current needs in the area of agriculture. Before responding to
the EU’s demands on liberalizing legislation pertaining to agricultural land, the Estonian
Delegation chair, Estonian Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland, met with the Consultative
Council to discuss the issue. After the meeting, the Delegation sent two proposals to impose
substantially stricter restrictions on the sale of land to the Estonian Parliament for approval
before the official position were to be stated at the accession negotiations. 142
The EU’s Association Council met with Estonia’s Accession Delegation once again
in 2003 to revisit the chapter on purchase of agricultural land. During that meeting, after
some discontent from the EU’s side both parties agreed to have a transitional period that
would allow Estonia to maintain the revised legislation concerning the sale of agricultural
land and forests to foreigners for seven years after the accession to the EU with a possibility
to extend the period for three more years under extraordinary circumstances. 143 While such
a verdict seemed to only have marginal effects on domestic interest groups and the ERT in
the short run, it actually gave Estonian domestic groups a big advantage over foreign
investors. An official delay in purchasing Estonian land by foreigners gave Estonian
domestic interest groups and the Estonian government the opportunity to acquire the land
for their own operations at lower costs than foreign investors, which limited competition
for an extended time period. Similarly, while the short derogation was a minor setback for
the ERT, the extension was lengthy enough to potentially prohibit ERT members from
acquiring land that had already been purchased. These provisions of the derogation
allowance limited the transnational interest bloc’s goals of expanding business and
increasing profits in land acquisition opportunities in the short term.
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In the realm of taxes, transnational interest blocs were especially involved because
any changes in corporate taxation in Estonia could increase or decrease the rate of return
on their investments. Business Europe was particularly invested during the negotiations
over corporate taxation in Estonia given that Business Europe’s members operate on much
smaller cost margins than the bigger corporations. As a result, Business Europe wanted to
keep corporate taxes as low as possible. The mission to keep the taxes low was also
supported by Business Europe’s junior partner, the Estonian Employers’ Confederation.
As changes in corporate taxes would affect domestic businesses as well, domestic entities
were also supporting Business Europe’s agenda of keeping the taxes constant or lowering
them.144
Unlike the situation with the land purchase legislation, the Estonian Consultative
Committee together with the Estonian Negotiation Committee, supported Business
Europe’s goal of keeping Estonian corporate taxes as low as they were before the accession
to the EU. The Estonian national and private actors believed that keeping low corporate
taxes would allow domestic businesses to profit more and hence improve the national
economy.145
When discussing the chapter on corporate income taxation, the EU Association
Council stated that Estonia’s corporate taxes are significantly lower than in other EU
member states, which gives Estonia an unfair competitive advantage. Business Europe
representatives expressed concern that harmonization of taxes may have a negative effect
on the business environment in Estonia. The Estonian Employers’ Confederation chairman,
Enn Veskimagi, who was part of the Consultative Council, supported Business Europe in
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its claim. Mr. Veskimagi stated that “the productivity of Estonian companies is still
significantly below the European level and enterprise is need of constant investment. It is
therefore sensible to keep investment exempt of income tax. This way money will return
into enterprise in a more direct way. It was added that in the conditions of a common
market, taxes will become harmonized voluntarily and by themselves in the long term
because competition will force old member states to lower their taxes as it was done in
Finland.146
Toomas Luman, the chair of the Consultative Council, stated that the old EU
member states’ pressure for the harmonization of taxes is an attempt to cut Estonia’
competitiveness by force, and declared that Estonia has to defend its business interests by
all means available. The Council urged the Estonian Accession Delegation to clearly
declare during the accession negotiations that lower corporate income taxes are necessary
in order to increase the competitiveness of Estonian labor, the movement of which Europe
is restricting to a large extent.147
When meeting with the EU’s Association Council to finalize the taxation chapter,
the EU decided that Estonia can maintain a reduced rate of corporate income tax of not less
than 5% for business operating in Estonia for at least three consecutive years while
businesses supplying goods and services to the state may be exempt from the corporate
income taxes.148 While the Estonian Accession delegation, ERT and Business Europe were
happy about the decision, some members of the Estonian Consultative Council were
concerned. ERT and Business Europe representatives were grateful for the above decision
because lower corporate taxes allow different transnational interest blocs to move capital

99

easily without losing any resources to taxes. The ability to move capital to Estonia where
corporate taxes and labor are cheaper than in Western Europe, allows members of different
transnational interest blocs to retain more revenue as profits due to decreased costs.
Since the Estonian government could not obtain sizeable tax revenue from the big
corporations, it shifted its focus on smaller enterprises. Toomas Luman stated that the
“terminator-style” policies of the Estonian Tax Board are increasing the unemployment
rate by forcing the SME owners to close down. He added that the trend in counties across
Estonia is astonishing because the number of small entrepreneurs is decreasing because the
tax laws and tax rates are getting more and more aggressive. He concluded that such trends
towards SME owners should not be allowed in Estonia where 10% of the people ever get
the idea to go into business, 3% try and only 1% succeeds. Revenue taxation had become
much more extensive not only in Estonia, but across the EU. While in Western Europe,
revenue taxation has increased for both SME and big corporations, in Estonia the revenue
taxation has disproportionally fallen upon the local SME which indicates how political and
economic policies across the EU have been crafted in order to serve the big corporations
at the expense of SMEs across the region. In order to counteract the harsh tax schemes,
Mr. Luman proposed that since Estonia is lacking in tax revenue because local
corporations’ tax rates stayed small, that the income tax should also be applied to profits
that are gained by foreign parent companies through Estonian subsidiaries. 149
Regarding this matter, the EU Accession council allowed Estonia not only to tax
profits that were distributed by Estonian subsidiaries to their foreign parent companies but
also tax the profits that were not distributed abroad but were rather used for local business.
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While Business Europe representatives were not as affected by such decisions because their
members consisted most of regional manufacturers rather than transnational corporations,
ERT representatives were shocked by the decision and lobbied both the EU association
Council and the Estonian Consultative Council to abandon the idea of increasing tax rate
for its subsidiaries. Given that ERT’s subsidiaries contribute a lot to Estonia’s tax revenue,
Estonia’s government would suffer since it would have less resources (due to a smaller tax
revenue) to put into its economy. As a result, the Estonian Accession delegation and its
Consultative Council agreed to postpone the application of such tax until 31 December
2009.150 The transnational interest bloc under ERT’s command once again exercised its
market power by exhibiting how its presence is beneficial to Estonia.
The push for entrance into the Estonian markets did not stop with the fight for
agricultural land and taxation policies. The German energy conglomerate, NRG Energy,
wanted to buy the two Estonian power plants located in the city of Narva. Additionally,
together with its Estonian junior partner, Kunda Nordic Cement, NRG Energy wanted to
acquire the Estonian Oil Shale to extract natural resources for profit at the expense of the
local environment.151 As a result, ERT lobbied the EU accession committee to impose high
enough standards on Estonian plants that they could not adhere to them and would be
forced to sell the plants to NRG Energy. 152
During the negotiations of “Energy” and “Transportation” chapters, the Estonian
Consultative Council clashed with NRG Energy. NRG Energy is a big energy and
transportation conglomerate that specializes in buying foreign electricity power plants and
cargo transportation companies to expand their market power in the EU. Accession of the
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Baltic States presented a good opportunity to expand NRG’s portfolio of energy producing
plants. The two With Estonia having two plants in the city of Narva, NRG’s focus was set
to buy and modernize them in order to supply electricity for profit. The Estonian
Consultative Committee protested such goals because an increased price for electricity
would have a negative impact on the socioeconomic situation in Estonia. 153
In 2000, during the accession negotiations, NRG Energy expressed the desire to
acquire 49% shares of the two Narva Power plants, Eesti and Balti, that supply the majority
of Estonia’s electricity.154 Lembit Vali, director of Eesti Energy, stated that this deal is not
beneficial to the Estonia because it would make it more difficult for Estonian companies
and private individuals to afford electricity.155 Given the relatively poor performance of the
Estonian economy since its independence, its citizens cannot afford electricity if its price
reaches Western European price levels. As a result, the country would plunge into an even
worse economic situation which would be taxing for rest of the EU.
Despite the Estonian Consultative Council’s protest to the above deal, the two
plants were sold to the NRG Energy. The Estonian government together with the EU were
pleased with the deal because it enabled the NRG Energy to make the plants comply with
EU regulations and to produce more energy for Estonia and perhaps other EU members.
To further its presence in the Estonian resource market, the German energy
conglomerate wanted to buy the mining company to supplement its dominance over
Estonia’s energy sector.156 While this was appealing to the Estonian government and the
EU, the Estonian Consultative Council and the former Narva plant owner urged the
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Estonian government not to sell the Oil Shale as it would force Estonia to be fully
dependent on NRG Energy’s supply of energy and natural resources.

157

After meeting with the Estonian government, the Estonian Consultative Committee
managed to cancel the sale of the Oil Shale. The Committee claimed that the money
received from the sale of the Narva gave Estonia enough resources not only to keep the Oil
Shale operating under the Estonian government but also it allowed Estonian authorities to
modernize its infrastructure so its operation would not be as damaging to the environment.
This turn of events was seen as victorious for the Estonian government and Estonian
Consultative Committee.158
After consulting with the Consultative Council, Toomas Luman together with Eesti
Energia managed to call off the sale because the privatization of the Narva plants gave
Estonia enough financial assistance to prevent the oil shale mining from becoming too
environmentally damaging. While the ERT was not pleased with the decision, the EU
association council together with the Business Europe were satisfied as it preserved the
environmental EU standards. While Business Europe did not have competitive issue with
the sale of the oil shale, the negative impacts it would have had on the environment was
troubling for the transnational interest group. It has heavily lobbied Estonia and the EU to
maintain strict environmental standards in terms of waste disposal and management of
natural resources.159
During the negotiation meeting on the Energy and Environment chapters, the
Estonian Accession Delegation, the ERT and the EU Accession Council were happy to
close the negotiations with the two Narva plants sold to the NRG Energy while the Estonian
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oil shale was kept in the hands of the Estonia despite the pressure from the ERT and NRG
Energy to sell it. While Business Europe was not directly involved in the negotiations, it
was pleased by the result because despite being part of a transnational interest bloc that
represents regional SMEs, care of the environment within the EU plays an important role
in their statute and especially their business interests and profits in the specialized energy
markets they serve.
ERT, other hand, is comprised more of global corporations that operate at the top
of the global supply chains. As a result, this transnational interest bloc is interested in
establishing global supply chains around the world, including the CEE. Since ERT
members may not necessarily limit themselves to the EU and are rather flexible on the
geography of their operations, they are not concerned as much about the environment in
the EU beyond its potential to generate profit. Consequently, when the sale of the Oil Shale
was not conducted, ERT lost an opportunity to obtain a profit generating source and an
opportunity to increase their energy market share in Estonia.
The EU accession negotiations between Estonia and the EU concluded in December
2002 with all negotiation chapters being closed. The result for Estonia and different interest
groups are mixed from these negotiations. In terms of movement of capital and acquisition
of land for commercial use by foreigners, the Estonian Delegation together with the
Estonian domestic interest group members managed to withstand the pressure from the EU
to relax the Estonian legislation in order to enter the EU. Instead, the Estonian Consultative
Council managed to reach a derogation that would prevent foreigners from buying Estonian
land for seven years after the accession period. While the foreign transnational interest
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groups were not happy with the result, domestic Estonian interest groups were temporarily
safeguarded from the international business competition which allowed Estonia to get used
to the dynamics of the Internal Market in a more gradual way.
In terms of taxation, energy and environmental chapters, the results were to some
extent less fortunate for Estonia and its domestic interest groups. Perhaps the most
beneficial outcome of the taxation chapter for the ERT representatives was the fact that
Estonia and the Estonian Consultative Council succeeded in preventing Estonian corporate
taxes from being harmonized with those in existing EU member states. Since corporate
income taxes are much higher in the EU than in Estonia, Estonia had the advantage in
attracting investors which the Estonian Accession delegation and the Estonian Consultative
Council wanted to maintain. After some negotiations, the EU Accession Council allowed
the lower tax rates to be kept but the distributed profits that go from Estonian subsidiaries
to the main foreign headquarters would be required to be taxed after the accession.
Finally, the policy outcomes regarding the energy and environment chapters were
also with mixed results. The sale of the two Narva plants pleased the ERT members, the
Estonian Accession Delegation, and the EU Accession Committee while the Estonian
domestic interest groups and the Consultative Council were not happy about the outcome.
The tables, however, had turned when the NRG Energy was not able to buy the oil shales.
Business Europe and the Consultative Council were pleased with the outcomes because it
allowed Estonia to safeguard its environmental integrity from further damage.
Overall, the Estonian Negotiation Committee and the Estonian Consultative
Council managed to withstand the pressure from international interest groups and the EU
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Accession Council to some extent compared to the cases in Latvia and Lithuania. The
Estonian Consultative Council was not only more involved with the accession negotiations,
but it also had much more experienced representation that wanted to preserve Estonian
business and environmental climate to some extent and not allow it to be damaged by the
international forces at the expense of what these actors defined as the national well-being.
Conclusion
The accession negotiations in the Baltic States was a chance for all parties involved
to state and bargain their positions with hopes of getting the outcome that would best serve
them. Officially, the accession negotiations happened on the political level between the
accession countries and the EU. However, since the accession negotiations touched upon
various political, social, and economic spheres of the accession states and the EU, that
would affect the interests of several civil and commercial entities.
As a result, the accession negotiations involved transnational interest blocs under
the command of ERT and Business Europe who would gradually assert their own interests
on the accession states and the EU. Some of the most powerful members that comprised
the transnational interest blocs were the Swedish automobile producer, Volvo, and the
Norwegian real estate conglomerate, Linstow-Varner, who wanted to expand their
influence in Latvia.160 In Lithuania, the most powerful corporate groups were the Nordic
banks, DnB Nord and Swedbank, who wanted to become the main financial institutions
within the country. Finally, in Estonia, the German energy conglomerate, NRG Energy,
wanted to take over Estonian power supply infrastructure to add to its big energy supply
empire that spans across Europe.
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The transnational interest blocs had extensive political and economic linkages
within each accession country. ERT mostly utilized Business Enlargement councils and
Business Europe used BOSMIP and domestic Confederations of Employers to expand their
influence and gain junior partners in the Baltic States.161 In Latvia, ERT was heavily
involved through FICIL, while Business Europe was involved through the Latvian
Confederation of Employers. Both groups managed to gain concessions in the form of
ability to buy agricultural land and have decreased real estate and sales taxes on their
operations. Additionally, ERT with its junior partners managed to minimize stated aid to
Latvian business in order to decrease market competition for ERT members.
During Lithuania’s accession negotiations, the transnational interest blocs were not
as successful, because Lithuanian domestic interest groups such as LCA, managed to delay
law that allows foreigners to purchase agricultural land for commercial purposes. In the
financial realm, the Lithuanian authorities managed to delay the EU regulations regarding
Investor and Depositor compensation schemes while in the environmental area, Lithuania
was forced to concede to ERT members by closing the domestic power plant and opt for
installation of Western European energy generators.
In Estonia, both transnational interest blocs faced a lot of resistance from the
Estonian Consultative Committee that did not want foreign companies to enter the market
and deprive local businesses of their market share. Despite such resistance, ERT managed
to enter the energy supply markets by purchasing the two Narva plants as well as the oil
shale. At the same time, ERT failed in getting Estonia to allow it to buy agricultural land
for commercial purposes.
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Overall, the results of transnational interest blocs’ influence in the Baltic States
were mixed, but with a trend that supports the theory that corporate actors are intertwined
in relationships that form transnational interest blocs. When incorporated in transnational
interest blocs, with the sheer amount of resources and market power, they are able to
influence political and economic policies on a national, regional, and supranational level.
While transnational interest blocs cannot always achieve the desired result from the very
beginning, they utilize their resources to gain enough concessions in the short run, to make
further efforts in achieving their goals worthwhile in the long run.
As seen in the case of the Baltic States, different transnational interest blocs do not
always have the same goals, thus allowing for a possibility that different transnational blocs
can clash over policy areas. Depending on the needs of their members and policy
preferences, Business Europe and ERT agreed or disagreed on results that were achieved
in various negotiation chapters. In such situations, availability of financial resources, share
of market power as well as linkages to national and supranational political actors, usually
decided which transnational interest bloc would prevail with its agenda in each negotiation
chapter.
Chapter 4. Accession Negotiations in Poland
Since the 1989 transition to a more democratic society with a market economy,
Poland set its foreign policy of “returning back to Europe” as one the most important goals
to be achieved by the end of the 20th century. The policy implied becoming more unified
with its Western European neighbors in terms of international trade and political values.
To achieve this goal, Poland signed the European Association Agreement in 1992 which

108

established trade and diplomatic relationships between Poland and the European Economic
Community. During the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, the European Council offered Poland
membership in the EU if it satisfied the Maastricht Treaty conditions of having stable
democratic institutions, a functioning market economy and the ability to contribute to EU’s
political and economic agenda in the future. Poland submitted its membership application
in 1994 and started preparing for enlargement process in 1997 by establishing the National
Strategy of Integration which encompassed policies that would satisfy the Maastricht
Criteria.162
Apart from the effort to satisfy the Maastricht criteria, the Polish government
established a nineteen-person negotiation team that was responsible for representing
Poland’s interests during the EU accession negotiations. The negotiation team was headed
by the Chief Negotiator and eighteen negotiators who held positions within various Polish
ministries. When the EU accession negotiations started in March 1998, the negotiation
team was chaired by Jan Kułakowski, a member of the majority Polish coalition Solidarity
Electoral Action. Under Mr. Kulakowski’s leadership, the team managed to close twentyone negotiation chapters out of thirty. In 2001, as a result of parliamentary elections, the
majority party coalition changed from Solidarity Electoral Action to Democratic Left
Alliance, as a result of which the leadership of the negotiation team was passed to Jan
Truszczyński, the deputy foreign minister, who would chair the team until the end of
negotiations in December, 2002.163
On the EU side, the European Commission proposed the official EU positions
regarding the negotiation chapters while the Council of European Union together with the
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European Parliament had powers to give the final approval of EU positions. A joint
parliamentary committee was appointed as the official representative of the EU that
directly bargained with Poland’s negotiation team during the accession negotiations. 164
The prospect of Poland’s accession to the EU did not only excite Poland and
existing EU member states, but also several corporate actors that saw business
opportunities in the new accession state. While many business actors were acting alone in
their quest to take advantage of the Polish market, some corporate actors were part of bigger
transnational interest blocs. Transnational interest blocs are led by powerful corporate
actors who have a lot of market power as well as financial resources, and political linkages
to advance their agenda across national boundaries. Within the EU, the European
Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) and Business Europe are the two corporate actors who
led their respective transnational interest blocs. ERT represents big West European
corporations that operate across the world and utilize global supply chains to profit from
their business. Business Europe, on the other hand, represents small and medium size West
European enterprises (SMEs) that operate on a more regional level and focus on expanding
regional trade as opposed to relying on foreign capital investment to expand their market
power.
While transnational interest blocs may have some common views on policies that
are mutually beneficial in supporting expansion of their businesses, sometimes they
disagree on policies depending on how it affects their sectoral interests. In such cases,
transnational interest blocs either come to a compromise or one transnational interest bloc
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prevails at the expense of the other. Political influence and market power are usually the
determinants of which bloc prevails.
When the EU extended the invitation to Poland to join the Union, transnational
interest blocs were captivated by the prospect of using Polish markets to expand their
market power and increase profits. Poland’s large agricultural and industrial capacity as
well as cheaper real estate were potential venues to establish or to expand foreign
investment.
In order to execute their agenda in Poland, various members of different
transnational interest blocs sought to influence the EU representatives as well as Polish
business and political actors during the accession negotiations. One of the most involved
corporate actors during Poland’s accession negotiations was the Spanish construction
company, Ferrovial, that wanted access to Polish vast agricultural land in order to build
commercial real estate. Ferrovial wanted to take advantage of the disparity between real
estate prices in Poland and in Western Europe. Ferrovial wanted to purchase Polish land
and forests in the first year of accession and sell it in anticipation of price increases that
would result in the value of these Polish assets becoming closer to those in existing EU
member states, thus guaranteeing capital gains. The British pharmaceutical company,
Glaxo Wellcome, pressured the EU to deny Polish pharmaceutical companies the license
to export Polish drugs into the EU. Similarly, the German Confederation of Employers
lobbied the EU not to grant Polish citizens the ability to obtain employment in existing EU
member states.
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While Business Europe and ERT had established economic and political linkages
within the EU, they did not have any economic or political leverage to expand their agenda
in the new accession country at the beginning of negotiations. Therefore, both transnational
interest blocs solicited several Polish business actors or even entire domestic business
interest groups and incorporated them into their respective transnational interest blocs as
junior partners. These junior partners served as links between Western European corporate
actors and the Polish market, and potentially the Polish government. ERT and Business
Europe influenced their junior Polish partners to act not only as economic partners within
the Polish markets but also as political actors who would help influence the Polish
government to advance the transnational interest bloc agenda.
With Poland being a major economy in Eastern Europe, many Polish companies
wanted to cooperate with foreign corporations to improve their own business. This included
the Polish construction company Budimex, which specialized in selling residential and
commercial real estate to the local population and businesses. As a result, it was eager to
work with Ferrovial and the ERT to advance their agenda in order to increase profit-making
opportunities. Finally, the largest Polish pharmacy chain, POLFA, wanted to be
incorporated into the transnational interest bloc under ERT’s leadership so that it could
access Glaxo Wellcome’s pharmaceutical products and sell them in Poland as opposed to
relying on Polish products that were thought to be inferior to the foreign ones. Polish junior
partners were attracted to the prospect of being part of a transnational interest bloc because
they believed that such membership not only would increase domestic business but it also
would eventually bring the opportunity to gain influence over the Polish government as

112

well as gain business recognition in the EU as well as in other parts of the world. To that
end, Polish junior partners helped ERT and Business Europe gain market power in Poland
as well as influence over the Polish government by steadily lobbying the accession
negotiation team before and during the accession negotiations. Polish junior partners and
other members of the transnational interest blocs often did not have any opposition to their
lobbying activities in Poland.
However, in some policy areas, domestic interest groups such as the largest Polish
farmers’ union, Kółka Rolnicze, the two largest Polish trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ,
as well as the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL), heavily contested corporate influence on the
accession negotiations. These domestic interest groups criticized the accession negotiations
but ultimately did not have enough structural, financial, and political resources to sway the
Polish government into a stronger opposition to EU’s demands. This opposition was mostly
seen in policy areas such as agriculture, real estate, and labor regulations. These policy
areas were instrumental to Poland’s economic and social flourishing and therefore some
domestic corporate and political elites, but especially those organizations representing
workers and small farmers, wanted to ensure that Poland’s overall wellbeing would be
improved after the accession to the EU.165
Movement of Goods and Company Law Chapters
The strong influence of transnational interest blocs was also evident during the
negotiations regarding the movement of goods and company law chapters. Similar to the
Free Movement of Persons chapter which postulated rights for Polish citizens to seek
employment in other EU member states, the free movement of goods enabled Poland to
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export and import various goods within the EU. While such free trade agreement seems to
be beneficial to many entities, certain sectors would have been at a disadvantage if Poland
received rights to export certain goods and services to the EU. The pharmaceuticals sector
was one of the sectors which would have been affected by Poland’s ability to export its
products into the EU. The pharmaceutical sector was an important area for many corporate
actors because it was the second most profitable sector in the EU, which since 1980s was
losing global market share to the United States and Japan. 166
As a result, the major pharmaceutical companies such as the British pharmaceutical
conglomerate, Glaxo Wellcome, wanted to maintain its dominance within the EU so that
the company could have a chance of competing with foreign companies. In order to
maintain its dominance, Glaxo Wellcome and the ERT wanted to utilize their respective
dominant position within the EU to influence politicians to implement additional patent
protection mechanisms to safeguard Merck’s market position. Such enhanced patent
protection tools would allow Merck to maintain its market dominance by limiting the
number of new entrants into the EU pharmaceutical market and consequently keep prices
of pharmaceutical products high due to limited supply.167
When it was announced by the EU Commission that Poland would be able to export
its pharmaceutical products to the EU, the transnational interest bloc led by ERT was
concerned about such stipulations. Glaxo Wellcome and the ERT were concerned that the
cheaper Polish pharmaceutical products would increase competition in the EU and Merck
would lose its market share. Furthermore, Merck was concerned that Poland would take
advantage of EU-originated pharmaceutical products and make cheaper copies of them
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while ignoring EU patent law. As a result, ERT and Glaxo Wellcome wanted to implement
a 5-year transition period after which Poland would be allowed to trade pharmaceutical
products in the EU single market. Secondly, the transnational corporate interest bloc
pushed for Supplementary Protection Certificates which extended the patent protection for
another 5 years. Such extended protection against product copying allowed bigger
corporations to have the ability to increase prices and gain more profit at the expense of
public health.168
In Poland, the largest pharmaceutical importer and exporter, POLFA S.A., was
working with Glaxo Wellcome and the ERT to secure the import of higher quality products
into Poland. POLFS S.A. was established in 2002 with an exclusive goal to serve as the
middleman between the existing EU pharmaceutical companies and former Central and
Eastern European communist states. With a specific focus on its home country, Poland,
POLFA S.A provided more than average services to its partners. Apart from offering
middleman services, POLFA was eager to outsource export department duties for its
foreign clients. With the in-depth knowledge of the Polish market, and much lower service
charges, POLFA was very appealing to Merck. POLFA wanted to establish an exclusive
partnership with Glaxo Wellcome and serve as the main importer for the British
pharmaceutical company. Such a relationship would prove essential for the Polish
company since the prospective profits would be a crucial tool to POLFA’s expansion in
Poland. Given its recent inception as a company in the midst of the Polish the accession
negotiations, POLFA had limited capital, which pushed the Polish company to pursue the
partnership with Merck in order to receive more resources for its expansion in Poland. 169
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On the other hand, several Polish pharmacy chains and private healthcare
companies were against such a partnership because increased competition would make
local companies lose market share and would allow Glaxo Wellcome to increase their
prices due to higher quality of products as well as due to extended patent protection. Big
corporations such as Glaxo Wellcome used patents and supply partnerships with its junior
partners to dominate pharmaceutical markets within the EU and its neighboring countries.
EU patent law allowed big pharmaceutical companies to have exclusive ownership and
marketing rights while extensive supply chains enabled such companies to easily deliver
their patented drugs to foreign markets at a cheaper price. Once a big pharmaceutical
company has entered a new market, it can eventually start expanding its influence by
exclusively offering its patented drug at cheaper prices in order to undercut its competitors.
In such cases, the foreign company undercuts its competitors by not only offering cheaper
products but also by eliminating the chances of its competitors copying the product itself.
Such market dynamics often leads to a more concentrated industry where the entire sector
is dominated by a few companies. This contrasts with the scenario that that is envisioned
by the EU. The EU promotes its patent laws among the acceding member states stating that
patent laws promote a fair competition policy that protects foreign companies when they
enter a new market and allows them to become competitive enough with local companies
that already have a bigger presence in the market.
The negotiations on Movement of Goods and Company Law Chapters
The negotiations regarding the free movement of goods and company law chapter
started in March 2001. The Polish negotiation team and the EU representatives knew that
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the included pharmaceutical sector would be a sensitive topic due to the high discrepancy
in Polish and EU regulations. While in the EU, pharmaceutical companies are involved in
more research activities that yield novel, organic pharmaceutical products which are
protected by patent laws for 10 years since their introduction into the market. The CEE
region is known for utilizing more generic drugs that contain the same ingredients, utilize
the same production technology but are marketed at up to an 80% price discount compared
to their Western European counterparts. Considering such price differences, Glaxo
Wellcome and the ERT wanted to prevent Polish pharmaceutical companies from entering
the EU Single Market because they would lose a lot of market share due to Polish prices.170
The ERT wanted to influence the EU Commission by stating to the Office of Competition
and Competition Protection (UOKiK), that the generic Polish pharmaceutical products
would not benefit the EU public health as their quality is inferior to that of existing EU
manufacturers. ERT added that parallel trade in pharmaceuticals from Poland would create
distortions in the EU market which would disincentivize R&D within the EU market since
it would not be rewarded by the previously held prices. In order to remedy this situation,
the ERT demanded a 5-year transition period only after which Poland would be able to join
the EU pharmaceutical market.171
For the sake of expediting the negotiations regarding the trade in pharmaceuticals,
the Polish negotiation team agreed to the transition period if the EU Commission allowed
Polish pharmaceutical companies to take samples of the new pharmaceutical products that
were originated in the EU and to research them during the transition period. This option
would allow Polish companies to duplicate the original product and make a much cheaper
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generic product with the same ingredients for the Polish market. While the EU Commission
and the European Generic Medicine Association were initially in favor of such a request,
Glaxo Wellcome was concerned that such a clause would undermine the patent rights that
are exercised in the EU but not in Poland.
Glaxo Wellcome and the ERT claimed that since Poland was part of the former
Communist bloc and the norms of the Polish pharmaceutical market were dictated by the
government and not the market, that Poland was not adhering to minimum patent laws that
prevented other companies from using original drugs for 10 years since their introduction
into the EU market. In order to prevent their original pharmaceutical products from being
copied and sold at a cheaper price in Poland despite the trade barriers with other EU
member states. Glaxo Wellcome and the ERT demanded Supplementary Protection
Certificates that would extend the initial patent period of 10 years by another 5 years. The
members of the transnational interest bloc explained that it takes about 5 years to introduce
a new drug in a different country. While it is being introduced into a new country, the
safeguarding clause of the patent law is running its time. As a result, Merck would be losing
its protected time promised by the patent law while not being able to even sell the product
and receive exclusive revenue for its product. In order to remedy that, the proposed
Supplementary Protection Certificate would extend the patent period by 5 years which
would offset the 5 years it takes to introduce the new product into a new country. In the
end, Merck would be able to sell its original products in Poland while utilizing the 10-year
patent period without wasting it on the period required to get the new drug approved to be
sold in Poland.172

118

Upon hearing this proposal and accusations that Poland had outdated patent
regulations, the Polish negotiation team came back stating that Poland introduced new
patent laws in 1994 which prohibited using new drugs for commercial purposes but allowed
companies to research new drugs for educational and public health purposes. The Polish
representatives added that their patent provisions were compatible with those in other EU
member states such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, and yet they are not recognized by the
EU Commission. Instead, the EU Commission demanded that Poland harmonize its patent
laws to be identical to those prescribed by the European Medicines Agency. 173
The EU representatives demanded that this be done by 2002 if Poland wanted to
meet the 2004 accession date. The demanded time frame was not feasible for Polish
authorities which made them suspect discrimination regarding accession demands. The
Polish negotiation team referred to the fact that Portugal and Spain did not have to
harmonize their patent laws to those within EU before accession but rather were given
several years after accession to complete the changes in legislation. The EU Commission
responded to the discriminatory allegations by stating that in the case of Spain and Portugal,
their accession to the EU would not have had as much of an economic impact on the
existing EU member states as would the case of Poland. 174
The EU Commission reiterated that patent law harmonization and the introduction
of additional safeguard mechanisms was to prevent distortions in the EU pharmaceutical
market. In case of Spain and Portugal’s accession, the EU had the leading pharmaceutical
market in the world and the existing EU member states that were heavily contributing to
it, were in great economic shape without any signs of potential economic difficulties in the
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future. As a result, the EU Commission was not concerned about the economic distortions
that Spain and Portugal might bring to the pharmaceutical market upon their accession. 175
After several discussions between the Polish negotiation team and the Polish
government, the Polish political actors agreed to the implementation of Supplementary
Protection Certificates that would extend the EU patent laws that safeguarded
pharmaceutical companies of existing EU member states for an additional 5 years on top
of the initial 10 years.176 That way, companies such as Glaxo Wellcome would be able to
expand its business in Poland without fearing that Polish companies would be able to copy
their drugs and sell much cheaper versions in Poland. The inability to swiftly harmonize
Polish patent laws with the EU standards, prevented Poland from exporting its own
patented drugs into the EU, which consequently safeguarded Western European
pharmaceutical companies from losing their market share to Poland.
Poland signed the Accession treaty in March 2003 alongside other CEE accession
member states. Within the Accession Treaty text regarding free movement of goods and
company law chapters, it was agreed upon that with the help of the transitional period until
December 31, 2008, the marketing authorizations of Polish drugs issued under Polish
patent law prior to the accession date would not be recognized in other EU member states
until the Polish patent laws are renewed with compliance of EU standards. Existing
member states may not put Polish drugs and medical devices on their markets if Polish
legislation is not in conformity with the EU Directive.177
After the successful ratification of the Accession Treaty, the Polish government and
the Polish pharmaceutical sector were on the losing end of the negotiations. The
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implementation of the Supplementary Protection certificates and the deemed
incompatibility of Polish patent laws with their EU counterparts prevented Poland from
exporting their medical devices and medical products to other EU member states. At the
same time, the British pharmaceutical company, Glaxo Wellcome, and its partners within
the same transnational interest bloc, the ERT and POLFA, were benefiting from the
negotiations because the additional legislation allowed Glaxo Wellcome to expand its
business in Poland with POLFA getting additional revenue as the junior partner as a result
from Merck’s expansion. The ERT as the leader of the transnational interest bloc had
successfully secured its presence in the Polish pharmaceutical market while at the same
time preventing Polish pharmaceutical entities from distorting ERT’s dominance in the EU
by not being able to have a market share in the EU pharmaceutical market.
Free Movement of Persons Chapter
Once a new country joins the EU, according to the Accession Treaty, its
citizens have the right to move to another EU member state and gain employment without
being discriminated against based on nationality. Given that Poland’s level of economic
development is lower than the one in Western Europe, Polish workers do not have the same
rights and compensation levels as the ones in more developed EU nations. As a result, it
was expected by both, the EU and Poland, that there would be a large wave of Polish
workers that would leave Poland for other EU member states in search of new employment
opportunities. Despite the danger of losing a lot of skilled workers, the Polish government
and the two largest Polish trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ, were in favor of liberalizing
the labor market between Poland and the EU. The Polish government saw this as an
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opportunity for Polish workers to increase their standard of living and the potential for
future streams of remittances to families that were left in Poland. On the other hand, given
the excess supply of labor in Poland, a decrease in the number of workers in Poland would
increase the bargaining power of remaining Polish workers which would lead to higher
wages.
Upon approaching the negotiations of the movement of persons chapter, the
EU Commission was open to allowing Polish workers to obtain employment in the existing
EU member states as per the Accession Treaty. The friction started when different
members of Business Europe started to raise their concerns about this chapter. While
British, Swedish and Dutch employers’ organizations were welcoming of labor market
liberalization between Poland and the EU, German and Austrian employers’ associations
were against such liberalization.178 The goal of these members of transnational interest
blocs were to minimize the chances of Polish workers coming to Germany and Austria
which would distort Polish and foreign labor markets.179
The ability to limit employment options for Polish labor within the EU was one of
the goals of German and Austrian trade unions who wanted to protect its FDI that was
aimed at the Polish real estate and agricultural market. With German workers demanding
high salaries, German trade unions wanted to complete its projects using Polish labor which
was much cheaper. With German trade unions operating in the real estate and constructions
sectors, the ability to employ the local workforce at a cheaper price and the possibility to
avoid taxes if the workers are employed through the widespread Polish shadow economy,
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was lucrative enough that German trade unions wanted to put barriers against the Polish
labor force emigrating to other EU states.
Moreover, the German and Austrian Employers’ Associations had long-term
contracts with German and Austrian labor unions, which dictated high salaries and strict
labor conditions. Thus, these interest groups would not be able to exploit the incoming
cheap Polish labor because of these contracts. Consequently, it was in the interest of
German and Austrian Employers’ Associations to prevent Polish labor from entering the
German and Austrian labor markets because their competitors, which were not bound by
these contractual obligations, would be able to employ cheap Polish labor and thus cut
their labor costs. With their competitors being able to potentially cut labor costs, they
would be able to increase their profit rates and potentially become more competitive.
German Employers’ Association and its Austrian counterpart would be at a disadvantage
by having high labor costs and a lower profit rate compared to their competitors, and thus
would not be able to maintain their market power without increasing their resources.
In order to achieve its goal of preventing Polish labor from entering the EU labor
market, the members of the transnational interest bloc wanted the EU to implement at least
a seven-year transition period during which Polish nationals could not permanently settle
in and work in existing EU countries. In order to gather maximum support for such a policy
within the transnational interest bloc, the German and Austrian Employers’ Associations
added that each EU member should be able to adjust such a transition period depending on
the local labor market conditions. The German and Austrian Employers’ Associations
wanted to persuade the EU to give existing EU members the right to individually ban
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foreign labor after the EU transition period expires. This policy provision was suggested
by German and Austrian Employers’ Associations in order to compromise with other
members of the same transnational interest bloc. While Austrian and German Employers’
Associations could achieve their goals by keeping the transition longer, other members of
the same transnational interest bloc such as the Swedish Employers’ Association did not
have to prolong the transition period if it did not serve their agenda. 180
The two Polish trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ, were vocal about their
discontent regarding the transition period but ultimately did not have enough structural,
financial, and political resources to sway the Polish government into a stronger opposition
to EU’s demands. Since Poland’s transition to a free market economy in 1990s, the Polish
state embraced neoliberal policies that were thought to improve the efficiency of the
economy. Part of the transformation was the weakening bargaining power of labor unions.
The new Polish government believed that labor unions, like many other interest groups,
were self-interested associations that advocated for their own agenda at the expense of the
national economy’s efficiency. As a result, since 1993, labor unions stopped being part of
the tripartite council where the Polish government, employers’ association and labor unions
came together to discuss how to make the national economy better. After this turn of events,
labor unions were still present in Poland, however, their voice was only heard by left-ofcenter parties that advocated egalitarian policies. Given the prominence of policies that
advocate neoliberalism, such parties, together with labor unions, have lacked resources and
power to advocate for their agenda within the Polish government and during the EU
accession negotiations.181
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Free Movement of Persons Chapter Negotiations
On May 26, 2000, the negotiations over the free movement of persons started
between the Polish Negotiation Team and the Joint Parliamentary Committee. The Polish
negotiation team prepared a position advocating for free movement of labor between
Poland and the EU. The team claimed that free movement of workers among the EU
member states is chartered in the EU treaties and would only create economic and political
benefits among EU members. After hearing the Polish position, German and Austrian
employers’ organizations lobbied the EU Commission to implement a seven-year transition
period after which Polish workers could work in Germany and Austria. The German and
Austrian employers’ associations were joined by German trade unions to pressure the EU
Commission to mount barricades against Polish workers. Even though trade unions do not
usually work together with employers’ associations, in this case, German trade unions
wanted to collaborate because an influx of Polish workers would create more competition
for German and Austrian workers. With Polish workers agreeing to work for lower wages
in comparison to German and Austrian workers, they would be more likely to be hired
which would potentially result in a higher unemployment rate. 182
When the JPC met with the Polish Negotiation team in March 2001, it expressed
the importance of having a transition period of at least seven years before Polish citizens
can gain full employment in the existing EU members. The EU cited that the estimated
influx of Polish workers could reach 330 000 workers in Germany and Austria which
would cause economic and social distortion in those countries. A large wave of immigrants
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would cause social tension with the native population, which could be remedied by a steady
immigration of workers after the transition is over. The JPC presented several options of
mitigating such a crisis. Firstly, a system would be implemented within which each EU
member state can enact clauses that would safeguard regional and sectoral labor markets
from disruptions. Secondly, the EU suggested a mixed system of a transitional period and
a fixed quota that would be implemented through which the number of foreign workers
could be limited. The EU stated that such transitional measures are in the interest of the
union and are fully justified.183
Once the Polish negotiation team relegated this message to Polish domestic interest
groups, the two largest trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ, stated that the proposition to
implement a transition period is discriminatory on many levels. First, the transition period
goes against one of the four freedoms of the EU Treaty, the freedom of movement and
employment within the EU. Secondly, the Solidarity trade union stated that the idea of
restricting the free movement of labor when the movement of capital is liberalized, is
unjustifiable and socially detrimental. As a result of abolishment of capital movement,
Poland would receive a lot of FDI in the real estate and agricultural sectors. The restrictions
on Polish labor would limit employment options only to Poland despite being part of the
large union. With such an excess labor and shortage of jobs in Poland, future FDI projects
would have the opportunity to exploit the massive supply of unemployed Polish labor. 184
Amid these contentious negotiations, the results of the 2001 Polish parliamentary
elections changed the personnel of the Negotiation team. The newly appointed members
of the negotiation team adopted a new strategy regarding the Free Movement Of Persons
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chapter. It believed that since the EU agreed to Poland’s demands to have a 12-year
transition period for the purchase of Polish real estate and agricultural land, Poland should
yield to EU’s demand for a 7-year transition period regarding the movement of labor
between Poland and the EU. The newly appointed foreign minister, Wlodzimierz
Cimoszewicz, declared that despite harsh criticism from Polish trade unions, Poland would
accept the proposed transition period through bilateral agreements with existing EU
member states. Poland made this concession as part of a “quid pro quo” strategy in order
to expediate the accession process and ultimately achieve EU membership in 2004. The
Polish negotiation team believed that to achieve Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004, it
had to appease the existing EU members on their domestic level by giving up the right for
free movement of labor upon accession.185
The new Polish position was heavily criticized by Polish trade unions and the public
in general. Representatives of trade unions stated that such a shift in position was a big
political mistake that would allow existing EU member states to treat Polish nationals as
second class citizens by exploiting them in Poland and in other EU member states once the
transition period was over. Compared to the criticism about purchase of land concessions,
the domestic pressure to withstand the influence of the EU and foreign corporate entities
was not as strong in the case of Free Movement of Persons chapter. In the case of real
estate, it was business sectors versus business sectors, whereas the issue of labor mobility
it was capital versus labor and capital had more resources and greater strength and
alliances.186
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Polish labor lost its influence and collaborative strength during the 1990s after the
Communist government fell and Poland pursued neoliberal restructuring that expanded the
power of foreign capital at the expense of local labor. When Poland hit the political and
economic recession after the democratic transition, the new government elected to pursue
a free market economy at a rapid pace. In the transformative process, most labor-intensive
labor unions were disbanded in order to minimize the interference in the expansion of free
economy. Labor unions were seen as advocates for more encompassing social policies that
benefited workers and their families but created inefficiencies in national economies. For
capitalism and transnational capital to thrive in Poland, the EU and foreign companies
pushed Poland to adopt neoliberal policies that would diminish labor protection. As a
result, Polish labor lost its power across the nation and does not have the political and
economic power it once had to counter the pressures of transnational capital. 187
This position was seen during the negotiations over labor movement, when
remaining Polish trade unions and smaller Leftist parties could not mount a strong enough
opposition to EU based corporate power and their political allies. The former Polish prime
minister Jerzy Buzek claimed that it was because there were not any Polish business
interest groups interested enough in the issue of movement of labor to mount an organized
opposition to the outside forces. 188 On the other hand, the German Employers’ Association
wanted to have access to such labor markets in order to increase its profit margins through
lower labor costs while keeping the German labor market protected from the influx of
Polish labor which would distort the economic and social dimensions of the German labor
market.
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The chapter on Free Movement of Persons was closed in March 2003, when Poland
agreed to the EU’s demands of implementing a 7-year transition period only after which
Polish nationals could move to other EU member states and seek employment. The
Accession Treaty that was negotiated between Poland and the EU stated that existing EU
member states could impose national restrictions on the free movement of labor for two
years after Poland’s accession, after which they could renew the restrictions by another
three years and if need be, for another two years afterwards, culminating for a maximum
transition period of seven years. For the first two years after the accession, the access to
existing EU labor markets would depend on each member state’s national measures which
would regulate access to their markets by Polish workers. The existing EU member states
could continue implementing such measures for a total of five years since the accession. 189
For the final two years of the possible transition period, the EU Commission would write
a report on the labor market conditions in each EU member state. Upon knowing the result,
the EU Council would decide if further transitional measures were justified. The most
restricting measures were taken by Germany and Austria which kept their measures for
seven years while other member states such as Sweden and the Netherlands did not impose
any restrictions upon Polish nationals since the date of accession.
When the negotiations on the chapter of free movement of persons were concluded,
the Polish government together with the two largest trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ, did
not gain any concessions. Despite the bargaining prior to 2001, Poland could not secure
the right to move to other EU member states and seek permanent employment after
accession. On the contrary, members of the transnational business bloc, the Polish
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construction company, STRABAG Polska, and the German employers’ association
managed to limit Polish citizens from leaving the cheaper Polish market which ensured the
cheap labor cost for their future operations. The EU in general managed to prevent an
alleged social and economic distortion in the existing EU member states by limiting a large
influx of Polish labor.
Chapter on Real Estate and Land Sale
The tough accession negotiations continued when it became time to discuss the
policies regarding purchase of real estate and natural land which was part of the capital
movement chapter. Spanish construction company, Ferrovial, wanted to take advantage of
the disparity between real estate prices in Poland and in Western Europe. Ferrovial wanted
to purchase Polish land and forests immediately after Poland’s accession and sell it when
the prices increased and became closer to those in existing EU member states, thus
guaranteeing capital gains. Consequently, the Spanish real estate company’s goal was
influencing the EU to allow foreign corporations to purchase Polish land and real estate as
soon as Poland joined the EU, and that there would not be any legislation that would
prohibit or delay such an opportunity. 190
With Ferrovial being part of the transnational interest bloc, which was under the
leadership of ERT, the company used its ties with the ERT to lobby the EU on a political
level.191 The ERT sees itself as an organization that represents only the elite corporate
actors within each sector. ERT’s members are the top executives of Europe’s largest
corporations as opposed to corporations themselves. This requirement ensures that its
members have the authority and monetary resources to execute policies that ERT members
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have voted upon. As such, throughout decades, ERT has focused on the capital represented
by such individuals as an eligibility criterion for membership. Most of ERT’s members
appeared on The Financial Times’ Europe 500 list which ranks European companies by
market capitalization, and it excludes corporate entities that are not publicly quoted or are
not located within top 100 entities within each sector. ERT uses such rankings to choose
which entities to represent and which ones to ignore. Corporate entities within each sector
who do not meet the market capitalization threshold are therefore at a disadvantage because
they must compete with rivals who have the backing of ERT’s financial and political
resources.
Similarly, the Polish development agencies and more internationally inclined
Polish construction companies, wanted to help foreign companies such as Ferrovial
because potential sale of Polish land would grant larger amounts of revenue as well as the
opportunity to operate as a construction liaison between Polish and foreign construction
companies in case foreign owners wanted to build property on the newly acquired land.
One of the largest Polish construction companies, Budimex, wanted to use Polish accession
as a means to improve their business through selling property directly to foreigners or to
help attract foreign companies into the Polish market and serve as a local partner for their
operations. During the accession negotiations, ERT representatives reached out to
Budimex to see if the Polish company wanted to join Ferrovial in improving the Polish real
estate.192 Budimex was attracted to the proposition because the financial benefits stemming
from this partnership would allow Budimex to expand its market share as a real estate
valuation entity.193 By being a valuation agent for foreign clients, it could gain profits by
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expanding foreign clients’ business without the fear that Budimex’s market share would
be affected. Since Budimex participates in trading and renting properties only to a minor
extent, its wellbeing would not be affected by Ferrovial’s entry into the real estate market
as a developer. As a result, both parties benefited from this partnership without any fear
that one party would undermine the other party’s market share.
On the other hand, Polish domestic interest groups that operated in the real estate
market, were opposing foreign real estate entities as well as their junior Polish partners.
The more domestically focused companies, such as STRABAG Polska, felt that if foreign
entities own a significant portion of Polish land, then it would make it harder for Polish
citizens to buy land in Poland due to increasing prices and lower purchasing power
comparing to Western European counterparts. While the more domestically oriented Polish
real estate companies appreciated the Polish negotiation team’s effort to protect the Polish
real estate from foreign entities, the defensive domestic interest groups pressured the Polish
government to implement a 25-year long transitional period and some individuals even
pressed for a perpetual derogation. Domestic construction companies claimed that such a
long period would be much more accommodating to increasing the prices of Polish land
and real estate, as well as to Polish citizens’ purchasing power. After the 25-year long
transitional period, the prices of Polish land and real estate would be on par with the prices
across the EU and the citizens’ income would have increased enough to enable them to
purchase land at the same capacity as their counterparts in existing EU member states. 194
Together with the Polish negotiation team, domestic interest groups believed that
the EU promoted capital opening policies that favored the interests of the already dominant
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transnational corporations, that are able to move money freely to speculate on assets and
to purchase those assets, which means they can use their existing market power to
consolidate more market power. The Polish negotiation team was pressured by all the
above groups while attempting to secure Poland’s accession into the EU by 2004.
When the Polish legislation with regards to sale of land and real estate to foreign
entities began to be discussed as part of the capital movement chapter in 1998, the Polish
negotiation team realized that Poland’s law was inconsistent with the Treaty of the
European Community which prohibited barriers to movement of capital among EU
member states. The negotiation team justified such laws as being preventative measures
against uncontrollable trade in Polish land. The negotiation team wanted to maintain a
sustainable transition of Polish real estate market from the exclusive domestic market to
the open EU market where existing EU member states could purchase Polish land and real
estate. Considering the differences between the purchasing power of Polish citizens and
their counterparts in Western Europe, removal of barriers to purchase land by foreign
entities, would significantly impair the Polish citizens’ ability to buy local land at a rate
that existing EU members can afford. The much lower real estate prices in Poland would
attract a lot of demand from foreign entities which would ultimately increase the prices of
Polish real estate property to the point where local citizens would not be able to afford
them.195
Real Estate and Land Sale Chapter Negotiations
As a result, during the negotiations, the Polish negotiation team proposed an 18year transition period after which foreign entities can acquire real estate, water sources and
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forests. Polish negotiators believed that such a large transition period would help Poland
and citizens to slowly adjust to the EU real estate market through gradually increasing real
estate prices as opposed to an immediate spike in prices that could have occurred after an
increase in demand for land after Poland’s accession in 2004. The negotiation team added
that inability to implement such a transition period would aggravate Polish citizens which
would cause them not to vote for the accession into the EU after the accession negotiations
are completed.196
On the other hand, the Polish real estate company, Budimex, which relied on
foreign investors, claimed that the transitional period should be shortened to 12 years or
even not implemented at all. The immediate influx of foreign investment would improve
the economic wellbeing of many Polish landowners who desire to sell their property, and
open opportunities for other revenue streams if new landowners want to further invest in
the newly acquired land, thus generating taxable revenue for the Polish government.
During Polish accession to the EU, a divide within Polish landowners arose regarding how
soon land could be sold to foreign entities. Landowners who were interested in selling their
land due to economic hardship or because of the opportunity to gain profit due to land price
difference in Poland and the EU, wanted to have a long enough transition period for Polish
land prices to rise but not too long a period when they become on par with the prices in the
EU which would eliminate any opportunity for profit. 197
In order to counter Poland’s position, ERT influenced the JPC to set aside the
chapter on the sale of land from 1999 to 2002. The reason for such a move is that it was
believed that pushing difficult chapters closer to 2004 would pressure accession countries
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to give up their tough positions and concede to EU’s demands with hope that accession
nations would join the EU in 2004. While such a shift in the negotiation schedule did not
concern the Polish negotiation team as it was determined to stand by its demands of a 25year transition period, the Polish public and more liberal political parties felt that the
negotiation team’s stubbornness would cost Poland the historic chance of joining the EU. 198
The 2001 Polish parliamentary election would introduce a more liberal majority
coalition that would appoint new members of the negotiation team. The newly reorganized
negotiation team would then proclaim that it was ready to soften its position by decreasing
the originally stated 25-year transition period to a 12-year long transition period with
several conditions. First, for EU citizens to qualify for land purchases, they would need to
lease the land or real estate for 5 years before the 12-year period would start. Such a
condition would make the official transition period be 17 years from the date of accession.
In terms of forest and agricultural land, there would be a 12-year transition period from the
date of accession. In terms of purchasing real estate for secondary residence purposes, there
would be a 3-year long lease requirement for properties located in the southern and eastern
parts of Poland, and 7 year-long lease requirements for properties located in the northern
and western parts of the country.199
The EU agreed to such demands while Ferrovial and Budimex were discontent with
the results because such long transitional period would delay their opportunity to gain
capital from reselling cheaper land or using it to grow their profits through producing more
goods for the Polish market. Overall, the negotiations on the sale of Polish land and forests
were seen as a success for the Polish side.
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Ferrovial and Budimex were hit the most and yet not to a large extent since the
transition periods only delayed the ability to acquire new land as opposed to preventing
ERT members from executing their plans entirely. After the negotiations on the purchase
of land were concluded with fewer than expected benefits to the transnational interest bloc
members, the corporate actors were able to show their discontent in the chapter that was
one of the most important ones to Poland – Free Movement of Persons. Meanwhile the
agricultural chapter also emerged as a source of tension and conflict between the parties to
the negotiation.
Agriculture Chapter
During the early stages of accession negotiations, it was clear to both the Polish
negotiation team and the EU representatives, that accession policies regarding agriculture
would pose significant difficulties because of the disparity between Polish and EU
agricultural standards. On the Polish side, the Polish negotiation team wanted to achieve
several goals. First, it wanted to fully incorporate the Polish agricultural sector into the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so that Polish farmers could receive subsidies for their
products and funds to modernize their infrastructure. Secondly, the Polish negotiation team
wanted to impose high production and export quotas for its dairy products, sugar and
tobacco products. Third, they wanted the Polish agricultural market to be fully incorporated
in the Single European Market when Poland joined the Union in 2004. By being part of the
EU Single Market, the Polish farmers would be able to export and sell their produce to a
much bigger consumer base which would lead to higher revenue streams. 200
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Upon hearing the Polish initial position, the EU Commission stated that Poland
would not be able to increase its production and export quotas for dairy and grain products.
Given the much lower prices of Polish agricultural products compared to those in existing
EU member states, it would make the EU agricultural market inefficient. The customers
would prefer the lower-priced products over the existing high-priced produce. As a result,
Polish farmers would channel a lot of revenue from existing EU producers, thus leaving
them in distress. The EU Commission representatives added that not only would Poland
not be able to keep high quotas, but it would need to lower production of many agricultural
products as well eliminate any import duties for foreign- produced agricultural products.
Such a mandate was given with the belief that existing EU member states would be able to
export adequate amounts of their produce into Poland without paying high import taxes,
which consequently would adhere to EU Single market efficiency and fair competition
regulations. If Poland satisfied the requirements put forward by the EU, it would qualify
for CAP aid upon joining the EU.201
Apart from the Polish negotiation team and the EU representatives, the German
Farmers’ Association Deutcher Bauernverband (DBV) president, Gerd Sonnleitner,
criticized that the EU Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler’s proposed CAP
redistribution towards Polish farmers. He believed that the increased CAP redistribution
towards Polish farmers is “not well-thought out as far as agricultural and foreign trade
policy are concerned”. He added that such actions are not good for farmer-oriented and
sustained agriculture in existing EU member states. Ultimately, such policies will lead to
lower profits and more bureaucracy.202 With DBV consisting of 300,000 German farmers,
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who represent 61 different agricultural guilds, they have been of the largest suppliers of
various agricultural products across Germany. 203 Since 1990s, DBV has been supplying
about one-third of all agricultural products in Germany. To maintain its market share, DBV
had developed strong relationships with the European famers’ association (COPA) which
it uses to channel its agenda to EU representatives and other business interest groups. The
close ties with the upper echelon of a transnational interest bloc enabled the German
farmers’ association to seek help from actors who had the means and the political
connections to change the course of negotiations in the association’s favor. 204
When DBV learned that Poland was a major producer of meat and dairy at much
lower prices than its EU competitors, DBV expressed its concerns about how such a
situation can affect DBV’s market power.205 With the fear of its member losing market
power which consequently would undermine Business Europe’s power as an interest
group, Business Europe’s executives started influencing the EU to make it more difficult
for Poland to enter the EU agricultural market. According to DBV’s agenda, two
mechanisms could be employed to safeguard its market power. First, the EU must set low
meat and dairy export quotas into the EU to ensure that Poland would not be able to flood
the EU agricultural market with lower priced products. Secondly, in conglomeration with
Business Europe, DBV wanted the EU not to grant the same amount of financial aid under
the CAP provisions in order to stop the modernization of Polish agriculture. If Poland
improved its agricultural market structure, its productivity could increase and affect the
DBV’s market share even more.206
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Despite strong connections with Business Europe and the EU, DBV had to attract
junior Polish partners in order to maximize the chances of its goals coming to fruition. To
this end, DBV partnered with one of the largest Polish agricultural importers, Baywa Agro
Polska, to help DBV expand its market share in Poland. By partnering with Baywa Agro
Polska, DBV not only could expand its overall EU market share by entering the Polish
market, but it also could undermine the Polish farmers’ ability to export their produce to
the EU. By having exclusive agreement to import DBV’s products into Poland, Baywa
Agro Polska, agreed not to export any Polish agricultural products into the EU. 207
At the same time, for Baywa Agro Polska, the partnership with DBV not only
provided initial investment into the company but it also provided a secured revenue stream
that would come from importing DBV’s products. On top of that, being part of the
transnational interest bloc gave the Polish junior partner the opportunity to develop strong
financial and political ties with the more elite members of the transnational bloc which
could serve as potential partners in future endeavors. The partnership between DBV and
Baywa Agro Polska brought opportunities to achieve their respective goals but the potential
impact on Polish society generated domestic political opposition. 208
While DBV and Baywa Agro Polska fought to expand their business in Poland and
sought to limit Polish farmers from exporting their products to the EU, domestic
agricultural interest groups also tried to defend the interest of Polish farmers. The largest
farmers’ union, Kółka Rolnicze, was created in 1973 to represent the interests of Polish
cooperatives, consisted of more than 1 million members who occupied about 22% of
Poland’s agricultural market. Upon Poland entering the EU, the union wanted to ensure
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that Polish farmers received the equivalent amount of financial aid under CAP as well as
resources to modernize their farms in order to meet the EU standards. The representatives
of the union wanted its members to receive the full extent of the EU funds and the ability
to export its products to the EU Single Market under the same conditions as the existing
EU member states, shortly after Poland joined the EU. 209
The farmers’ union was joined by the Polish League of Families, a political party
that represented the interest of Polish rural families and farmers. The party joined forces
with the union after it witnessed the aggressive stance of foreign interest groups and the
Polish Negotiation team’s inability to resist foreign pressure. The resulting comprise of the
quality of rural aid prompted a strong involvement of domestic interest groups during the
negotiation process but the large disparity in financial and political resources between
foreign entities and domestic interest groups, ensured the victory of the transnational
interest blocs’ members at the expense of the Polish rural population.
The German Farmers’ Association emerged victorious after such negotiations.
Lower subsidies and lower export quotas diminished Poland’s competitive potential in the
EU agricultural market, which consequently did not allow Poland to intrude on Belgium’s
market share and diminish their profit rates. This association was able to benefit from such
results because it was part of Business Europe which was the leader of one of the
transnational interest blocs.
Agriculture Chapter Negotiations
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After the Polish negotiation team expressed its position regarding concessions that
ought to be given to Polish farmers upon entry in the EU, the Joint Parliamentary
Committee (JPC) assigned to work with the Polish negotiation team, claimed that Poland’s
demands were unreasonable. Immediate receival of the full extent of CAP financial aid by
Polish farmers would create financial disparity between the Polish farmers and other
members of the Polish society which could cause economic and social tension within the
Polish society. The JPC representatives believed that the big allocation of EU funds would
elevate the economic wellbeing of Polish farmers while employees in other sectors such as
manufacturing and services industries, would not be able to improve their wellbeing, thus
leading to a large socioeconomic inequality in Poland. The JPC representatives feared that
the potential increase in socioeconomic inequality as a result of EU policies would leave a
bad perception of the EU not only in Poland but also among future candidate states. 210
Additionally, the JPC claimed that the EU simply did not have enough financial
resources to satisfy Poland’s demands because existing EU member states were not willing
to donate so much money to the CAP. Poland’s request for 23 million Euros to be allocated
to Polish farmers upon the May 1, 2004 accession was seen as unrealistic to satisfy, given
that the CAP funding came from existing EU member states’ contributions. Given that
Poland did not have to contribute to CAP its first year, the existing EU members needed to
finance such a request without any contributions from the beneficiary. What made this
request even more unattainable is that Poland was one out of 10 countries that was trying
to join the union on the same date. As a result of such a large accession wave, the EU
needed to optimize between allocating a fair amount of the CAP funds to all accession
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states and requesting existing member states to contribute a fair to the CAP fund so that
there would not be any member that was treated unfairly on either side of the accession. 211
Instead of agreeing to Poland’s initial request for the entire CAP allocation upon
the accession date, the EU suggested breaking the requested 20 million Euros into portions
that would be paid across a decade. The EU proposed a payment schedule that would
encompass a 20% distribution of the total amount during the first three years of accession.
After that, Poland would be eligible of receiving 30% of the remainder between 2007 –
2010, with the remaining half of the amount to be spread during the 2010 – 2014 period.
Upon hearing the JPC position and for the sake of meeting the May 2004 accession
deadline, the Polish negotiation team decided to be more flexible with their requests for
financial aid from the CAP. The Polish accession negotiation team decided to accept the
proposed breakdown of payments as long it could join the EU with the rest of the CEE
applicant countries.212
While the EU was pleased with such a shift in Poland’s position, representatives
of Kółka Rolnicze, the largest farmers’ union in Poland, took the position that Polish
diplomats were not safeguarding the interests of the Polish farmers. According to them, if
Polish farmers would be harmed after the EU accession in terms of income and production
regulations, then it would be irrational for Poland to join the EU. Their arguments were
supported by the League of Polish Families and Democratic Left Alliance, two political
parties that prioritized building a political coalition with Polish farmers over the existing
terms of the EU accession. When the Polish negotiation team could not secure full CAP
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financial aid, both political parties created a coalition that won the Polish parliamentary
elections in 2001 and set up a new Polish negotiation team. 213
The new Polish negotiation team returned to Poland’s initial bargaining position
and demanded full subsidies and high production quotas upon the entry to the EU. The new
team wanted Polish farmers to have an equal level of payouts with those of existing EU
farmers from the EU agricultural budget in order to assist farmers who may have
difficulties adjusting to a liberal agricultural trade between Poland and the EU.
Furthermore, the Polish negotiation team wanted the EU to restructure around 60% of
finances that are offered for rural development after accession, to increase the direct
payments to Polish farmers. Finally, the new negotiation team wanted to include a
provisional condition of extending the right to the Polish government to implement tariff
protections for grains, tobacco, and hops. The new Polish negotiators stated that if such
demands were not fulfilled, the Polish citizens and agricultural interest groups that
comprise a large portion of the voter base, would not vote for the accession into the EU.214
At this moment, Business Europe and its partner, the German Farmers’ Association,
influenced the JPC to exercise a more coercive strategy. The members of the transnational
interest bloc saw Poland’s accession to the EU as a big opportunity to advance its business
agenda. The ability to expand into Poland was guaranteed to yield large profits as well as
expansion of their EU market power. Consequently, DBV and Business Europe did not
want to take any chances of Poland not acceding to the EU. In order to prevent Poland from
not voting for EU accession, the transnational interest blocs wanted to persuade Poland that
not acceding to the EU would create more disadvantages than advantages for Poland. To
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that end, members of the Business Europe transnational interest bloc stated that other CEE
member states that were attempting to join the EU in 2004 had already accepted the EU
conditions regarding the agricultural sector and that Poland was not seen as a critical
supplier of agricultural products from CEE. Consequently, the JPC was not deterred by the
consequences of Poland’s demands for the full payment. Instead, the JPC insisted that
Poland accept the much lower payments that would be distributed only several years after
its accession. Failure to comply with EU accession conditions would leave Poland out of
the EU while most CEE members states would be in the Union, thus forcing Poland to be
alienated from other CEE states that benefit from EU Single Market. 215
The Polish negotiation team and the Polish farmers’ associations considered such a
demand and after analyzing the power dynamic between the EU and Poland, were
ultimately forced to concede to EU’s demands. While this situation was a defeat for Polish
farmers and a victory for Business Europe when such a decision got made, the tables had
turned when the EU Presidency got passed on from Spain to Denmark. The new leadership
was devoted to concluding the negotiations of the agriculture chapter before the Danish
presidency concluded its term. The Danish Commissioner Verheugen was very interested
in resolving the tough agricultural negotiations between Poland and the EU. He believed
that such a success would be a turning point in his career which would ultimately yield a
lot of professional opportunities in the long run. In order to conclude the negotiations on
the agricultural chapter across all CEE accession states, the Danish representatives of the
EU Council presented a deal which was described as something between Poland’s demands
and what the EU Commission had offered. 216
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Within the framework of that deal, the initial Polish request for 23 million Euro
funds would not change but additional small amounts are going to be available immediately
upon accession. The new deal offered 90 million Euro for a “Schengen facility” to
reimburse Polish farmers for expenditures and to accelerate their preparations for a
liberalized trade in the agricultural market. The new package offered additional one billion
Euros across all CEE candidate countries for budgetary compensation, to be distributed
among the countries based on their National Gross Income. The Danish premier, Anders
Fogh Rasmussen, stated that this package is better that the one proposed during the
previous presidency, but it cannot be negotiated. 217
Even with such an improved deal from the new EU presidency, the Polish
negotiation team was not satisfied with the concessions. When declaring the new package
details to the Polish farmers, only 10% were satisfied with the packages content while the
rest felt disrespected. The Polish negotiation team came back to Brussels to continue the
negotiations concerning the financial support for its farmers. The annoyed Danish
presidency stated that “if Poland doesn’t want to be part of the Union, we will have to
accept that. The Polish side has reached the limit of concessions on agriculture and it cannot
go any further than that” Poland’s chief negotiator, Jan Truszczyński, refused to accept that
the existing EU member states would force Poland to accept the offer or make it leave the
negotiations entirely if the offer is not accepted. 218
Just a few days before the 2002 Copenhagen Summit, polls were showing that 64%
of Polish farmers stated that Polish agricultural interests during the negotiations were not
being properly protected and only 10% claimed the opposite. The Polish negotiation team
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felt the immense pressure coming from Polish agricultural interest groups, and knew that
in case of failure, the Poles may not want to ratify the EU Accession Treaty during the
referendum. Simultaneously, the JPC together with the EU Commission were desperate to
conclude the negotiations by the end of the Danish presidency. In order to persuade the
Polish negotiation team to conclude the Agriculture chapter, the EU offered the so-called
“Copenhagen Agreement” which offered additional 5 billion Euros as direct aids for the
new member states which would be dispersed over 10 years. Poland would receive 25% of
the full EU rate in 2004, which would be increased to 30% in 2005 and to 35% in 2006.
Between 2004 -2006, the direct payments would be co-financed up to 40% from Poland’s
rural development fund. From 2007, Poland could increase EU direct payments by up to
30% in each respective year but financed by national funds. The Polish farmers would have
full and immediate access to CAP provisions such as export refunds as well as high quotas
on cereal, skimmed milk and butter which could help stabilize product prices and farmer
income in the first years of accession.219
After reviewing the final proposal, the chief Polish negotiator, Jaroslaw
Kalinowski, and the Polish Prime Minister, Leszek Miller, agreed to accept the EU position
and the Accession Treaty was approved by the EU and Poland on February 5, 2003. The
Polish political figures and domestic interest groups considered the negotiations a huge
success since the Copenhagen deal granted an additional billion Euros over the first ten
years of accession. However, after Poland signed the Accession treaty, it was announced
by the EU that the additional billion Euros are going to be “virtual” since the EU agreed to
move 500 million from already secured structural funds for the development of rural areas
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so that increased CAP subsidies could be financed. The other 500 million was the
exemption of Poland from co-financing structural funds but did not mean that Poland
would receive them. It was a tactical maneuver of moving money around within the same
allocation. The only additional money was 172 million from a special European fund to
finance the sealing of EU eastern borders. 220
After such turn of events, the Polish political actors and the Polish domestic interest
groups gave a lot of concessions to the EU and to the German Farmers’ Association while
receiving only marginally better concessions from the EU. At the end of the negotiations,
Poland and Polish domestic interest groups received less financial aid than expected but
more importantly, the end of negotiation left Polish domestic interest groups with lower
production and export quotas, which they had relied on to support their livelihood. Lower
production and export quotas impeded their business while subpar financial aid did not
compensate for lower production revenue, thus leaving Polish farmers at a disadvantage
compared to those who are already operating in the EU Agricultural market.
On the other hand, the EU and Business Europe members received a lot of
concessions while losing very little. The additionally negotiated financial aid was not a big
cost to the EU because all the existing EU member states were required to contribute to
that fund, making it less taxing for the EU as a supranational entity. Moreover, the German
Farmers’ Association, which would be competing with Poland in grain provision for the
EU Single Market, received the ability to export its produce into Poland without paying
any tariffs or be limited by import quotas. At the same time, they would not be endangered
by Polish agricultural products in the EU Single Market due to lower Polish export quotas
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and subpar financial aid. Due to having a bigger budget and structural ability to shift
financial aid, the EU together with members of the transnational interest bloc managed to
receive a lot of concessions from Poland while not investing a lot of additional resources
and endangering existing agricultural actors to a large extent.
The German Farmers’ Association, which represented major German agricultural
businesses, emerged victorious after such negotiations. Lower subsidies and lower export
quotas diminished Poland’s competitive potential in the EU agricultural market, which
consequently did not allow Poland to intrude on Belgium’s market share and diminish their
profit rates. This association was able to benefit from such results because it was part of
ERT which was the leader of one of the transnational interest blocs. The close ties with the
upper echelon of a transnational interest bloc enabled the Belgian Farmers’ Association to
seek help from actors who had the means and the political connections to change the course
of negotiations in the association’s favor.
Conclusion
The EU accession negotiations between Poland and the EU Joint Parliamentary
Committee lasted between 1998 and 2002. The chapters related to agricultural subsidies;
sale of land; free movement of persons; pharmaceuticals trade and patent protection and
had several sensitive implications not only for political actors but also for members of
transnational interest blocs which complicated the negotiation process. The negotiations
regarding these legislations attracted several corporate actors who were part of different
transnational interest blocs.
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Among the biggest corporate entities that were engaged in influencing the
negotiations were the Spanish construction company, Ferrovial, that wanted to access to
Polish vast agricultural land in order to build commercial real estate. The British
pharmaceutical company, Glaxo Wellcome, showed heavy influence towards the EU about
not granting Polish pharmaceutical companies the license to export Polish drugs into the
EU. Similarly, the German Confederation of Employers lobbied the EU not to grant Polish
citizens the ability to obtain employment in existing EU member states in order to prevent
economic and social distortions in the German labor market.
Different corporate actors developed political and economic linkages within Poland
by attracting Polish domestic corporations that were interested in becoming junior partners
within the transnational interest blocs and help expand their agendas. Among various junior
partners were the Polish construction company, Budimex, and the Polish pharmaceutical
distributor, POLFA, both of which were interests in their senior partners’ ability to expand
business in Poland in exchange for future revenue streams.
With much help from their junior partners in Poland and connections within the EU
bureaucracy, members of transnational interest blocs managed to reach goals at the expense
of Polish social, political, and economic interest groups. Within the agricultural chapter,
despite the resistance of Polish domestic agricultural groups, the corporate actors managed
to minimize the number of agricultural subsidies and rural development aid that was
initially allocated to Poland. Such steps were made to ensure that Polish agricultural sector
would not distort the wider EU agricultural sector which has already been divided among
existing Western European agricultural actors.
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Similarly, within the chapter regarding the sale of land, Western European real
estate and construction companies managed to minimize the initial transitional period after
which they can obtain Polish land for investment purposes. Western European construction
and investment companies wanted to be able to purchase land as soon as possible in order
to take advantage of price disparity between Polish and EU markets, which would lead to
higher capital gains. The corporate actors pressured Poland to minimize the transition
period if it wanted to join the EU by 2004, emphasizing that keeping the longer transition
period would leave it behind other CEE countries that are well in route to meeting the 2004
accession date. While the minimized transition period was not considered to be a strong
win for the Polish actors, the mere fact that some sort of transition period was implemented
to slow down the advances of transnational interest blocs was a victory.
As for the free movement of person and goods chapters, the German Employers’
Confederation and the British pharmaceutical company, Glaxo Wellcome, wanted to limit
Poland’s entry into the EU’s labor and pharmaceutical markets, respectively. The German
entities wanted to set a transitional period after which Polish nationals could seek
employment in the EU while Merck lobbied the EU to extend its patent laws to prevent
Glaxo Wellcome’s drugs from being copied in Poland. Additionally, Glaxo Wellcome
wanted the EU not to accept Polish patent laws which would not allow Poland to export its
drugs to other EU countries. Such limitations on the Polish pharmaceutical market
safeguarded existing EU firms from more competition while allowing them to enter the
Polish market without any significant impediments.

150

Poland joined the EU in 2004 with all the negotiation chapters closed. However,
despite heavy resistance from the Polish government and Polish domestic interest groups,
the members of various transnational interest blocs alongside their junior partners in
Poland, managed to swiftly change the direction of the negotiations to suit their own agenda
at the expense of numerous domestic interest groups in Poland.. Poland’s case supports the
theory that transnational interest blocs make extensive political and economic linkages with
political and business actors across geographic regions in order to advance their agenda.
The accession negotiations between Poland and the EU touched upon several chapters that
were of crucial importance to several transnational interest blocs. With Business Europe
and the ERT being the most powerful actors within their respective transnational interest
blocs, they utilized their financial resources and political ties to influence actors on the
Polish national level as well as on the EU’s supranational level which allowed to
successfully shift the negotiations in their favor.
Chapter 5. Theoretical Analysis
The previously analyzed case studies of the Baltic States and Poland show that
transnational European capital managed to exert influence during the accession
negotiations with various degrees of success. By embedding themselves into different
transnational interest blocs, the biggest European corporations put themselves into
powerful positions not only to further their agenda but also to cultivate relationships with
various economic and political allies. By being part of a transnational interest bloc under
the leadership of Business Europe or the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT),
many European corporate actors utilized their connections within these lobbying
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organizations to out-maneuver their competitors who did not have as many economic and
political resources. Different factors within these transnational interest blocs as well as
several external factors determined the various degrees of achieving successful policy
outcomes during the accession negotiations.
Structural advantages
When looking at costs and benefits of the 2004 CEE accession wave, it was obvious
that the accession was much more important to the incoming CEE states as opposed to the
EU. While there are various reasons why the ten CEE states wanted to join the EU, the
most prominent was the “return to Europe” vision. Former Communist bloc countries
wanted to enter the EU because it shared many political and economic objectives. Apart
from sharing democratic values, the access to the bigger EU Single Market and EU
financial assistance provided incentives for the CEE nations. The expansive EU market
opened a lot of new investment and trade opportunities for the incoming states, which were
thought to eventually bring economic growth and stability. At the same time, the accession
of the CEE states offered much less to the EU itself. From the EU perspective, CEE had
much smaller markets and inefficient political systems which would require a lot of EU
resources to bring up to par with EU governance standards. As a result of these resource
and incentive differentials, the political power structure was heavily tilted towards the EU.
Since the EU needed the CEE states less than the CEE states needed the EU, the
EU representatives did not have to agree to any terms it deemed unacceptable, while the
CEE states were forced to concede to many EU demands. By limiting their challenges to
EU guidelines and preferences, the CEE representatives increased their chances of joining
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the EU, but they also were not able to achieve their own national agendas and, in some
cases, sacrificed the well-being of their citizens. It was this difference in structural power
that the EU used to enforce its policy preferences in several negotiation chapters. When
CEE representatives did not want to agree to the EU’s demands, the EU could plausibly
threaten to walk away from the negotiations. Failures to accept the EU terms could have
left disobedient CEE states behind other incoming states that wanted to join the EU at the
same time.
Factors that contributed to first-preference policy outcomes for transnational capital
During the accession negotiations, transnational capitalists had well-defined policy
outcomes, that fostered their agenda in each negotiation chapter. Policy outcomes that fully
reflected the goals and needs of transnational capitalists without any alterations or
compromises are called first-preference policy outcomes. Several factors enabled
transnational interest blocs to secure their first preference outcomes during the
negotiations. The most prominent factor was the ability of transnational corporations to
build a cohesive transnational interest bloc with political coalitions in Eastern European
countries. If a transnational interest bloc had cultivated strong relationships with other
economic and political actors who would assist transnational interest bloc representatives
in achieving their goals, then a transnational interest bloc would have better chances of
reaching their goals. In many instances where transnational capitalists managed to achieve
their first preference outcome, leaders of transnational interest blocs used their commercial
and technical expertise to appeal to the support of EU representatives. Representatives of
transnational interest blocs would carefully enforce their agenda with the help of technical
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position papers. Such papers would target discrepancies in CEE representatives’ policies
and exploit their incompatibility with the EU norms that are cited in various treaties. Under
such circumstances, transnational interest blocs would increase their chances of advancing
their policy objectives against countervailing proposals coming from parties within the
CEE.
The patterns of economic integration that were occurring between Western and
Eastern European countries contributed in many cases to a mutual interest among alliance
partners in maximizing their profits after integration was achieved. In cases where
economic alliances had already been built, the EU-based transnational capitalists were able
to work with Eastern European businesses to help drive support for their preferred policies.
A more deeply integrated political and economic coalition was more likely to achieve its
first policy preferences. When transnational interest blocs had a better integrated
membership network that spanned the borders of the EU and the accession country, then it
was more likely that this interest bloc would achieve its first policy preference rather than
having to compromise with competing coalitions. By having cross-border allies in the same
political networks, transnational interest blocs were in a much better position to expand
their market power by entering CEE markets at a much smaller cost than local CEE
competitors or Western European companies with much smaller cost margins.
At the same time, CEE junior partners were attracted to join different transnational
interest blocs and collaborate with individual corporations primarily for financial benefits.
CEE commercial actors were limited in their ability to generate profit and secure market
power given their limited financial resources and commercial acumen. Consequently, the
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prospect of partnering with much larger and more powerful Western transnational
capitalists opened avenues for additional revenue streams as well as opportunities to
increase their own market share by helping foreign corporations eliminate local
competition. When CEE junior partners joined various transnational interest blocs, they
received technical and commercial expertise as well as financial resources to successfully
execute their goals as long they did not impede the transnational interest blocs’ agenda. In
exchange, CEE junior partners had to assist their senior partners in achieving the agenda
of the transnational interest bloc. Such assistance included lobbying local politicians to
enact policies favorable to the agenda goals and persuading local commercial entities to
abandon their resistance to foreign capitalists, thus making it easier for members of
transnational interest blocs to enlarge their market power with the newly acceded CEE
states.
In addition to having relationships with external allies, transnational interest blocs
had to have large financial resources and their members had to have large enough market
power to be able to execute their agenda. The transnational interest blocs under the
leadership of ERT and Business Europe, respectively, purposefully selected their members
according to their financial assets and their status within their industrial sector. This was
done so that each member was independently able to execute their share of the agenda
without relying too much on other members’ resources. When the goals of transnational
capitalists within the ERT bloc aligned with the goals of transnational capitalists within
Business Europe, transnational interest blocs were more likely to achieve their first policy
preferences. In cases where the ERT and Business Europe members had conflicting policy
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objectives, then that lack of unity made it less likely for first policy preferences to be
achieved. Disagreements over policies pertaining to labor mobility of Polish workers, for
example, contributed to conflicting policy preferences between transnational capital in the
ERT and Business Europe. In this case, as I will summarize later in this chapter, these
differences contributed to a policy outcome that incorporated the concerns of both
transnational blocs, while stopping short of securing first policy preferences for either
transnational bloc.
Aside from the factors associated with the structural power of transnational interest
blocs, the political and economic circumstances plaguing the CEE member states
contributed to the success rate of transnational capitalists during the accession negotiations.
The Baltic States and Poland had experienced a complete transformation of the political
system since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Not only did the governance system change
from a centralized governing apparatus to a democratic system that encompassed multiparty systems with a proportional representation election types, but also the new
governments desperately wanted to forget the communist past and embrace the free market
economic model. To that end, center-right parties were elected to replace social democratic
and left parties to pursue policies that led to rapid neo-liberal restructuring of the economy.
Such policies entailed rapid liberalization of domestic prices and foreign trade as well as
large-scale privatization of state assets to build a framework that would attract foreign
direct investment.221
The drastic changes in the political realm were accompanied by even bigger
changes in the economies of the Baltic States and Poland. After the collapse of socialism,
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the CEE states experienced a recession during 1990-1995, throughout which the output and
export of the heavy industries decreased immensely, real wages dropped by half and firmbased benefits disappeared due to the decreasing number of trade unions. The
unemployment rate increased to an average of 12% by 2000 which culminated in many
workers being desperate to find any type of employment. Such large number of low-cost,
moderately skilled and non-unionized labor provided transnational capitalists an
opportunity to invest in light industries that required little capital but a lot of low-skilled
labor. The new employment in transitional industries produced insecurity and low-wage
jobs with deteriorating labor conditions. These economic circumstances and the declining
power of trade unions undermined the bargaining power of the working class which heavily
constrained the implementation of any labor friendly policies for the coming years. 222
Starting in 1996, the economic conditions in the Baltic States and Poland had
improved to the point where transnational capitalists wanted to route FDI flows towards
capital-intensive sectors that involved more skilled labor. Even though the economic
benefits in terms of real wages, unemployment and working conditions were marginal for
the CEE economies, neoliberal restructuring further weakened the power of trade unions
and transformed wage bargaining from the previously practiced sectoral-level to the
individual case-by-case level.223
This political and economic context played an immense role during the accession
negotiations. The neoliberal restructuring that the new CEE governments embraced after
the collapse of socialism, together with an economic recession that left local labor power
diminished, enabled transnational capitalists to successfully achieve their first preferences
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within the realm of taxation, labor policy and brownfield investment. Given that the Baltic
States and Poland were intensely competing for future FDI in the so-called “race-to-thebottom”, their representatives had to accept the demands of transnational capitalists in
order to attract future investment flows. Transnational interest blocs wanted to minimize
taxes and investment requirements that had previously protected state-owned enterprises.
Given that the CEE member states needed transnational capital more than transnational
capitalists needed the CEE markets, they were forced to concede to the demands of the
foreign investors in several policy areas.
The above advantages suggest that transnational capital would be in a stronger
position to secure their first preferences in negotiations, and that was true across a range of
issues discussed in the previous chapters. However, it was not always true, and the
exceptions allow for a deeper theoretical investigation into the factors that best explain the
range of outcomes that have been discovered in the case studies. Transnational capital was
more likely to secure their first preferences, but this was not automatic, and was often
dependent on the political, economic, and historical circumstances of the specific
negotiations.
Factors that contributed to second-best policy outcomes for transnational capital
Second-best policy outcomes meant that transnational capitalist blocs had to defer
their first policy preferences for an extended transition period, or they had to accept
modification of their first policy preferences to accommodate political opposition. There
were various reasons that transnational capitalist interest blocs had to settle for second-best
policy outcomes. First, political, and economic divisions between ERT and Business
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Europe contributed to second-best policy outcomes, as well as an inability of capitalist
firms within ERT and Business Europe to unify around a consistent set of objectives. In
cases where transnational firms clashed over policy objectives, these firms were often
unable to secure their first policy preferences. Second, when transnational interest blocs
faced strong political opposition within CEE countries, especially when public opinion was
unified against the policy preferences of transnational capital, then it was less likely that
first policy preferences would be attained. This was especially the case when public
opinion was translated through the lobbying power of domestic interest groups in CEE
countries in the controversial area of agricultural policy. Third, transnational capitalists
also fell short of their first policy preferences if those preferences contradicted EU
accession norms, rules, and requirements in a fundamental and clear way. Finally, in cases
where transnational capital had failed to secure domestic allies in CEE states and instead
faced well-organized opposition that was politically entrenched in the decision-making
process and close to political power-brokers within the CEE state, then transnational capital
was not likely to secure its first policy preferences.
When transnational blocs faced opposition from powerful political and economic
opponents, either within their own ranks of the same transnational interest bloc or from
members of competing interest blocs, the transnational capitalists were less likely to
achieve first preference outcomes and be forced to settle for second-best policy outcomes.
In some policy areas, there can be divisions within a bloc as well as between different
transnational interest blocs which can affect a bloc’s ability to secure their preferences. If
some members within a bloc do not agree with an agenda point because it does not bring
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any benefit to their business or even hurts their individual interests, then they will not help
their bloc members to achieve their goals or might even block them from making any
progress towards them. One of the biggest factors that contributed to divisions between
different transnational interest blocs is the industrial and sectoral composition of a
transnational interest blocs. A transnational interest bloc consisting of members that
represented industries and sectors that relied more on global value chains, subcontracting
as well as low-cost mobile labor would push for policies that included liberal trade, low
taxation, and flexible labor laws. On the other hand, a competing transnational interest bloc
may consist of members that represent industries and sectors that focus more on regional
and domestic markets to gain profit. Such firms usually prefer domestic labor and operate
on much smaller cost margins which often results in pursuit of policies that limit the effects
of globalization on domestic markets. Such an example clearly emerges in the differences
between the preferences of transnational capital pertaining to the mobility of Polish migrant
workers.
Another area that transnational capital often failed to secure their first policy
preferences, and instead had to settle for second-best policy goals, was agricultural policy.
Agricultural policy was beset with contradictions due to the EU’s own discriminatory
practices of subsidization of its own domestic agribusiness corporations and farmers, which
established a precedent that allowed CEE representatives, and domestic agricultural
lobbies, to argue for a delay in agricultural trade liberalization, an extension of subsidies
for domestic agriculture and inclusion within the CAP subsidy system. The agricultural
policy area was also sensitive in that it involved potentially severe changes to a sector that
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was highly vulnerable and subject to the domestic policy interests of landowners and
farmers with a disproportionate stake in agricultural policy. In addition, the agricultural
negotiations proved sensitive because they produced a clash of interests within the
controversial topic of liberalization of agricultural trade, the extent of agricultural subsidies
for new EU members, and circumstances under which land could be sold to foreign
speculators and investors. This made agriculture a barometer of “public opinion” and
“nationalism” that could often translate into criticism of the objectives of transnational
capital in this area.
Apart from various economic and political factors that contributed to transnational
capitalists’ inability to secure their first preference outcomes, EU norms and regulations
were a significant obstacle to transnational interest bloc agenda goals. When transnational
capitalists wanted to eliminate state aid to CEE domestic commercial entities, the EU
representatives opposed transnational capitalists because their agenda goals contradicted
the norms and values of the EU treaties. With regards to state aid elimination, the 1957
Treaty of Rome enacted the State Aid control policy that allowed governments to transfer
aid to domestic businesses in order to bring their efficiency on par with the EU standards,
but not disrupting intra-EU trade at the same time. Consequently, the request to eliminate
such aid immediately was repealed by the EU since it clashed with the treaty norms and
would have put CEE businesses at a disadvantage upon the entry into the EU and would
have negatively impacted the efficiency of the EU Single Market. Instead, the EU agreed
to a transition period for CEE nations to gradually decrease state aid, allowing CEE
businesses to get accustomed to EU Single Market norms. 224
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Lastly, in cases where domestic political opposition to transnational capitalist
policy preferences was strong and cohesive, and transnational capital had failed to secure
political allies, first policy preferences were either delayed or modified. This circumstance
often derived from the lack of political and economic partners within CEE countries that
could assist the transnational bloc in securing their first policy preferences. If domestic
lobbying groups and political coalitions, especially those attached to dominant local
political and business elites, formed a cohesive set of lobbying networks in opposition to
transnational capital’s first policy preferences, then those preferences were more likely to
be delayed or modified.
However, it is important to recognize that, even in cases where transnational
capitalist interest blocs failed to attain their first policy preferences, they were able to either
secure a delayed adoption of their policy preferences or were able to accept a modification
of their original terms. Thus, transnational capital in just about every case realized much
of their policy agenda and were often able to absorb the costs of policy delays and
modifications due to their structural economic and political power. Given the financial
resources and already established market presence of the Western European transnational
capitalists, they were able to absorb the short-term costs that were associated with second
best outcomes. Transnational capitalists had developed several characteristics that made
them more powerful than smaller firms, thus enabling them to withstand the short-term
costs and secure long-term goals in the future. The overall market power of transnational
firms, measured by market size and market ownership within a sector of production or
investment, gave transnational capitalists more resources and leverage compared to the
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tighter cost margins of their competitors. Such financial resources and economies of scale
allowed transnational capitalists to move economic and political resources across
geographical boundaries at a much lower cost than their competitors, which

enabled

transnational capitalists to absorb short-term costs in order to achieve greater opportunities
for market consolidation in the long-term.
Once transnational interest blocs “outwaited” their competitors, they used their
structural market power to mark up prices in order to gain higher profits that would cover
the short-term costs associated with the second-best policy outcome. Limited supply due
to industry concentration and interconnected directorates of large-scale corporations had
enabled transnational capitalists to increase the prices above market clearance rates at the
expense of innovation and worker wellbeing. Recent trends have shown that transnational
companies have marked up prices in CEE while at the same time minimizing the innovation
rate and labor cost in the past decades. Absence of competition and limited number of
corporate employers in CEE has enabled members of transnational interest blocs to
increase their structural market power even more which allowed them to settle for secondbest outcomes and to afford the short-term costs associated with them. This mechanism
and enormous financial resources allowed members of transnational interest blocs to be
patient with less optimal outcomes and thus contributed to their decisions to peacefully
agree to such outcomes with other negotiating parties.
As will be shown in the next sections, different variations of the above factors
played a key role in achieving policy outcomes during the CEE accession negotiations.
Several actors, including leaders of transnational interest blocs and smaller CEE domestic
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interest blocs, operated within an international, institutional, and domestic policymaking
context which collectively determined negotiations over policy outcomes.
Case Study Summaries of Transnational Capital Securing Their First Policy Preferences
Republic of Latvia
During the accession negotiations with the Latvian negotiation team, the policy on
corporate taxation was of central importance to transnational capital. Given that purchase
of real estate in Latvia is done for profit gathering or cost minimization purposes, the ERT
representatives wanted to have real estate taxes lowered from the 25% to 12%. To that end,
the ERT representatives established FICIL in order to channel their agenda to the local
government and attract Latvian Junior partners to their cause. One of ERT’s senior
members, the ABB Vice President Anders Novinger, established partnerships with local
Latvian junior partners to exert more pressure on the Latvian government to lower
corporate taxes.225 The ERT managed to do so by having increased their market power in
Latvia to the point where Latvian commercial entities and consumers would suffer
economically if ERT decided to implement detrimental policies because of high corporate
taxes. The Scandinavian electronics producer, ABB, also partnered with Latvian
manufacturing company, Alstom LLC, to enhance their market position and have more
influence on the local political actors.

226

The Latvian government succumbed to the

pressure of the transnational interest bloc because it had strong enough market presence in
Latvia. Their operation in Latvia was a vital part for Latvia’s economy, therefore the
Latvian negotiation team had to agree to the transnational interest bloc’s first preference of
corporate tax minimization.
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Representatives of transnational interest blocs also managed to secure their first
preferences during negotiations on excise duty taxes. During the accession negotiations, it
was noted that there are big discrepancies between Latvian and EU tax laws. The Latvian
excise rate of 7.5% per 100 liters227 of alcoholic beverages was significantly lower than the
EU’s 10.5% excise rate.228 While such taxes are a mandatory part of the EU accession
process, the transnational interest bloc’s priority was to postpone their implementation in
Latvia. In order to achieve such a goal, the transnational interest bloc together with their
Latvian junior partners managed to persuade the EU to push for a 5-year transition period.
The excise tax would gradually increase during the transition period which would allow
transnational capitalists to gradually adjust their pricing and cost schedules in a manner
that would not lower their profit rates to a large extent. The transnational interest bloc
utilized its expansive market presence, support of local junior partners as well as
commercial expertise in order to advance their agenda. The Latvian government could not
oppose such influence because transnational capitalists had built a strong coalition that
supported the implementation of transnational capitalists’ agenda. The Latvian government
was simply outnumbered and lacked resources to oppose the more powerful and
interconnected capitalists.
In terms of securing a steady capital flow into Latvia, the transnational capitalists
also managed to secure their first preference policy outcome in the form of trade barrier
abandonment. The Latvian political and Latvian domestic interest groups wanted to keep
trade barriers intact upon EU accession in order to protect its industries from competition
with EU-based transnational firms. Latvian actors believed that liberalization of the market
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would destroy Latvian businesses and substitute domestic products with cheaper imports,
thus leading to a larger trade deficit and an eroded domestic manufacturing sector. After
the Latvian delegation explained that a sudden abandonment of trade barriers would
immensely affect its economy and a more gradual approach is required, the EU
representatives supported such a position and were willing to grant a 5-year transition
period. Transnational interest blocs under the leadership of Business Europe, however,
saw the existence of trade barriers as an impeding factor to its members’ expansion in the
Latvian market. Consequently, Business Europe made the abandonment of trade barriers
its first preference policy outcome. To that end, Business Europe utilized its commercial
expertise and its longstanding relationships with the EU to persuade the supranational body
to side with Business Europe’s position because that facilitated a more efficient EU Single
Market. The transnational capitalists argued that according to EU treaties, the EU Single
Market should operate as a unified liberal market without any policies that would harm the
efficiency of the free market. The Latvian government along with Latvian domestic interest
groups were not able to oppose transnational interest blocs because the proposition to keep
trade barriers intact would have been against the premise of a unified EU Single Market.
As a result, the EU representatives sided with transnational capitalists and rejected Latvia’s
position to keep the trade barriers in place upon accession to the EU.
Republic of Lithuania
Transnational capitalists also managed to attain their first policy preferences during
the accession negotiations with Lithuania. During the negotiations of the environmental
chapter, the transnational interest bloc under the leadership of Business Europe wanted the
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closure of Lithuania’s Ignalina Nuclear Plant. Business Europe wanted to achieve this in
order to pave the way for its members from the renewable energy sector to enter the
Lithuanian energy market. The transnational interest bloc was led by Danish and Finnish
renewable

energy

companies

whose

first

preference

outcome

entailed

the

decommissioning of the Lithuanian nuclear plant and its replacement with wind turbines.
With the absence of its own energy source, Lithuania would be dependent on the
Scandinavian firms’ supply of renewable energy which would grant the transnational
capitalists the ability to gain large profits as a result of higher energy prices than they would
be able to charge in a more competitive energy market. . The bloc was successful in
achieving its first preference because it was unified and had no opposing from other
transnational interest blocs. The renewable energy sector resembled a small industrial niche
in which only a small number of commercial entities competed. Since most of the
renewable energy companies were operating on a domestic level, the Scandinavian
transnational capitalists did not have any competition within their own interest bloc or from
other transnational interest blocs.
The successful achievement of their first policy preferences was also enabled by
the fact that the interests of transnational capitalists coincided with those of the EU. In
order to gain support of the EU, Business Europe representatives issued a position paper
on the Lithuanian nuclear plant and its dangers to the environment, detailing how the switch
to renewable energy would benefit the environmental sustainability within the EU. With
the EU being determined to make the union a more environmentally sustainable
organization for the coming generations, it enthusiastically agreed to the transnational
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interest blocs’ suggestion to decommission the Lithuanian nuclear plant and replace it with
foreign made renewable energy technology.
At the same time, the Lithuanian government and the interest group consisting of
employees working at the Ignalina Nuclear plant that were opposing the transnational
capitalists, were not able to counter such influence due to lack of financial and political
resources as well as absence of any domestic commercial interest groups that were willing
to oppose transnational capitalists in their quest to take over the Lithuanian energy market.
Once it became known that the EU wanted to decommission the Lithuanian nuclear plant
under the premise that its structure did not meet the EU requirements, the Nuclear Society
of Lithuania, largely consisting of the plant’s employees, fundraised money to modernize
the plant but despite these efforts, were not able to enough capital for modernization and
thus failed to meet the EU requirements for its operation.
The transnational interest bloc managed to secure its first policy preferences
because it had a unified interest bloc with strong members that supported the agenda. Such
a unified structure was enhanced by Business Europe’s expertise and longstanding
relationships with the EU that allowed the bloc to sway the political actors into supporting
the bloc’s agenda. To effectively advance their preference, Business Europe partnered with
several Scandinavian clean energy companies to influence the EU to support its goals. The
transnational interest bloc grew when Business Europe persuaded the EU representatives,
that the bloc’s goal enhanced the EU’s environmental standards, to gain the final support
the bloc needed to achieve its goal.
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The transnational interest bloc under the leadership of ERT, on the other hand,
managed to achieve their first preference in negotiations regarding the taxation of
commercial transportation. For the past couple of decades, German nationals had expressed
a strong interest in visiting CEE states and Russia. Transnational capitalists saw this trend
as an opportunity to gain profits in the tourism industry. Since Lithuania played an
important role as a transit country between Western Europe and Russia, it wanted to have
as low transportation taxes as possible. Low taxes would minimize operation costs and
would facilitate a larger share of profits gained on an annual basis. The transnational
interest bloc led by ERT relied on their Lithuanian junior partners for a successful route to
Russia. At the same time, the Lithuanian tour companies relied on their senior partners
within the transnational interest bloc for additional revenue streams. As a result, the
Lithuanian junior partners together with ERT managed to persuade the Lithuanian
government and the EU representatives, respectively, that an increased tax on commercial
transportation through Lithuanian would cause a decline in tourism which would have a
negative economic effect on the country. The similarity of interests and the strong
relationship between transnational capitalists and their Lithuanian junior partners allowed
them to push their agenda onto political actors and ultimately achieve their first preference
during the transportation policy negotiations.

Republic of Estonia
During the Estonian negotiations, the transnational interest bloc managed to secure
its first preference during the discussion of corporate taxation. The transnational interest
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bloc under the leadership of Business Europe wanted to minimize corporate taxes for
domestic and foreign corporate entities to foster the productiveness of its members within
the Estonian market. Since transnational capitalists wanted to expand into the CEE markets
to extract more profit, having low corporate tax rates in comparison to the rest of the EU
would greatly enhance the profit margins of foreign corporate entities. To achieve its goal,
Business Europe extended its membership to the Estonian Employers’ Association in
exchange for its assistance in achieving transnational capitalists’ goals. To further
strengthen its bloc, Business Europe attracted the members of the Estonian Consultative
Committee that was assisting the Estonian government with the accession negotiations.
Given that the members of the Committee are corporate actors such as Toomas Luman, the
chairman of the Estonian construction company, Nordecon AS, they also shared the same
goal as the transnational interest bloc, which resulted in a much stronger partnership than
initially expected. It was precisely this factor that allowed the transnational interest bloc to
achieve its first preference. The cross-border economic and political integration between
Western European and Eastern European commercial actors contributed to a strong and
unified lobbying vehicle which overwhelmed the Estonian government and consequently
resulted in a complete policy victory for the transnational interest bloc at the expense of
the local government and commercial entities. The Estonian government, on the other
hand, was not able to mount an effective protest to such lobbying because it did not have
any corporate allies or resources to oppose the more powerful transnational capitalists.
The transnational interest bloc under the leadership of ERT also managed to secure
its first preference during the negotiations over the two Estonian nuclear plants. The
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transnational interest bloc led by a German energy company which was part of the ERT
wanted to acquire the two plants to expand its presence in the Baltic energy market. While
the bloc did not manage to partner with Estonian domestic interest groups as most of them
were opposed to the sale of the plants, the transnational capitalists managed to secure its
agenda because it succeeded in persuading the Estonian government and the EU that the
two plants would be more environmentally sustainable under the new ownership which
had more resources than the Estonian entities. The ERT influenced the EU to pressure the
Estonian government to sell the plants because they allegedly did not comply with the EU
energy standards. After receiving so much pressure from the EU as well as the transnational
capitalists, the Estonian government decided to let the foreign entities acquire the two
Estonian energy plants despite the opposition from Estonian domestic interest groups. At
the end of the negotiations, the transnational interest bloc managed to achieve its first
preference outcome due to the strong connection it had with the EU.
Republic of Poland
Transnational interest blocs also had some success during the accession negotiation
with Poland. In particular, the transnational interest blocs under the leadership of ERT
managed to secure its first preference during the Movement of Goods chapter negotiations.
Given that the chapter touched upon the regulations within the pharmaceutical market, the
ERT representatives wanted to make sure that the EU pharmaceutical patent laws were
operational in Poland which would protect the ERT’s members. The ERT representatives
used their commercial expertise to persuade the EU to enact transition periods during which
the transitional pharmaceutical company, Glaxo Wellcome, was able to operate in the
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Polish market without restrictions. At the same time, the Polish companies were not able
to operate in the EU Single Market in order not to protect the patents of the large-scale
transnational capitalists. Apart from the alliance with the EU actors, the transnational
capitalists managed to attract Polish junior partners that had enough domestic market
presence not only to assist foreign entities entering the Polish market easier, but also to
counter opposition from Polish domestic groups. At the end, the ERT managed to achieve
their first policy preferences due to extensive connections with the EU political actors and
the strong Polish junior partners that had enough resources to productively assist
transnational capitalists by countering the opposition of Polish domestic interest groups.
Cases where transnational capitalists secured second-best preferences
Republic of Latvia
While transnational interest blocs managed to successfully achieve their first
preferences in many policy areas, they were not able to reach their preferred outcomes in
all the negotiating chapters. In several cases, transnational interest blocs had to settle for
second best outcomes either in the short-term or permanently. In each case, the inhibiting
factors varied from restrictive EU legislation to strong interest group opposition.
In the case of Latvian negotiations, the transnational interest bloc under the
leadership of ERT managed to only secure a second-best outcome during the competition
policy discussions. Initially, ERT’s first preference was to eliminate state aid to Latvian
companies. However, it was not able to achieve the first preference because it clashed with
the EU preferences and regulations. The EU representatives were skeptical that immediate
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state aid elimination would yield a more efficient economy in Latvia. As a result, ERT was
forced to settle for a suboptimal outcome of having a transition period before the first
preference conditions could be achieved. In this specific case, transnational capitalists
could not achieve their goal not because they lacked junior partners in Latvia or any
financial resources to pursue their agenda, but rather because their agenda did not comply
with the norms of the EU.
The EU believed that state aid elimination would cause immense economic
hardship for Latvian commercial actors and would compromise the efficiency of the Single
Market. In the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the State Aid control policy does not prohibit state
aid that is used to improve business conditions across all companies within a sector to
ensure an “open, fair and level Single Market”.229 As long as state aid is not implemented
to bolster already powerful domestic companies with the goal of disrupting the trade
patterns among EU member states, the EU cannot prohibit such use of national funds.
Consequently, the EU adjugated a transition period until 2009, during which the Latvian
government should steadily decrease state aid to local commercial entities. While this
outcome was not perfect for transnational capitalists, the small transition period did not
pose large costs, therefore ERT was able to fully withstand the derogation period. In this
case, ERT did not manage to get their first choice because their goal interfered with the
EU’s Single Market efficiency criteria. The EU, despite pressure from transnational capital,
decided to go with its own policy and to reject the demands of these non-state actors.
The transnational interest bloc under the leadership of Business Europe, at the same
time, also managed to only secure their second-best policy preference during the Latvian
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deposit scheme and investment compensations schedule negotiations. Business Europe’s
first preference was to immediately implement a guaranteed compensation system through
which foreign investor’s capital will be safeguarded against improper use by local
government or non-state entities and any earned interest would be delivered in an efficient
manner. Business Europe attracted a Latvian junior partner, the Latvian Employers’
Association, to help them achieve this goal, citing benefits to the EU Single Market upon
achieving such a goal. At the same, the Latvian government and the EU were in opposition
to the transnational interest bloc’s agenda because it did not believe that the bloc’s agenda
would be beneficial for the Latvian economy in the short term. Transnational capitalists
proved unable to sway EU representatives to adopt their first policy preference.
However, Business Europe’s position paper that analyzed the benefits of a welldeveloped investor compensation scheme was able to persuade the EU to implement a
gradual implementation of the transnational capitalist’s preferred investor compensation
policy over a period of years. Business Europe‘s junior Latvian partner, the Latvian
Employers’ Association, assisted the leaders of the transnational interest bloc in achieving
the gradual implementation of the scheme, by convincing the EU that the investor
compensation scheme must be implemented at least in a gradual method between 2004 and
2007 so that foreign investors are more inclined to invest in Latvia. The Latvian junior
partner supported such a notion because that would create jobs for local workers and
establish partnerships with local Latvian commercial entities which would result in a winwin experience. While inability of attracting political actors into its bloc to support the
immediate implementation of investor schemes hindered Business Europe’s ability to
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achieve its first preference outcome, the strong relationships with junior partners as well as
the technical expertise enabled Business Europe to persuade the EU to gradually adopt its
second best policy preference which entailed only a waiting period of several years as
opposed to a complete loss within this policy area.
Republic of Lithuania
During the Lithuanian accession negotiations, the transnational capitalists also did
not always manage to secure their first preferences. Within the negotiations over the
agricultural policies, the transnational interest bloc under the leadership of Business Europe
wanted to eliminate state aid to farmers and be able to acquire Lithuanian land immediately
upon accession. In order to achieve this goal, Business Europe attracted political actors
within the EU into its interest bloc, claiming that elimination of aid would ensure fair
competition among EU farmers within the EU Single Market. While the EU was supportive
of this policy, the Lithuanian agricultural interest groups together with the Lithuanian
public pushed back against the EU and the transnational capitalists. The opposition showed
its strength by stating an ultimatum that it would not join the EU unless a 7-year transition
period for the purchases of land was implemented. Similarly, the Lithuanian agricultural
groups stated that until it could benefit from Common Agricultural Policy funds to the
same degree as existing EU members could upon their accession to the EU, the Lithuanian
government should be able to provide aid to the farmers. In the eyes of the transnational
interest bloc and the EU, even though the ultimatum brought short-term costs, it was
necessary to accept it in order to gain long- term benefits of Lithuania’s accession. The
ultimatum that came from the strong Lithuanian interest groups forced the transnational
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interest bloc to forego its first preference outcome and accept a suboptimal outcome where
the transnational capitalists would reach their agenda only after a 7-year transition period.
In terms of financial regulation, the transnational capitalists did not manage to
secure their first preferences either. Similar to the Latvian negotiations, Business Europe
wanted to implement viable Bank Deposit and Investor Compensation Schemes, that
would insure foreign capital against any unforeseen loss or devaluation upon the accession
to the EU because that would attract a lot of FDI from its members. From the perspective
of Lithuanian state actors and EU officials, such a drastic increase in financial obligations
would cause immense pressure on the Lithuanian economy. Before the EU accession, the
Lithuanian financial regulations did not contain policies that would insure foreign entities’
assets against potential loss and devaluation which would have made it much easier to
establish and operate a foreign financial institution in Lithuania. Bank Depositor and
Investor Compensation Schemes would require Lithuanian government and financial
institutions to maintain a certain amount of funds available to cover any unforeseen losses
foreign capitalists may encounter while investing their assets into Lithuanian markets.
Such immediate financial requirements were beyond the capabilities of Lithuanian
financial and political entities and if implemented immediately, could lead to a potential
economic downturn if the Lithuanian parties had been required to compensate foreign
entities of any major losses. Consequently, that could have led to existing EU members
being forced to redistribute more financial aid with the goal of stabilizing the economy. As
a result, the EU agreed to a five-year transition period during which Lithuanian banks
needed to implement a higher financial compensation scheme of at least 100,000.00 Euros
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per depositor that would partially suffice the needs of transnational capitalists. For Business
Europe, this was the second-best outcome which resulted in transnational interest bloc
members having to wait for their desired policy and to incur potential costs while doing so.
However, the large-cost margins enabled them to withstand such a transition period which
makes the policy outcome not a complete defeat. In case transnational capitalists lost
portions of their investment due to unforeseen circumstances, they would still stay solvent
as such investments represented a low fraction of their corporate revenues. The structural
market power manifested by having enough resources to cover such losses enables
transnational capitalists to tolerate this inadequate policy with hopes of gaining long-term
benefits that would offset the potential short-term risk of investment loss.
Republic of Estonia
During the Estonian negotiations, the transnational capitalists were able to secure
only their second-best preferences when it came to land acquisition. The transnational
interest bloc under the leadership of ERT initially wanted to have the ability to purchase
Estonian land immediately upon accession. The transnational capitalists, however,
encountered strong opposition from the Estonian domestic interest groups that did not want
foreigners to have access to Estonian natural resources in fear of commercial exploitation.
As several Estonian commercial entities were involved in the accession negotiations
through the Estonian Consultative Council, they had first-hand knowledge about the extent
of the negative effects that a transnational capitalist agenda would inflict on the Estonian
markets. The fact that some Estonian commercial actors were consulting the Estonian
government and knew the nuances of the negotiations, gave the members of the
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Consultative council the information to effectively organize their relatively limited
resources to mount a strategic opposition which had the best chance of successfully
defending their interests against those of transnational capitalists. The Estonian interest
groups were more eager to organize more effectively because they were especially
concerned about how the ability to acquire Estonian land by transnational capitalists would
affect the commercial well-being of their operations in the domestic market. They believed
that if foreign entities were able to buy local land without any restrictions, then local
businesses would not have the ability to set up their own operations, consequently that
would limit the development of the domestic commercial entities. The strength and level
of involvement of Estonian interest groups played a crucial role in preventing transnational
capitalists from securing their first preference outcome. The Estonian interest groups were
unified and resourceful enough to push back against foreign agenda because of their strong
market presence and ties to the Estonian government through the Consultative Council,
which enabled them to safeguard their commercial interests in the face of foreign influence.

Republic of Poland
Amidst the Polish negotiations, the members of transnational interest blocs were
not able to secure their first preference policy outcomes in the Real Estate and Land Sale
chapter. The Polish government managed to secure a 5-year transition period only after
which foreigners could purchase Polish land and real estate. The Polish public together
with the largest Polish agricultural interest groups managed to influence the Polish
government and the EU to implement a transition period which would safeguard the Polish
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land from a sudden buyout by foreigners for the purposes of reselling the land or utilizing
it for commercial development. The Polish domestic groups lobbied the Polish and the EU
political figures to have a derogation period by deploying the threat that the Polish public
would not vote for the accession into the EU in the mandatory post-negotiation referendum.
Under such demands, the EU agreed to such demands because the long-term benefits of
Poland’s membership outweighed the costs of the transition period for the EU political
actors. This outcome, however, was detrimental to transnational capitalists because it
delayed the process of expanding their market presence in Poland. At the same time, it was
not the worst outcome because transnational capital had large enough margin costs to wait
out this transition period in order to achieve their goal in the long term where the shortterm costs would be offset by future profits.
Apart from the ERT, the transnational interest bloc under the leadership of Business
Europe also did not manage to achieve its first preference policy outcome when the
Movement of Persons chapter was being negotiated amidst Polish accession negotiations.
A crucial factor that contributed to the failure to achieve the first preference outcome was
the internal division within Business Europe regarding the negotiation outcomes within
this chapter. The German and Austrian Business Europe members, the German and
Austrian Employers’ Associations, preferred that Polish workers would not be allowed to
work in existing EU countries upon accession. Existing labor contracts had German and
Austrian employers locked into relationships with local labor which prevented them from
taking advantage of the incoming low-cost Polish labor. In order to deny their competitors
of such an opportunity to reduce labor costs, they wanted to block any law that would allow
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Polish labor to work in existing EU states upon accession. In order to achieve this goal,
Business Europe sought out support from other existing Business Europe members to
support their Austrian and German colleagues as well as inviting the Polish Confederation
of Employers to join Business Europe.
At the same time, the Dutch members of Business Europe did not want the
transition period because they wanted to take the advantage of the cheaper labor to lower
their labor costs immediately upon accession, a position which clashed with the policy
preferences of the German and Austrian members of the bloc.
In order to mitigate such discrepancies in policy preferences within Business
Europe, Business Europe managed to successfully negotiate a policy that would have a
mandatory transition period of five years before Polish labor could be used, which all
transnational interest bloc members had to abide by. After the mandatory period,
transnational interest bloc members could choose if they wanted to keep the derogation or
not. Business Europe managed to accomplish this policy with such a clause within the EU
negotiations because of its strong relationships with EU political actors that were cultivated
over the years of bringing them technical advice and commercial expertise when it came
to discussing business related policies. Even though the final policy outcome did not reflect
the first preferences of either group of business interests within Business Europe, it
represented the second-best outcome for both business groups, whereby Polish labor was
still not able to work in the short term while it was a possibility in the long term. The longstanding relationship with the EU as well as strong members of the transnational interest
bloc enabled transnational capitalists to secure a second-best preference outcome.
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The German and Austrian members did not achieve a longstanding ban on Polish
labor but only a short-term one with optional extensions. At the same time British and
Swedish members achieved an outcome where they could potentially abandon the ban on
Polish labor after the mandatory ban expires. Such an outcome partially satisfied both
camps with either side not being able to fully achieve their first-order preference. While
the Polish government along with major Polish domestic groups were in a unified
opposition to transnational capitalists, they were not able to achieve their preferred
outcome because they did not have enough resources and extensive domestic partners who
were assisting Polish actors in their defense of Polish labor.
Lastly, during the negotiations of the agricultural chapter, the transnational
capitalists failed in securing their first preferences. The transnational interest bloc under
the leadership of Business Europe wanted to eliminate the CAP financial aid allocation to
Polish farmers and the protectionist measures that Poland placed against existing EU
member states. Business Europe pushed for such a policy because it knew that the
requested CAP financial aid would be redistributed from existing EU member states
towards Poland which would negatively affect the members of the transnational interest
bloc who are part of the agricultural sector. The redistributed financial aid would improve
the Polish agricultural sector and the quality of its products which would create more
competition for the transnational capitalists. At the same time, the Polish protectionist
policies prevented transnational capitalists from entering and expanding in the Polish
agricultural market which once again hurt transnational capitalists.
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The largest Polish agricultural interest group, Kółka Rolnicze, protested such a
policy claiming that it deprives Polish farmers of the same financial aid that existing EU
member states received upon the entry to the EU and that refusal of such aid
disproportionally affects the competitiveness of Polish farmers in the EU Single Market,
violating the norms of the EU. The Polish interest groups and the public put forward an
ultimatum stating that they won’t vote for the accession to the EU if Polish farmers did not
receive at least a portion of the intended CAP aid upon accession. The Polish opposition
was effective because the costs of Poland not joining the EU after the negotiation were
much greater for the EU and the transnational capitalists than the costs associated with
accepting the Polish demands.
The costs and inconvenience of the redistributed CAP aid towards Poland affected
the transnational capitalists only to a small extent. Their large cost margins allowed
transnational capitalists to withstand such a policy because the overall profit rates from
existing EU market and the future Polish market would offset the costs associated with the
Polish demands. Business Europe, however, published a position paper suggesting
removing the trade barriers in order to facilitate intra EU trade. The EU representatives
trusted Business Europe’s technical and commercial acumen, which consequently led to
the removal of Polish trade barrier. At the risk of Poland not acceding to the EU even after
the negotiations were done, the EU agreed to their demands and introduced a schedule of
progressive CAP payments but also it required Poland to abandon its trade barrier policies
because they impeded the notion of an efficient EU Single Market. The transnational
interest bloc managed to persuade the EU to make such policy recommendations because
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of its strong and long-lasting relationships with the EU representatives. As a result,
transnational capital was able to achieve part of their first policy preferences with the
removal of Polish agricultural trade barriers.
Conclusion
The above summaries of negotiation outcomes have shown that transnational
capitalists had managed to secure favorable outcomes across most policy areas.
Transnational interest bloc members had the most success in negotiation areas that
concerned the cost of foreign direct investment and market opportunities that would
increase the profitability of such investments. When negotiations touched upon taxation of
capital flows as well as corporate profits, the most important factor that contributed to the
achievement of first policy preferences was the strength interest bloc coalitions that
transnational capitalists had built. In particular, ERT and Business Europe leaders worked
to cultivate long-lasting and unified partnerships not only with CEE business actors but
also with CEE and EU political actors that would assist with the achievement of policy
outcomes that would support the transnational capitalists’ agenda.
Apart from the quality and degree of relationships that formed various transnational
interest blocs, several economic, political and historical factors enabled transnational
capitalists to achieve their first preference outcomes. When it came to negotiations
regarding financial flows, investment costs and profits, the fact that the Baltic States and
Poland elected right-wing parties that pursued neoliberal policies right after the collapse of
the socialist bloc, gave foreign corporate entities an immense advantage. Infused with the
promised benefits of a deregulated market economy, many CEE political actors agreed to
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soften their negotiation positions in chapters that concerned foreign investment flows,
consequently making it easier for transnational capitalists to achieve their agenda.
In addition to political factors, the macroeconomic factors manifested by high
unemployment and decreased power of labor unions, made several CEE corporate actors
succumb to the demands of transnational capitalists in exchange for better economic
conditions that would supposedly result from the incoming investment. The prevalence of
neoliberal policies combined with the economic crisis of the 1990s left CEE nations in dire
economic circumstances. Large numbers of unskilled and highly skilled labor were eager
to work even under sub-par labor conditions and compensation. As a result, transnational
capitalists were able to push their agenda on CEE domestic interest groups and government
officials without much opposition during the accession negotiations.
While transnational interest blocs managed to achieve their first preference in many
negotiation cases, they had to accept second-best policy preferences in some
circumstances. In negotiation chapters that indirectly and directly touched upon the wellbeing of CEE nationals, such as agricultural subsidies, acquisition of natural resources by
foreign nationals, and free movement of persons, transnational capitalists had to settle for
second best policy outcomes due to several internal and external factors.
In chapters that concerned the decrease of subsidies towards CEE business and
labor force, transnational capitalists could not achieve their first preference because of two
main factors. First of all, CEE public opinion and domestic interest groups, especially in
the agricultural sector, mounted a strong and extensive opposition towards transnational
capitalists which inevitably forced CEE and the EU political actors to deny transnational
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capitalists their first policy preference as it could have caused CEE nations not to vote for
the accession to the EU after the end of the negotiations. The above research suggests that
despite the large financial and political resources that transnational interest blocs possess,
smaller domestic interest groups and the public may still mount a successful opposition in
specific issue areas assuming they act in a coordinated manner. If an issue area, such as
free movement of persons, directly touched upon the well-being of a wide cross-section of
society that can unify, then effective mobilization around that issue is more likely. While
CEE domestic interest groups and the public did not have large financial and political
resources and connections within the CEE and the EU regions, their persistence and unity
could persuade their own governme1nts to protest policies that negatively affected the
welfare of their citizens.
Once all the accession negotiations were concluded, the CEE states had to have a
referendum in which the CEE public cast the final vote on whether they wanted to join the
EU or not. If no concessions were given by transnational capitalists in areas that aroused
strong public opposition, CEE nationals were in a better position to threaten not to vote for
the accession agreement in the final referendum. The dreaded scenario of CEE members
not joining the EU as a result of public vote, concerned both the EU and transnational
capitalists, forcing them to concede several of their first policy preferences in favor of
second-best policy outcomes. The structural market power in the form of larger cost
margins allowed transnational capitalists to withstand the shortcomings of the less-ideal
outcomes in the short term and use their power to improve their situation yet in the long
run.
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Secondly, on other occasions members of transnational interest blocs were not able
to achieve their first preference because there were internal divisions within the ranks of
transnational interest blocs. As a result, the leaders of transnational interest blocs had to
mediate conflicts among their members. During negotiations on the movement of labor,
the German and Austrian members of a transnational interest bloc wanted to block CEE
labor from entering the EU labor market while the British and Swedish transnational
capitalists within the same bloc desired an open labor policy which would have allowed
them to save operating costs by employing cheaper labor. In order to appease everyone
within the same bloc, a mandatory transition period was negotiated before member states
could have the option of employing Polish workers.
The third factor which played a lesser role in the achievement of second-best policy
was the fact that some policy outcomes simply did not coincide with the norms of the EU
treaties. During the negotiations where transnational capitalists wanted to completely
eliminate state aid to CEE farmers and implement investor compensation schemes which
would inflict extreme economic stress on the CEE economies and its nationals, the EU did
not support such policies because they went against the provisions of the founding EU
treaties. The EU was founded on the premise that its policies should not suddenly and
drastically decrease the well-being of its nationals because that would put the regional
organization in a bad light in the international arena. To that end, despite various lobbying
attempts of transnational capitalists, EU representatives did not accept their first preference
policy suggestions during the negotiations.

186

After the 2004 EU accession, the transnational capitalists had the momentum to
increase their dominance within CEE. However, the 2008 economic recession inflicted
drastic damage to the CEE states which undoubtedly affected the prospects of transnational
capitalists. In the final chapter, I will assess the current state of the relationship between
transnational capitalist interest blocs and the CEE in the context of recent international
crises and shifting political, social, and institutional circumstances.
Chapter 6. Post-Script
Transnational interest blocs led by corporate political organizations in Western
Europe have used their political and economic power to support economic liberalization,
extensive privatization, and integration in Eastern Europe through the EU-Eastern Europe
accession agreements. Regional corporate networks such as the ERT and Business Europe
have cultivated alliances with EU political actors and CEE junior partners to advance the
agenda of dominant European corporations. As shown in the previous chapters, the leaders
of transnational interest blocs used the EU expansion into the CEE to implement policies
that fostered a favorable investment environment manifested by low corporate taxes,
flexible labor policies and high rates of profit repatriation. As a result, transnational capital
has become more deeply embedded in the political economy of Eastern Europe, as this
final chapter will highlight by focusing on the aggregate macro-economic trends in the
region since the EU accession agreement was ratified in 2004.
The socio-economic environment of the analyzed case studies serves us as a
platform to assess how the achievement of first preference and even second-best policy
outcomes have benefited transnational capital at the expense of CEE nations. The practical

187

implications of transnational interest bloc influence on the accession negotiations can be
seen in the changing patterns of FDI inflow into our case study countries as well as the
changes in CEE corporate income tax rates, labor compensation and the rates of profit
repatriation and re-investment.
Corporate Income Tax
Transnational capitalists were heavily invested in making sure that the corporate
tax rates in the Baltic States and Poland were as low as possible because it affected their
ability to extract as much profit as possible from their operations in these countries. The
efforts by transnational capitalists to minimize the corporate tax rates in Eastern Europe
can be noticed in late 1990s when the EU and the prospective member states were
beginning to plan the accession negotiations. The transnational interest bloc under the
leadership of ERT wanted to harmonize the CEE corporate tax rate with those in existing
EU member states. ERT first started advocating for lowering of corporate taxes in 1997,
when it promoted the development of the EU Single Market into a more integrated
economic system which would help European transnational corporations reclaim their
competitiveness in the global trade arena. To achieve that, ERT wanted to minimize
corporate taxes in existing and prospective EU member states as much as possible as it
would foster more profit for their business. The demands to minimize corporate taxation
across the EU were first seen in the Single Market Action Plan which was adopted by the
EU Council in Amsterdam in 1997 and has since operated as a prerequisite for all EU
member states that wish to join the EU and EU Sigle Market. The suggestions to minimize
and harmonize corporate taxes across the EU were shared by the ERT Secretary-General
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Keith Richardson with the EU Commission in February 1997, three months before the
Amsterdam Summit. After the meeting with the EU Commission members, Richardson
was confident that ERT’s initiative would be implemented in the upcoming Amsterdam
Summit.230
The effects of ERT’s lobbying regarding changes in corporate taxation in can be
seen during the accession negotiations. Before the accession negotiations, Latvia had its
corporate tax rate at 24%, while the rate was 18% in Lithuania. Estonia and Poland had
their corporate tax rates at 26% and 27%, respectively, before the accession. 231
After the Baltic States and Poland joined the EU in 2004, the corporate tax rates in
Latvia and Lithuania rapidly decreased from their pre-accession rates to 15% in both states.
This change in the taxation rates coincides with the transnational capitalists’ efforts to
minimize the tax burden on their investments and subsequent profits. This quick and rapid
decrease in the tax rate symbolizes the success of the transnational capitalists’ lobbying
during the accession negotiations.232
At the same time, the corporate tax rate in Estonia decreased in a more gradual way,
from staying 26% upon accession in 2004, to finally dropping to 21% in 2008. Similarly,
the Polish corporate tax rate was kept at 27% between 2004 and 2005, but in 2006, the
corporate tax rate was rapidly decreased to 19% where it stayed until 2018. While the
corporate tax rates have decreased since both CEE states joined the EU, their decrease was
much more gradual than in Lithuania and Latvia. 233
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Foreign Direct Investment
Transnational interest blocs were also influential in advancing policies that favored
an accelerated flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Eastern Europe. The inflow of
FDI enabled transnational capital to expand their global value chains by adding new
production platforms in the CEE region, which lowered overall production costs and
enhanced profits from the segmentation of production across state borders. By becoming
integrated into the global value chains, the CEE nations have not been able to grow their
economies because of the inability to retain the benefits from generating value within the
global value chains. This is because transnational capitalists repatriate a substantial portion
of the generated profits back to their home country.
Per figure 1, when analyzing the data on the inflow and outflow of FDI in the Baltic
States and Poland, it is evident that the FDI flows have increased by about 36% on average
in our cases studies between 2004 and 2008 with most FDI going into financial, real estate
and retail sectors in the Baltics, while Poland has been a destination for manufacturing FDI.
When the Baltic States and Poland joined the EU in May of 2004, the inflow of FDI almost
doubled in Latvia while Lithuania and Poland received more than the double amount of
FDI they received in 2003. Estonia managed to only attract a slightly smaller amount of
776 million Euros right after the 2004 accession as opposed to 882 million Euros in 2003.
Between 2006 and 2008, however, the Baltic States and Poland received individually more
than 1 billion Euros in FDI while during the economic recession (2008-2011), the FDI
inflow in the Baltic States fell to pre-accession levels while it maintained high levels in
Poland. Since 2011, the Baltic States have been struggling to attract FDI inflow while
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Poland has managed to keep attracting over 10 billion Euros on an annual basis over the
past decade.234
Figure 1. FDI inflow in CEE, EUR million
Country/Year

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Poland

10334

6372

4371

4067

10292

7703

11093

Estonia

425

603

307

822

776

2349

1282

Latvia

447

147

269

270

513

582

1303

Lithuania

412

499

772

160

623

826

1426

One of the possible reasons why Estonia did not manage to receive as much FDI
inflow is because the Estonian interest groups managed to implement a transition period
during which foreign investors could not acquire Estonian land and real estate. Given that
the spike in FDI in the Baltics has been mostly fostered by increased rates of land and real
estate privatization by foreigners, it is unsurprising that foreign investors did not move a
lot of capital in the first few years after the accession. The consequent economic crisis has
hindered profitability rates in Estonia as well as in the other Baltic States which has led the
three countries to suffer economically due to decreased inflow of FDI.
In Poland, at the same time, the FDI inflow did not decrease drastically, mostly
because it was directed towards the manufacturing sector such as machinery building
which was embedded into the global value chains. Once manufactured in Poland, the
products would be exported to Western Europe for final assembly and sales.
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Repatriation and Reinvestment of FDI profits
FDI capital generates profits for transnational capitalists who either repatriate the
income to their home country or reinvest it in the FDI host country. The degree to which
transnational capitalists can repatriate their FDI profits is determined by two aspects.
The first aspect is the provision within the framework of the Treaty of Maastricht
that declared free movement of capital and payments as one of the core EU Single Market
freedoms. During the late 20th century, the most powerful transnational capitalists wanted
to establish a unified European single market that would allow capital to flow within the
EU without any barriers to trade and investment opportunities. To that end, ERT members
advocated for policies that would lead to the adoption of the European Single Market
through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Under the provisions of the treaty, EU member
states are not allowed to implement any kind of capital controls on all financial flows
among the EU members, except for cases where financial flows can negatively affect
public safety. The prohibition of capital controls shows the EU commitment to
neoliberalism which prioritizes the preferences of transnational capitalists to repatriate or
re-invest as much of the FDI generated profits as they see fit. With the help of abandonment
of capital controls and establishment of unified EU industrial policies, the abandonment of
capital controls aided the growth of intra-firm trade within the EU as well as contributed
to the EU’s expansion into CEE where transnational capitalists could take advantage of
cheap labor and weak commercial regulation, all of which is part of the restructuring of
global capitalism.235
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The second aspect that determined the extent of repatriated or re-invested FDI
profits is whether transnational capitalists saw the initial FDI as means of cutting operating
costs within the global value chains or as means to generate profit that would justify further
re-investment of profits. Transnational capitalists that relied on global market for their
profits, utilized the EU Single Market and the expansion into the Baltics and Poland as an
opportunity to cut their production costs. By using the Baltic States and Poland to establish
low-cost production networks as part of their global value chains, they effectively
decreased their operating costs which resulted in higher profit margins. Transnational
companies that utilized the Baltics and Poland for intermediary goods and services
production, exported the value added goods and services as well the generated profit
margins back to their headquarter country where the intermediary goods and services can
serve to create the final product. The generated profit from the Baltics and Poland is
distributed among shareholders or invested in the headquarter country for further
enhancement of their market power.
On the other hand, if a transnational parent company invested in the Baltic States
or Poland to simply generate FDI profit, then it could decide to re-invest the generated FDI
profits into the Baltic States and Poland if those markets promised long- term profit
generating capabilities. Transnational companies that specialized in producing goods or
services for the CEE markets, would be more likely focused on profit generation as
opposed to cutting production costs within a global value chain. As a result, if FDI inflow
into the CEE helped generate profits through the sale of a finished good or product in the
Baltics and Poland, and there was potential for long-term profit generation in these markets,
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then such transnational capitalists would be more inclined to re-invest their short- term FDI
profits with hopes of generating more profit in the future.
When the Baltic States and Poland joined the EU in 2004, they were required to
abandon any capital controls that were placed on incoming and outgoing financial flows.
Such EU norms constrained the CEE states in having any authority on the nature, quantity,
and direction of FDI. Given that the Baltic States and Poland had recently transformed their
political and economic systems into democratic countries with liberal market economies,
the local political and economic elites wanted to make sure that any foreign financial flows
would not disrupt their countries. While CEE states realized the importance and possible
benefits of FDI towards their economies, they wanted to make sure that it would not exploit
their labor laws or business practices as compared to those in the rest of the EU. The
requirements to abandon any capital controls, however, denied Baltic and Polish entities
the ability to safeguard their economies and citizens from the potential perils of
transnational capitalists’ financial flows and agenda goals.
When looking at the data on FDI profit repatriation and reinvestment, FDI profit
trends have gradually shifted from being reinvested back into the Baltic States and Poland,
to being repatriated back to Western Europe. Before the Baltic States and Poland joined
the EU in 2004, the CEE states had stricter capital controls in the form of higher taxation
of FDI profit that left the FDI host country. The higher capital controls made it less
beneficial to repatriate the FDI -related profits because the high tax rates would require
transnational capitalists to leave a portion of the outgoing FDI flow in the country where
the FDI profit was generated. Consequently, transnational capitalists tended to keep the
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FDI profits in CEE and re-invest them locally to expand their operations even more and
gain even more long-term profit from their investment location.
The repatriated profit rates, however, have increased from around 60% of the total
annual profits before the EU accession negotiations started, to an average of 85% between
2004 and 2013. From 2004 until 2007 the FDI profit repatriation rates were around 45%,
much lower than we would expect given that relaxed capital control allowed transnational
corporations to repatriate much higher profit portions without high costs. This can be
explained by the notion that during the first few years of accession, the economies of the
Baltic States and Poland were growing due to access to credit amidst FDI booms that
fostered a lot of local aggregate demand. Transnational capitalists saw this trend as
opportunity to expand its operations even more to gain more profit in later years. Thus,
transnational capitalists may have decided to reinvest more of their profits to fuel the
expansion of their activities, instead of repatriating them to gain a short-term advantage. 236
The FDI profit repatriation trend increased even more in 2008 when the economic
recession collapsed. In CEE economies, the share of the repatriated profit increased from
around 45% in pre-crisis years to around 85% between 2008-2013, with 90% of profits
repatriated in 2008-2009. The sharp increase in the share of repatriated profits happened
because transnational capitalists believed that the CEE region was not a stable source of
investment and profit generation during the recession. As a result, transnational capitalists
started to repatriate most of their FDI profits since 2008 because they feared that if they reinvested their profits in CEE, they would not gain any profit or even lose their money due
to poor economic growth. Repatriation of most of the profits guaranteed the economic
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safety of transnational capitalists and their headquarter countries, as Western European
countries were weathering the economic recession much better. 237
In the years after the recession, the FDI profit repatriation rates remained high. The
FDI profit repatriation after the recession have remained above 85%. The FDI profits are
repatriated abroad because of economic stagnation in CEE which discourages long-term
reinvestment of profits. Instead of attempting to improve the economic conditions of the
Baltic States and Poland with the help of investment, transnational capitalists have
advocated for the implementation of austerity policies during the economic recession, to
improve the national account balance to the point where future foreign investment is
possible. Transnational capitalists convinced the EU and the CEE political actors that
cutting public costs and the welfare state is the only viable way to improve their national
economies and provide a sustainable investment environment for foreign investors. 238
Changes in Labor Conditions
For transnational capitalists to continue receiving FDI profit, the investment costs must
be kept smaller compared to the incoming revenue streams. The decrease in corporate tax
rates and absence of capital controls have helped transnational capitalists increase their FDI
profit rates by minimizing the costs associated with investing in the Baltic States and
Poland. Another significant cost factor for transnational capitalists that affected their
operations and FDI profit rates are labor costs.
When the Baltic States and Poland joined the EU in 2004, the CEE economies were
growing because of large FDI inflows as well as increased private and commercial loans.
The financialized growth of the early post-accession years coincided with growing
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employment and wages of the local labor. Between 2004 and 2009, the wages in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania increased by 14%, 16% and 4% respectively, while in Poland, the
level of labor compensation increased by 9%. The average increase in wages in the Baltic
States and Poland, however, was marginal comparing to the amount of profit per wage that
transnational capitalists were able to gain since the accession. The amount of profit per
wage ratio can be obtained by looking at gross operating surplus (profit) per compensation
of employees (wages). When looking at the data provided by Eurostat, the average profit
per wage ratio was around 115% between 2004 and 2008 in CEE. The ratio of 115%
indicates that for each 1$ spent in wages, transnational capitalists gained 1.15$ in profit. 239
The disproportionate ratio of FDI profit going to transnational capitalists as
opposed to labor is a product of CEE labor bargaining power that has been decreasing since
the 1990s when the EU expansion to CEE had been widely discussed among EU and CEE
political representatives as well as the ERT. The transnational interest bloc under the
leadership of ERT began its influence on the CEE labor markets in 1993, when the initial
accession process had started. In ERT’s position paper Beating The Crisis, the transnational
capitalists called for socio-economic restructuring policies in CEE that would lead to
greater innovation rates which would consequently improve EU’s competitiveness in the
world trade arena. The paper advocated for the deregulation of CEE economies and
flexibility of CEE labor markets. Upon agreeing to such demands, the EU Commission
adopted such requirements in their 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and
Employment which was the main blueprint for CEE accession framework throughout the
accession negotiations.240
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Transnational capitalist blocs pushed for flexible labor policies in their reports to
the EU, before each inter-governmental conference, during which the Baltic States and
Poland’s accession was formally negotiated. In 1996, before the EU Summit in Florence,
the ERT advocated for a social pact between CEE states, labor and corporations that would
counter the increasingly uncompetitive CEE labor market. In this report, the transnational
capitalists proposed modernization of the CEE labor market legislation with the help of
changing flexibility of working hours and wage bargaining as well as greater flexibility in
labor mobility between companies. The transnational capitalists advocated for the ability
to prolong existing working shifts as well as establishment of night shifts that would
guarantee 24/7 operations for transnational capitalists. The flexibility in wage bargaining
enabled transnational capitalists to move from a sectoral level wage bargaining to a
company level bargaining where wage bargaining would occur on each individual worker’s
level. Finally, the flexibility in labor mobility echoed the transnational capitalists’ desire
to hire and terminate employees at their own will without paying any severance benefits
that were initially demanded by established CEE labor policies. 241
The transnational capitalists expanded their demands in the 1997, right before the
so-called EU “Job Summit” in Luxembourg. The leadership of ERT called for a reduction
in the role of the state in the CEE economies aspiring for EU membership. In particular,
the transnational capitalists wanted to see a retrenchment of the CEE welfare state, where
the previously state- sponsored social security programs would be minimized to encourage
individual responsibility in pension, healthcare, and unemployment systems. Such changes
in policies required CEE nationals to rely on private commercial entities to secure their
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retirement funds and to provide healthcare services as state- sponsored services would
become very limited. The calls for retrenchment of unemployment systems entailed a
decrease in the amount of monthly unemployment benefits as well as shortening of the
period during which unemployment benefits can be obtained from the state. 242
With the Baltic States and Poland aspiring to join the EU in 2004, the CEE states
were subject to adoption of the proposed changes in the socio-economic and labor policies
as a prerequisite to the accession to the EU and to the European Monetary Union. The
adoption of the above proposed structural changes left CEE labor with a weakened
bargaining power as the CEE governments could no longer provide protection to workers
and trade union leaders against liberal market forces and foreign commercial entities.
Changes were seen in trade union density and availability of viable job prospects. Upon
the 2004 accession, it became more difficult for CEE labor to form unions and to gain
secure employment because the labor policies would dictate flexible hiring practices that
both local and foreign companies would take advantage of.
The effects of transnational capitalist influence on wage changes were also seen
during the 2008 economic crisis. Between 2009 and 2012, the Baltic States and Poland
were drastically impacted by the recession which resulted in a sharp decrease in aggregate
GDP and wages that accompanied increasing unemployment in labor-intensive industries
such as retail, construction, and manufacturing. After lengthy discussions with the IMF,
EU and several foreign advisors, the CEE nations were urged to pursue the austerity
policies to minimize the mounting national deficit with the help of cutting government
expenses.
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The austerity program, dubbed “internal devaluation”, mainly focused on cutting
the national expenditure account by decreasing the employment and wage rates in the
public sector. Between 2009 and 2012, around 30% of public servants lost their
employment while remaining staff saw their wages gradually decrease by up to 20%. The
austerity program dictated limitation of several social programs including the
unemployment benefits policies that were already made more limited since the
accession.243
Apart from the diminished employment opportunities in the public sector, the
austerity program entailed several structural reforms that negatively impacted the social
aspects of CEE nations. In the health sector, around 50% of national hospitals, that were
predominantly placed in rural areas, were closed while some others were merged to
minimize operational costs. Similarly, within the educational sector, the number of
vocational and general education institutions were decreased on average by 10% with
educators seeing their wages decrease by up to 25% and their benefits, such as sick leave,
cut by up to 50%.244
In additional to cutting government expenses in the public sector, the most common
tax types were increased to supplement the national budget. The value added tax levied on
common goods and services, and the income tax were increased by about 3% while an
individual’s contribution to social security was increased by 2% due to the limitation of the
national retirement programs since the accession. 245
The above changes in the socioeconomic policies resulting from the austerity policy
had a profound impact on the social inequality across the Baltics and Poland. With the
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austerity policies targeting aspects of national economies that directly impact the economic
wellbeing of labor, the overall inequality trends had increased during the economic crisis.
The choice to pursue austerity policies as means to combat the economic crisis
forced labor to bear the consequence of the economic recession. The bargaining power that
has been slowly diminishing since the 1990s has put labor in a precarious position where
they did not have any means to politically protect themselves against their national
governments and transnational capitalists alike. The influence of transnational capitalists
was evident during the economic crisis, where members of transnational interest blocs
acted as policy advisers and advocated for the implementation of austerity policies as
opposed to the devaluation of the Baltic and Polish national policies which was another
means to alleviate the consequence of the crisis.
Transnational capitalists alongside the EU and IMF advocated for austerity
policies because that way the Baltic States and Poland could keep their exchange rates
fixed to the Euro and their capital control policies at bay, which was the requirement to
enter the European Monetary Union. By advocating for austerity policies, the transnational
capitalists secured a scenario where the Baltic States and Poland adopt the Euro without
any delays, which would eliminate any transaction costs associated with the repatriation of
profit from CEE into the headquarter countries of transnational capitalists. 246
Additionally, by the successful push for austerity policies, the transnational
capitalists prevented the Baltic States and Poland from the implementation of any capital
controls that would impede the FDI profit repatriation. During the crisis, the EU member
states hit the hardest advocated for the ability to impose stricter capital controls to prevent
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FDI capital flight. Such measures were necessary to limit the volatility of the affected
economies; however, they would restrict the transnational capitalists’ ability repatriate as
much FDI profit as possible. The EU together with IMF blocked the motion to restrict
capital flows citing that such measures violated the Treaty of Maastricht and will not be
allowed to be implemented by the CEE states.
The lack of ability to utilize capital controls, even during volatile market downturns
that have drastically affected CEE states, enabled transnational capitalists to repatriate their
profits the same way they did before the economic crisis. Given that the austerity policies
decreased wages and increased unemployment rates, the transnational capitalists were able
to repatriate even higher profit rates than before the crisis. The decreased wage levels
minimized operation costs which consequently increased the share of revenue that could
be turned into profit. As such, the profit per wage ratio had increased from the pre-crisis
level of 115% to 120% since 2009 when the austerity policies came into effect. The
recovered profit per wage ratio did not increase because of increased gross revenue, but
rather because of decreasing worker wages resulting from austerity policies. Because of
austerity measures and decreased worker wages, the increased profit rates have persuaded
transnational capitalists to keep their operations in the CEE; yet at the same time, the profit
rates have not been high enough to encourage much higher investments that would
contribute to economic growth in the Baltics and Poland.247
Conclusion
The rise of transnational interest blocs can be traced back to 1980s when the largest
European companies started facing increased competition from Asian and American
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commercial entities. In response to increased global competition, several European
transnational corporations created Europe-wide lobbying groups such as the European
Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) and Business Europe, that would eventually cultivate
relationships with high level EU political actors and government representatives of EU
member states, to advance their agenda. The establishment of such political and economic
coalitions eventually manifested itself in the establishment of a transnational interest bloc.
Transnational interest blocs include transnational corporations, national and regional
political actors as well as domestic corporate entities, all of whom work together to
influence trade and investment agreements that would further consolidate the power of
transnational capitalists within global value chains.
The effectiveness of European transnational interest blocs was examined during the
accession negotiations of EU’s 2004 enlargement round. The 2004 enlargement was seen
as an opportunity for Western and North European leading transnational corporations, to
expand their market power and improve their global competitiveness by incorporating the
CEE markets into their global value chains and cutting operations costs by using local low
cost but highly skilled labor. As analyzed in this work, the leading European transnational
interest blocs under the leadership of ERT an
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d Business Europe used their political and economic relationships to influence the
accession negotiations in a manner that would favor the operations of transnational interest
blocs’ members. When looking at the Baltic States’ and Poland’s accession negotiations,
the transnational interest blocs attempted to influence several legislative areas; however,
they especially focused on areas such as corporate taxation, freedom of capital flows, real
estate acquisition as well as flexibility of CEE labor policies, because these policy areas
directly influenced transnational capitalists’ operations in the countries.
Despite having extensive political and economic resources that sustained
transnational capitalists’ existing market power and enabled them to influence the
accession negotiations, the members of various transnational interest blocs were not able
to achieve their first preference outcomes in several policy areas. While the success of
transnational capitalists’ influence was mostly a result of having strong and cohesive ties
to their junior partners in the Eastern European countries as well as with high level EU
political actors, the foreign commercial entities encountered strong resistance from the
Baltic and Polish domestic interest groups in several policy areas which forced
transnational capitalists to settle for second-best policy preferences. The inability to unify
all members of the same transnational interest bloc or have policy disputes with competing
interest blocs also minimized the chances of transnational capitalists to achieve their
desired goals.
Even though transnational interest blocs under the leadership of ERT and Business
Europe faced obstacles in some negotiation areas, their influence on the Baltic States and
Poland’s accession negotiation yielded successful results. Upon accession to the EU in
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2004, the results of the lobbying efforts exerted by ERT and Business Europe since the
late 1980s manifested themselves in the form of lowered corporate tax rates, abandonment
of capital controls and establishment of flexible labor policies in the CEE states. The
changes in these policy areas enabled transnational capitalists to integrate the Baltic States
and Poland into their global value chains. The Baltic States and Poland served as a source
of new markets, cheap but highly qualified labor, and avenue for repatriated of profit into
the higher tiers of the global value chains. In exchange, the Baltic States and Poland were
stripped of many political, social, and economic rights that could have helped them more
technologically developed and more competitive not only in the EU Single Market but also
in the global economic realm.
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